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Abstract		Rowland	Kenney	was	a	British	propaganda	agent	operating	in	Norway	during	both	the	First	World	War	and	the	Second	World	War.	He	has	been	forgotten	by	history	but	the	re-discovery	of	his	private	collection	of	materials	allows	for	an	analysis	of	his	work.	Kenney	was	deeply	involved	in	the	development	of	propaganda	policy	and	practice.	In	the	First	World	War,	his	work	in	Norway	resulted	in	thousands	of	pro-British	articles	appearing	in	the	Norwegian	press	as	well	as	the	realignment	of	the	Norwegian	national	news	agency.	In	the	interwar	years,	in	spite	of	severe	medical	difficulties,	Kenney	continued	to	work	within	the	field	of	propaganda,	becoming	instrumental	in	the	establishment	of	the	British	Council.	At	the	start	of	the	Second	World	War,	he	returned	again	to	Norway,	but	was	forced	to	flee	during	the	German	invasion	of	April	1940.	During	the	Second	World	War,	Kenney	became	the	Director	of	the	Northern	Section	of	the	Foreign	Division	in	the	Ministry	of	Information	where	he	continued	to	affect	policy-creation	and	the	development	of	propaganda.	There	is	no	doubt	that	Kenney	was	a	key	figure	in	this	development.	His	professional	network	and	his	varied	roles	within	the	propaganda	bureaucracy	speak	to	his	level	of	involvement,	and	his	documented	accomplishments	even	more	so.	Finally	discovering	Kenney’s	story	and	his	impact	illustrates	vividly	a	few	aspects	of	how	the	practice	of	propaganda	mutated	and	changed	between	1916	and	1942.	
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I	was	always	embarrassed	by	the	words	sacred,	glorious,	and	
sacrifice	and	the	expression	in	vain.	We	had	heard	them,	
sometimes	standing	in	the	rain	almost	out	of	earshot,	so	that	only	
the	shouted	words	came	through,	and	had	read	them	on	
proclamations	that	were	slapped	up	by	billposters	over	other	
proclamations,	now	for	a	long	time,	and	I	had	seen	nothing	sacred,	
and	the	things	that	were	glorious	had	no	glory	and	the	sacrifices	
were	like	the	stock	yards	at	Chicago	if	nothing	was	done	with	the	
meat	except	to	bury	it.		―	Ernest	Hemingway,	A	Farewell	to	Arms				 	
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CHAPTER	I	
INTRODUCTION		 It	is	very	important	that	it	should	not	be	known	that	these	copies	have	come	into	my	possession…1		There	is	a	handwritten	list	with	the	heading	‘Interviews	1945-46’	in	the	collection	of	papers	belonging	to	the	principal	subject	of	this	thesis,	Rowland	Kenney.2	Its	cursive	lettering	is	wide;	the	pencil	it	was	written	with	was	stub,	the	lead	strokes	broad	and	grey.	Dates	run	down	the	right-hand	column,	appointments	set	in	stone	a	year	in	advance	for	some.	The	left	column	carries	names:	E.	Gerhardsen,	T.	Lie,	O.	Torp,	and	on.	It	is	a	remarkable	list.	In	1945,	Einar	Gerhardsen	was	the	Norwegian	Prime	Minister.	The	list	carries	his	name	and	the	names	of	members	of	his	cabinet:	the	Foreign	Minister,	the	Finance	Minister,	Minister	of	Education,	all	present.	The	spacious	cursive	is	unmistakeable	after	years	of	studying	it	on	the	back	of	postcards,	on	wafer-thin																																																									1	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Sir	Roderick	Jones.	28	May,	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	2.	2	Interviews	1945-46.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	It	is	worthwhile	at	this	early	stage	to	quickly	remark	on	the	fact	that	Rowland	Kenney’s	name	is	often	misspelled	in	letters	and	literature.	‘Rowland’	sometimes	becomes	‘Roland’,	and	Kenney	has	appeared	both	as	‘Kenny’	and	in	one	instance	‘Kennedy’.	This	can	sometimes	be	confusing.	
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copy-paper,	in	the	margins	of	some	secret	report.	It	is	nonetheless	arresting	to	see	it	here,	listing	these	names.	The	mind	is	drawn	to	Rowland	Kenney,	the	working-class	boy,	wandering	aimlessly	along	the	dirt	roads	of	Lancashire	looking	for	work,	not	a	half-century	earlier.	There	was	nothing	in	particular	about	this	boy	that	would	suggest	he	would	be	arranging	interviews	with	the	entire	political	elite	of	another	country.	There	was	nothing	to	hint	that	he	would	play	a	part	in	toppling	a	national	news	agency.	Indeed,	there	was	nothing	at	all	that	seemed	to	intimate	that	this	was	a	man	who	would	play	an	influential	role	in	the	development	of	international	propaganda.	And	yet,	against	all	odds,	he	did.		 The	(re-)	discovery	of	Rowland	Kenney’s	papers	(introduced	properly	below)	has	prompted	an	opportunity	to	investigate	the	practice	of	modern	state	propaganda	from	its	very	early	days	in	the	First	World	War,	through	the	interwar	years	and	into	the	Second	World	War.	This	was	a	time	of	massive	development	of	the	practice,	and	to	witness	the	course	of	this	development	through	the	eyes	of	a	pioneer	is	a	staggering	experience.	Kenney’s	many	roles	in	many	different	segments	of	the	British	propaganda	machinery	gives	an	unparalleled	insight	into	how	propaganda	was	run,	how	it	evolved	and	how	it	affected	the	relations	between	Norway	and	Britain	during	a	trying	period	of	modern	history.	What	is	perhaps	the	most	striking	aspect	of	the	story	is	that	the	man	himself	has	been	neglected	for	so	long,	in	spite	of	his	manifest	impact	on	history	and	on	international	relations.	This	thesis	aims	to	address	this	problem,	to	allow	Kenney	his	deserved	recognition,	but	mainly	to	display	in	what	way	and	to	what	extent	he	effected	the	development	of	propaganda.						
Purpose		It	is	important	to	be	absolutely	clear	about	the	purpose	of	this	thesis,	and	it	would	be	better	to	overstate	it	than	to	offer	some	chance	for	misunderstanding.	The	thesis	is	precisely	an	investigation	into	the	work	of	a	single	man,	Rowland	Kenney,	and	his	impact	on	the	development	of	modern	propaganda	between	
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1916	and	1942.	While	he	worked	within	a	range	of	institutions,	such	as	the	Ministry	of	Information,	the	Political	Intelligence	Department	and	the	British	Council,	the	arcs	of	these	are	not	the	point	of	the	thesis.	The	development,	in	total,	of	any	single	bureau,	method	or	branch	of	propaganda	is	not	what	this	paper	seeks	to	explain.	Neither	is	the	thesis	a	full	biography	of	Kenney,	nor	a	treatise	on	the	definition	of	propaganda	or	kinds	of	propaganda.	This	thesis	simply	seeks	to	examine	the	evolution	of	propaganda	principles	and	practices	through	the	work	of	one	forgotten	pioneer.		 Several	themes	and	stories	are	of	course	native	to	any	such	discussion.	In	order	to	capture	the	fullest	view	of	Kenney	and	the	evolution	of	propaganda,	certain	discussions	must	be	had.	These	include	a	conceptual	foray	into	what	propaganda	is	and	how	it	functions,	a	brief	discussion	of	the	structures	and	functions	and	timelines	of	a	number	of	propaganda	institutions,	as	well	as	a	detailed	account	of	the	most	relevant	periods	of	Kenney’s	life.	Propaganda	as	a	concept	must	be	visited	in	order	to	have	a	clear	understanding	of	the	scope	of	the	term	as	it	is	used	throughout	the	thesis.	Institutions	must	be	charted	in	order	to	gain	some	understanding	of	the	major	ebbs	and	flows	of	propaganda	development.	Kenney’s	life,	the	circumstances	of	his	work,	must	be	held	in	view	in	order	to	appreciate	his	own	involvement.	This	does	not,	however,	make	the	thesis	a	definition	of	propaganda,	an	analysis	of	singular	development	nor	a	biography.	A	corollary:	if	one	can	imagine	a	paper,	the	aim	of	which	is	the	analysis	of	E.H.	Carr	and	the	development	of	the	theory	of	realism,	then	it	is	clear	that	such	a	work	would	have	a	fairly	limited	scope	and	line	of	argument.	It	would	not	be	a	complete	history	and	valuation	of	the	theory,	nor	would	it	be	a	worthy	biography	of	an	illustrious	character.	It	would	simply	be	an	investigation	of	the	scholar	and	his	impact	on	the	idea.	Imagine,	further,	that	E.H.	Carr,	in	spite	of	his	work,	had	been	forgotten	by	history,	and	not	a	single	work,	biography	or	theoretical	investigation	considered	his	importance.	This	is	a	similar	position	to	Kenney’s.	Consequently,	the	thesis	traces	Kenney’s	work	and	in	so	doing	uncovers	one	particular	line	of	the	development	of	propaganda	as	a	tool	of	statecraft.	With	such	a	tight	delineation	of	purpose,	the	importance	of	the	work	may	not	be	immediately	obvious	to	the	reader.	In	essence,	importance	is	a	major	part	
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of	the	argument	of	the	thesis.	Without	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	Kenney’s	work—and	there	is	none,	bar	this	one—who	could	assess	his	importance	to	the	field?	Fundamentally,	the	thesis	is	the	first	and	so	far	only	detailed	account	of	this	man	and	his	struggles	and	accomplishments,	apart,	perhaps,	from	his	single	and	very	limited	autobiography.3	It	is	a	fairly	large	collection	of	privately	held	documents	that	have	enabled	this	research.	The	documents	have	never	before	been	thoroughly	analysed,	and	thus	the	originality	alone	of	the	thesis	serves	as	a	strong	argument	for	its	importance.				MATERIALS	AND	LITERATURE	REVIEW		The	secondary	literature	used	in	this	work	is	wide-ranging	and	varied.	This	is	in	part	because	of	the	rather	stretched	and	multi-disciplinary	nature	of	the	research,	but	also	because	truly	relevant	texts	are	few	and	far	between.	In	this	section,	the	material	and	literature	used	is	mapped	out,	beginning	with	a	discussion	on	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	and	then	discussing	the	works	integral	to	the	argument.	The	goal	is	to	demonstrate	several	things:	1)	that	the	author	has	considered	all	possible	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	the	materials	employed,	2)	that	there	exists	a	gap	in	the	current	understanding	which	this	thesis	can	play	a	part	in	bridging,	3)	that	the	author	is	keenly	aware	of	current	research	both	intimate	and	tangential	to	the	subject	at	hand,	and	4)	that	the	conceptual,	methodological	and	analytical	framework	of	the	thesis	is	both	embedded	in	and	demonstrated	by	the	literature	and	academic	context.		
The	Rowland	Kenney	Papers		A	central	element	of	the	thesis—both	in	terms	of	purpose	and	originality—rests	in	a	trove	of	previously	unseen	documents,	hereafter	referred	to	as	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	These	documents	form	the	backbone	of	the	material	analysis	and	are	introduced	here	in	the	literature	review.	It	is	important	to	be	aware	of																																																									3	His	autobiography,	Westering,	will	be	described	in	the	Literature	Review	section.	
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the	context	of	the	documents,	as	well	as	their	strengths	and	weaknesses	(the	weaknesses	being	discussed	primarily	in	the	Limitations	section	in	this	chapter),	since	these	are	so	important	to	the	argument.		 The	collection	is	comprised	of	a	large	number	of	papers	ostensibly	obtained	or	created	by	Rowland	Kenney	throughout	his	lifetime.	The	types	of	documents	range	from	private	and	personal	letters	to	official	and	secret	reports.	Much	of	the	material	appears	to	be	carbon	copies	or	in	some	cases	drafts	of	materials	written	by	Kenney	himself,	though	there	are	almost	as	many	documents	addressed	to	Kenney	from	others.	A	small	number	of	documents	are	handwritten	and	some	are	nearly	illegible,	but	most	are	typed,	well	preserved	and	accessible.	Some	documents	are	devoid	of	either	dates,	or	addressees	or	even	author	indications.	Some	lack	all	three.	However,	the	papers	have	by	and	large	been	preserved	in	a	hybrid	chronological	and	thematic	order,	so	the	placement	of	the	document	in	the	collection	more	often	than	not	gives	a	fairly	clear	indication	of	where	it	falls	in	the	story.		 The	collection	itself	is	comprised	of	several	independent	folders,	each	containing	a	distinct	series.	Primarily	used	in	this	thesis	are	individual	series	corresponding	to	the	First	World	War,	to	the	interwar	years,	two	series	on	the	Second	World	War	as	well	as	one	series	of	papers	from	1945-46.	Series	not	included	are	mainly	those	concerned	with	Poland4	or	with	Kenney’s	life	before	the	First	World	War.		 It	is	risky	to	suggest	too	much	when	discussing	the	originality	or	rarity	of	these	documents.	Nevertheless,	after	several	searches	in	The	National	Archives	in	London,	where	such	materials	by	all	accounts	should	be	found,	only	a	very	small	fraction	of	copies	have	been	uncovered.	This	is	not	to	say	with	utmost	certainty	that	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	contains	a	very	large	majority	of	entirely	singular	documents,	but	it	is	to	suggest	that	it	is	likely	that	this	is	the	case.	In	illustration	of	this	fact,	documents	used	from	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	that	also	exist	in	public	archives	are	cited	doubly	in	this	thesis.	What	is	striking	after	years	of	research	is	how	difficult	it	is	to	find	references	to	Rowland																																																									4	Kenney	was	an	agent	of	the	Foreign	Office,	and	possibly	also	of	the	British	Security	Service	in	Poland	between	the	end	of	the	First	World	War	and	the	signing	of	the	Treaty	of	Versailles.	
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Kenney	at	all	outside	his	own	collection.	Barring	a	few	documents	from	the	British	National	Archives	or	from	the	Norwegian	National	Archives,	as	well	as	extremely	brief	(often	misspelled)	references	to	him	in	the	literature,	there	is	simply	nothing	to	be	dug	up.	One	conclusion	that	may	be	extrapolated	from	this	fact,	especially	the	paucity	of	references	to	the	man	in	books,	is	that	Kenney	is	indeed	virtually	absent	from	the	archives,	in	such	a	way	that	authors	and	academics	have	in	large	part	glossed	over,	or	perhaps	been	oblivious	to,	his	work	and	his	influence.	It	also	points	to	the	assumption	that	the	collection	has	never	before	been	analysed,	or	at	least	that	it	has	never	been	the	subject	of	any	publication	anywhere.	This	collection,	then,	and	this	thesis,	both	become	much	more	important	in	light	of	the	possibility.		 The	documents	were	revealed	to	the	author	by	Professor	Andrew	Williams	of	the	University	of	St	Andrews	and	are	available	to	the	examiners.	It	was	vital	to	the	author	to	trace	the	origin	of	the	documents,	so	an	investigation	was	set	in	motion.	The	author	gained	contact	with	the	living	grandchild	of	Rowland	Kenney,	Asta	Maria	Kenney,	who	was	able	to	provide	useful	information	on	the	man	himself	and	his	activities.	Originally,	the	documents	were	collected	and	kept	by	Kenney	himself,	possibly	in	order	to	write	a	second	autobiography,	which	would	explain	the	mix	of	private	and	professional	documents	as	well	as	the	careful	arrangement	of	the	collection.	When	he	died	in	19615	the	documents	were	inherited	by	his	son,	Kit	Kenney.	Kit	Kenney	passed	away	in	19886	prompting	his	widow	and	daughter,	Asta,	to	discover	the	collection	of	papers	belonging	to	his	father,	Rowland.	Recognising	that	the	collection	may	be	of	interest	to	historians,	they	donated	the	papers	to	the	University	of	Kent,	where	they	were	unfortunately	forgotten	and	set	aside	in	an	obscure	cupboard.	Some	years	later,	the	materials	were	unwittingly	slated	for	destruction,	but	were	saved	by	Professor	Williams,	who	at	the	time	was	employed	at	the	University	of	Kent.	Since	then,	the	collection	remained	in	the	
																																																								5	Obituary	for	Mr	Rowland	Kenney.	The	Times.	10	Apr.	1961.	p.18.	6	Family	of	Kit	Kenney,	1988.	KP/CLA/3.	The	Kenney	Papers	Archive.	University	of	East	Anglia;	it	was,	in	fact,	this	entry	in	the	East	Anglia	archive	in	honour	of	Rowland	Kenney’s	sister—the	famed	suffragette	Annie	Kenney—that	led	to	the	discovery	of	his	living	grandchild	Asta	Maria.	
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possession	of	Professor	Williams,	who	took	them	with	him	to	the	University	of	St	Andrews	where	they	now	rest	in	his	care.		 The	collection	offers	an	unparalleled	and	personal	view	into	Rowland	Kenney’s	life	and	labour,	allowing	for	a	rigorous	and	comprehensive	analysis	of	what	he	accomplished	and	how	he	accomplished	it.	There	is	simply	no	better	resource	for	this	undertaking	than	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	The	official	memoranda	and	reports	give	a	clear	and	objective	picture,	while	the	personal	letters	and	correspondence	colour	the	story	with	Kenney’s	own	idiosyncratic	narration.	Not	only	is	the	reader	given	access	to	the	inner	workings	of	the	propaganda	machinery,	but	also	to	this	agent’s	thoughts,	his	conscience,	and	his	sarcastic	quips.	The	comprehensiveness	of	the	collection	also	allows	for	certain	guesses	to	be	made	about	the	negative	space,	the	periods	that	it	does	not	follow.	As	a	result,	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	is	undoubtedly	a	treasure	both	of	historical	and	political	significance,	and	its	usage	as	a	centrepiece	here	only	adds	to	the	value	of	the	thesis.	
	
Literature		As	noted,	material	and	literature	outside	of	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	is	varied.	The	difficulty	in	obtaining	anything	on	Rowland	Kenney	himself	means	that	there	is	little	directly	relevant	to	his	work	or	person.	This	results	in	the	usage	of	literature	primarily	as	context,	in	order	to	flesh	out	the	framework	of	the	story,	or	to	provide	alternate	perspectives.	The	literature	therefore	mainly	revolves	around	conceptual	or	historical	works	on	propaganda,	the	First	and	Second	World	War,	Anglo-Norwegian	relations,	and	the	history	of	British	institutions	such	as	the	Ministry	of	Information	or	the	British	Council.	Some	Norwegian	literature	is	included	and	where	indicated	has	been	translated	by	the	author,	but	most	remains	Anglophone	and	primarily	British	in	origin.		 In	terms	of	literature	focusing	on	Rowland	Kenney	himself,	there	is	only	his	own	works.	Of	utmost	relevance	is	his	autobiography	Westering.7	This	book	is	highly	valuable	to	the	thesis	and	is	used	accordingly	where	appropriate.																																																									7	Kenney,	Rowland.	Westering:	An	Autobiography.	London:	J.	M.	Dent	&	Sons,	1939.	
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However,	published	in	1939,	the	book	does	not	address	the	Second	World	War,	and	indeed	contains	fairly	limited	sections	regarding	his	work	in	the	First	World	War	and	the	interwar	years.	It	is	likely	that	Kenney,	still	active	in	the	propaganda	sector,	would	have	been	keen	to	maintain	some	secrecy	about	his	work,	and	therefore	was	tight-lipped	on	some	subjects	integral	to	the	argument.	As	a	signatory	of	the	Official	Secrets	Act	it	is	unlikely	that	he	would	have	been	able	to	publish	much	of	what	can	now	be	discovered	in	the	collection,	especially	given	the	then	prevailing	‘Forty	Years	Rule’,	which	made	the	publication	of	official	documents	within	the	period	of	forty	years	unlawful.	It	is	also	clear	that	an	autobiography,	while	being	a	great	resource	for	tapping	into	the	filtered	psyche	of	its	main	subject,	is	inherently	biased	and	unreliable,	and	must	be	considered	sceptically.	Care	is	taken	to	match	statements	from	Westering	with	documents	from	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers,	hopefully	achieving	something	akin	to	truth	in	the	cross-reference.	Kenney	also	wrote	a	much	more	impersonal	book	called	The	Northern	Tangle.8	This	book	was	a	political	history	of	the	Scandinavian	countries	from	early	recorded	history	until	1946.	While	impressive	in	ambition,	a	single	volume	could	not	hope	to	go	into	much	detail.	The	book	is	rarely	referenced	within	the	thesis,	substituted	with	more	heavy-hitting	works	where	its	subject	is	called	for.	It	nonetheless	is	useful	in	understanding	Kenney’s	own	views	on	Scandinavia,	if	only	as	background	reading.		 One	of	the	basic	conceptual	discussions	central	to	the	thesis	is	one	on	propaganda	as	a	concept.	Forming	the	backbone	of	this	discussion	are	three	scholars	and	their	works.	Harold	Lasswell’s	Propaganda	Technique	in	the	World	
War9	remains	to	this	day	a	seminal	work	within	the	field,	discussing	propaganda	from	a	particularly	communications	studies	perspective.	It	is	used	in	this	thesis	appropriately	as	a	foundation	for	propaganda	theory.	Similarly	canonical	is	Jacques	Ellul’s	work	Propaganda:	The	Formation	of	Men’s	Attitudes10,	which	is																																																									8	Kenney,	Rowland.	The	Northern	Tangle:	Scandinavia	and	the	Post-War	World.	London:	J.	M.	Dent	and	Sons,	1946.	9	Lasswell,	Harold	D.	Propaganda	Technique	in	the	World	War.	London:	Kegan	Paul,	Trench,	Trubner	&	Co.,	1938.	10	Ellul,	Jacques.	Propaganda:	The	Formation	of	Men’s	Attitudes.	Trans.	Konrad	Kellen	and	Jean	Lerner.	New	York:	Alfred	A.	Knopf,	1969.	
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concerned	rather	specifically	with	propaganda	technique	but	also	engages	in	theory.	Finally,	Philip	Taylor’s	works,	especially	his	two	books	British	
Propaganda	in	the	20th	Century11	and	Munitions	of	the	Mind,12	give	a	very	lucid	and	well-respected	historical	account	of	British	propaganda.	These	three	academics	together	provide	a	total	perspective	of	the	concept	by	in	turn	addressing	theory,	technique	and	historical	development.	A	more	modern	overview	of	not	only	theory,	but	also	research	methods	and	analysis	within	the	study	of	propaganda	can	be	found	in	Garth	S.	Jowett	and	Victoria	O’Donnell’s	
Propaganda	and	Persuasion.13	This	book	acts	almost	as	a	textbook	and	brings	together	various	points	of	view.	Another	modern	scholar	to	keep	in	mind,	especially	with	regards	to	propaganda	theory,	is	Nicholas	Jackson	O’Shaughnessy	who	wrote	Politics	and	Propaganda:	Weapons	of	Mass	
Seduction.14	Keith	Somerville’s	Radio	Propaganda	and	the	Broadcasting	of	
Hatred15	similarly	falls	into	the	category	of	recent	research,	this	book	in	particular	focusing	on	the	use	of	radio	after	the	Cold	War,	but	also	giving	an	excellent	history	of	the	development	of	the	practice.	Modern	critics	of	propaganda	are	also	important	to	take	note	of,	if	only	to	gain	some	insight	into	the	on-going	debate	on	the	ethics	of	the	issue.	Particularly	useful	in	this	regard	is	Randal	Marlin’s	Propaganda	and	the	Ethics	of	Persuasion16	as	well	as	Stanley	B.	Cunningham’s	The	Idea	of	Propaganda.17	Altogether,	the	literature	surrounding	propaganda	remains	fairly	wide-ranging	and	disparate,	so	that	most	academic	
																																																								11	Taylor,	Philip	M.	British	Propaganda	in	the	20th	Century.	Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	1999.	12	Taylor,	Philip	M.	Munitions	of	the	Mind:	A	history	of	propaganda	from	the	
ancient	world	to	the	present	era.	3rd	ed.	Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	2003.	13	Jowett,	Garth	S.,	and	Victoria	O’Donnell.	Propaganda	and	Persuasion.	3rd	ed.	Thousand	Oaks:	Sage	Publications,	1999.	14	O’Shaughnessy,	Nicholas	Jackson.	Politics	and	Propaganda:	Weapons	of	Mass	
Seduction.	Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	2004.	15	Somerville,	Keith.	Radio	Propaganda	and	the	Broadcasting	of	Hatred:	Historical	
Development	and	Definitions.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2012.	16	Marlin,	Randal.	Propaganda	and	the	Ethics	of	Persuasion.	Peterborough:	Broadview	Press,	2003.	17	Cunningham,	Stanley	B.	The	Idea	of	Propaganda:	A	Reconstruction.	Westport:	Praeger,	2002.	
	 15	
writing	must	return	to	the	early	scholars	like	Lasswell	and	Ellul.	This	scholar	is	no	exception.		 The	non-conceptual	literature,	mainly	historical	or	political	in	nature,	follows	many	different	strands.	In	terms	of	pure	history,	the	historical	range	of	the	thesis,	as	well	as	the	national	focus,	demanded	that	a	rather	specialised	list	of	works	were	solicited.	J.	M.	Bourne’s	Britain	and	the	Great	War18,	Gerard	J.	Degroot’s	The	First	World	War19,	and	David	French’s	British	Strategy	&	War	
Aims:	1914-191620,	are	great	resources	for	a	British-centric	First	World	War	analysis.	Conversely,	on	the	Norwegian	side,	a	great	introduction	to	the	Norwegian	experience	of	the	war	is	found	in	the	book	Scandinavia	in	the	First	
World	War:	Studies	in	the	War	Experience	of	the	Northern	Neutrals,	edited	by	Claes	Ahlund.21	Perhaps	the	most	well	regarded	work	on	the	subject,	however,	is	Olav	Riste’s	The	Neutral	Ally,22	which	takes	a	somewhat	politico-economic	analysis	of	Norway’s	relationship	with	the	warring	states	in	the	First	World	War	into	great	detail.	For	a	lucid	and	in-depth	synthesis,	focusing	on	the	relationship	between	Britain	and	Norway	during	the	First	World	War,	Patrick	Salmon’s	work	is	unparalleled,	in	this	thesis	exemplified	by	his	book	Scandinavia	and	the	Great	
Powers,	1890-1940,23	and	an	article	for	the	Royal	Historical	Society	entitled	‘Between	the	Sea	Power	and	the	Land	Power’.24		 The	literature	on	propaganda	in	the	First	World	War	is	similarly	wide	and	varied.	As	a	point	of	entry	into	the	field	in	this	time	period,	the	work	of	Gary	S.	Messinger	is	invaluable.	His	book	British	Propaganda	and	the	State	in	the	First	
																																																								18	Bourne,	J.	M.	Britain	and	the	Great	War,	1914-1918.	London:	Edward	Arnold,	1989.	19	DeGroot,	J.	Gerard.	The	First	World	War.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave,	2001.	20	French,	David.	British	Strategy	&	War	Aims:	1914-1916.	London:	Allen	&	Unwin,	1986.	21	Scandinavia	in	the	First	World	War:	Studies	in	the	War	Experience	of	the	
Northern	Neutrals.	Ed.	Claes	Ahlund.	Lund:	Nordic	Academic	Press,	2012.	22	Riste,	Olav.	The	Neutral	Ally:	Norway’s	Relations	with	Belligerent	Powers	in	the	
First	World	War.	Olso:	Universitetsforlatet,	1965.	23	Salmon,	Patrick.	Scandinavia	and	the	Great	Powers,	1890-1940.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002.	24	Salmon,	Patrick.	'Between	the	Sea	Power	and	The	Land	Power':	Scandinavia	and	the	Coming	of	the	First	World	War	1993.	Transactions	of	the	Royal	Historical	
Society,	vol.	6,	no.	3.	1993.	pp.	23-49.	
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World	War25	is	immensely	useful	in	mapping	out	the	institutions	that	arose	and	the	politics	behind	the	scenes.	Philip	Taylor	has	also	written	work	relevant	to	the	propaganda	history	of	Britain	during	the	First	World	War.	His	book,	British	
Propaganda	in	the	20th	Century:	Selling	Democracy,	is	absolutely	necessary	to	include	here.	In	addition,	Taylor	offers	invaluable	insight	into	the	role	of	the	Foreign	Office	in	his	article	‘The	Foreign	Office	and	British	Propaganda	during	the	First	World	War’26	which	is	very	appropriate	for	this	thesis.	A	number	of	smaller	texts,	such	as	book	chapters	and	journal	articles	are	necessary	to	gain	a	full	view	of	the	propaganda	institutions	of	the	time.	Worth	particular	mention	is	Stephen	Badsey’s	chapter	‘The	Missing	Western	Front’,	in	Mark	Connelly	and	David	Welch’s	War	and	the	Media,27	and	J.	M.	McEwen’s	article	‘Northcliffe	and	Lloyd	George	at	War,	1914-1918’.28	Together,	these	works,	and	a	handful	of	others,	paint	a	very	clear	picture	of	the	policies,	strategies	and	practices	of	the	often	byzantine	British	propaganda	systems	of	the	First	World	War.			 Since	the	propaganda	of	the	First	World	War	often	revolved	around	the	use	of	traditional	news	media,	it	is	useful	to	map	out	some	of	the	main	works	surrounding	the	media	as	well.	Particularly	interesting	is	Donald	Read’s	official	history	of	the	Reuters	news	agency,	The	Power	of	News.29	Similarly	focused	is	Graham	Storey’s	Reuters’	Century:	1851-1951,30	though	having	been	published	at	the	close	of	its	titular	century,	it	is	more	dated	that	Read’s	book.	This,	of	course,	carries	both	advantages	and	disadvantages.	The	article	‘Share	999’31	by	Peter	Putnis	is	a	great	in-depth	examination	of	the	restructuring	of	Reuters,	and	gives																																																									25	Messinger,	Gary	S.	British	Propaganda	and	the	State	in	the	First	World	War.	Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	1992.	26	Taylor,	Philip	M.	The	Foreign	Office	and	British	Propaganda	during	the	First	World	War.	The	Historical	Journal,	vol.	23,	no.	4.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	Dec.	1980.	pp.	875-898.	27	Badsey,	Stephen.	'The	Missing	Western	Front':	British	Politics,	Strategy,	and	Propaganda	in	1918.	War	and	the	Media:	Reportage	and	Propaganda,	1900-2003.	Eds.	Mark	Connelly	and	David	Welch.	London:	I.B.	Tauris,	2005.	pp.	47-64.	28	McEwen,	J.	M.	Northcliffe	and	Lloyd	George	at	War,	1914-1918.	The	Historical	
Journal,	vol.	24,	no.	3.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	Sep.	1981.	pp.	651-672.	29	Read,	Donald.	The	Power	of	News:	The	History	of	Reuters.	2nd	ed.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999.	30	Storey,	Graham.	Reuters'	Century:	1851-1951.	London:	Max	Parrish,	1951.	31	Putnis,	Peter.	Share	999.	Media	History.	Vol.	14,	no.	2.	Aug.	2008.	pp.	141-165.	
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insight	into	the	entanglement	of	the	news	agency	with	the	British	Foreign	Office.	Alternately,	for	literature	concerning	the	media	history	of	Norway,	the	newly	published	four-volume	work	Norsk	Presses	Historie32—The	History	of	the	
Norwegian	Press—edited	by	Martin	Eide	is	a	fantastic	work	which	covers	the	entirety	of	the	modern	period	for	the	Norwegian	media.	Both	the	Norwegian	National	Archives	and	the	Reuters	Archive	(curated	by	the	Thompson	Reuters	Company)	also	contain	a	variety	of	materials	very	useful	to	understanding	this	history.	Further	into	the	chronology,	the	inter-war	period	becomes	a	necessary	point	of	focus.	An	immensely	detailed,	well-researched	and	up-to-date	account	of	European	international	history	in	the	inter-war	period	is	found	in	the	two	works	by	Zara	Steiner,	The	Lights	that	Failed	and	The	Triumph	of	the	Dark.33	There	are	several	institutions	of	great	interest	to	the	thesis	that	arise	in	this	period	as	well.	Erik	Goldstein’s	book,	Winning	the	Peace:	British	Diplomatic	
Strategy,	Peace	Planning,	and	the	Paris	Peace	Conference,34	is	a	great	resource	for	understanding	not	only	the	transition	from	the	First	World	War	into	the	interwar	period,	but	also	the	policies	and	history	of	the	short-lived	Political	Intelligence	Department	which	features	in	Chapter	VI	of	his	work.	Goldstein	also	published	an	article	on	the	Political	Intelligence	Department,	called	‘The	Foreign	Office	and	Political	Intelligence	1918-1920’,35	which	is	well	worth	an	examination.	The	British	Council	is	also	a	point	of	interest,	where	Frances	Donaldson’s	official	history	of	the	institution’s	first	half-century	is	a	necessary	source	of	information.36	A	newer	look,	primarily	at	the	British	Council	and	cultural	propaganda	during	the	Second	World	War,	can	be	gained	from	Edward																																																									32	Norsk	Presses	Historie.	ed.	Martin	Eide.	Oslo:	Universitetsforlaget,	2010.	33	Steiner,	Zara.	The	Lights	that	Failed:	European	International	History	1919-
1933.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2005;	Steiner,	Zara.	The	Triumph	of	the	
Dark:	European	International	History	1933-1939.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011.	34	Goldstein,	Erik.	Winning	the	Peace:	British	Diplomatic	Strategy,	Peace	Planning,	
and	the	Paris	Peace	Conference,	1916-1920.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1991.	35	Goldstein,	Erik.	The	Foreign	Office	and	Political	Intelligence	1918-1920.	
Review	of	International	Studies,	vol.	14,	no.	4.	Cambridge	University	Press,	Oct.	1988.	pp.	275-288.	36	Donaldson,	Frances.	The	British	Council:	The	First	Fifty	Years.	London:	Jonathan	Cape,	1984.	
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Corse’s	A	Battle	for	Neutral	Europe:	British	Cultural	Propaganda	during	the	
Second	World	War.37	The	interwar	period	also	saw	the	return	of	the	Ministry	of	Information	in	preparation	for	the	Second	World	War.	Philip	Taylor	again	provides	a	lucid	article	on	the	subject	in	‘If	War	Should	Come:	Preparing	the	Firth	Arm	for	Total	War	1935-1939’.38	Two	articles	by	Robert	Cole	are	also	highly	worth	a	mention	here.	Cole	examines	the	pre-war	planning	for	the	Ministry	in	‘The	Conflict	within:	Sir	Stephen	Tallents	and	Planning	Propaganda	Overseas	before	the	Second	World	War’,39	whereas	in	‘The	Other	‘Phoney	War’’,40	he	delves	into	the	Ministry’s	experience	of	the	first	few	months	of	the	war.	 The	literature	surrounding	the	Second	World	War	is	so	extensive	as	to	make	any	selection	of	essential	works	banal.	However,	in	relation	to	this	thesis,	Antony	Beevor’s	The	Second	World	War,41	and	John	Keegan’s	book	by	the	same	name,42	are	examples	of	recently	published	works	of	great	detail	and	insight.	Anglo-Norwegian	war-history	is	helped	a	great	deal	by	Patrick	Salmon’s	work.	His	works	mentioned	previously	also	enter	into	the	discussion	surrounding	the	Second	World	War,	but	particularly	useful	in	this	regard	is	the	book	he	edited:	
Britain	&	Norway	in	the	Second	World	War.43	Giving	a	personal	and	enthralling	account	of	the	German	invasion	of	Norway	in	April	1940	is	Margaret	Reid’s	diary,	April	1940.44	Margaret	Reid	was	Frank	Foley’s	secretary,	and	a	member	of	the	party	that	fled	Oslo	together	with	Rowland	Kenney.																																																									37	Corse,	Edward.	A	Battle	for	Neutral	Europe:	British	Cultural	Propaganda	during	
the	Second	World	War.	London:	Bloomsbury,	2013.	38	Taylor,	Philip	M.	‘If	War	Should	Come’:	Preparing	the	Fifth	Arm	for	Total	War	1935-1939.	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	vol.	16,	no.	1.	Sage	Publications,	Jan.	1981.	pp.	27-51.	39	Cole,	C.	Robert.	The	Conflict	within:	Sir	Stephen	Tallents	and	Planning	Propaganda	Overseas	before	the	Second	World	War.	Albion:	A	Quarterly	Journal	
Concerned	with	British	Studies,	vol.	14,	no.	1.	1982.	pp.	50-71.	40	Cole,	C.	Robert.	‘The	Other	‘Phoney	War’:	British	Propaganda	in	Neutral	Europe,	September-December	1939.	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	vol.	22,	no.	3.	Sage	Publications,	July	1987.	pp.	455-479.	41	Beevor,	Antony.	The	Second	World	War.	London:	Weidenfeld	&	Nicolson,	2012.	42	Keegan,	John.	The	Second	World	War.	London:	Random	House,	2011.	43	Britain	&	Norway	in	the	Second	World	War.	Ed.	Patrick	Salmon.	London:	HMSO,	1995.	44	Reid,	Margaret.	April	1940:	En	krigsdagbok:	Margaret	Reids	dagbok.	Oslo:	Gyldendal,	1980.	
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In	terms	of	the	propaganda	of	the	Second	World	War,	there	are	again	too	many	sources	to	begin	to	list	them	all.	Narrowing	the	field	down	to	the	type	of	propaganda	in	which	Kenney	was	engaged	adds	some	limitation.	Ian	McLaine’s	book,	Ministry	of	Morale:	Home	Front	Morale	and	the	Ministry	of	Information	in	
World	War	II,45	is	a	good	resource	to	understand	the	significance	of	domestic	propaganda	in	Britain	during	the	Second	World	War.	Similarly	useful	in	gaining	insight	into	the	use	of	offensive	propaganda	is	Charles	Cruickshank’s	The	Fourth	
Arm:	Psychological	Warfare	1938-1945.46	Much	of	Philip	Taylor’s	work	is	again	highly	relevant	here.	One	specific	entry	from	Taylor	would	be	his	book	Britain	
and	the	Cinema	in	the	Second	World	War,47	which	takes	as	its	subject	the	usage	of	film	propaganda.	For	a	general	Taylorite	view	of	Second	World	War	propaganda	the	23rd	chapter	of	his	Munitions	of	the	Mind,48	however,	remains	a	cornerstone,	as	well	as	his	book	British	Propaganda	in	the	20th	Century.49	These	last	two	sources	from	Taylor	also	serve	as	a	more	general	history	of	propaganda	developments	following	the	Second	World	War.		 Thus	it	can	be	argued	that	the	literature	surrounding	this	work	is	spread	out.	With	regard	to	the	historical	literature,	it	is	difficult	to	find	detailed	sources	that	connect	perfectly	with	Kenney’s	work	and	position.	The	same	is	true	for	the	propaganda	literature,	often	focusing	on	subjects	like	hostile	or	domestic	propaganda,	the	use	of	specific	media	for	propaganda	purposes,	or,	if	neutral	propaganda	is	discussed,	then	it	is	more	often	than	not	the	neutral	propaganda	aimed	towards	the	United	States	of	America	that	is	brought	under	scrutiny.	This	presents	a	difficulty	in	establishing	the	correct	detail	in	the	context	of	Kenney’s	particular	activities.	Therefore,	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	remains	at	the	forefront	of	the	analysis	throughout,	with	the	more	general	literature	furnishing																																																									45	McLaine,	Ian.	Ministry	of	Morale:	Home	Front	Morale	and	the	Ministry	of	
Information	in	World	War	II.	London:	George	Allen	&	Unwin,	1979.	46	Cruickshank,	Charles.	The	Fourth	Arm:	Psychological	Warfare	1938-1945.	London:	Davis-Poynter,	1977.	47	Taylor,	Philip	M.	Britain	and	the	Cinema	in	the	Second	World	War.	Basingstoke:	Macmillan	Press,	1988.	48	Taylor,	Philip	M.	Munitions	of	the	Mind:	A	history	of	propaganda	from	the	
ancient	world	to	the	present	era.	3rd	ed.	Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	2003.	49	Taylor,	Philip	M.	British	Propaganda	in	the	20th	Century.	Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	1999.	
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the	contextual	basis	in	which	to	plant	the	new	information.	These	limitations	(as	well	as	the	advantages	in	employing	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers)	inform	the	method	of	this	thesis	significantly.			METHODOLOGY	AND	LIMITATIONS		As	has	been	stated	repeatedly,	at	the	very	core	of	this	work	stands	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	of	Rowland	Kenney.	The	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	is	primary	source	material,	which	in	turn	makes	the	research	conducted	primary,	documentary	research.	Considering	the	time-period	studied,	the	opportunity	to	undertake	primary	documentary	research	is	a	rare	one,	especially	when	it	is	at	the	level	of	detail,	scope,	and	impact	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	affords.			 The	primary	source	material	certainly	needs	secondary	sources	which	can	test—and	hopefully	confirm—the	primary	source	claims,	and	also	form	the	context.	However,	the	lack	of	secondary	sources	specifically	on	Kenney,	handicaps	the	available	analysis	somewhat.	This	is	because	much	of	the	work	and	space	afforded	must	go	into	mapping	out	Kenney’s	activity.	It	would	be	useless	and	rather	myopic	to	attempt	to	analyse	Kenney’s	work	as	head	of	the	Northern	Section	of	the	Ministry	of	Information,	for	example,	because	in	order	to	understand	his	focus,	his	drive	and	his	abilities,	there	must	be	some	basic	understanding	of	what	he	had	done	before	and	how	he	had	gained	the	position.	The	fact	that	there	never	has	been—until	now—a	full	and	detailed	narrative	account	of	Kenney’s	progression,	necessitates	at	least	some	narration	in	this	thesis.	The	thesis	cannot	make	simple	references	to	Kenney’s	role	in	the	establishment	of	the	British	Council,	it	must	be	explained	at	least	to	some	degree	of	detail.	Not	only	does	this	narration	allow	for	better	and	more	thorough	analysis	in	the	thesis,	but	it	also	aims	to	fulfil	the	secondary	source	requirement	so	that	future	research	can	engage	in	more	pure	analysis	of	the	man	and	his	accomplishments	and	trials.		 The	narrative	bent	of	many	sections	of	this	thesis	is	not	only	a	necessary	sacrifice,	however.	In	answering	the	question	at	the	centre	of	the	work—in	what	way	and	to	what	extent	Kenney	took	part	in	developing	the	practice	of	
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propaganda—narration	becomes	one	of	the	most	appropriate	methods	of	so	doing.	Narration	addresses	the	way	in	which	he	took	part;	analysis	addresses	the	extent	of	his	partaking.			 The	analysis	focuses	mainly	on	discovering	position,	initiative	and	influence.	Certainly,	it	becomes	very	difficult	to	historically	assess	the	impact	of	someone	not	placed	directly	into	a	seat	of	power,	but	it	is	nonetheless	possible.	One	method	used	in	this	thesis	is	in	mapping	out	Kenney’s	personal	and	professional	network.	This	places	him	relatively	well	within	a	sphere	of	influence	and	can	give	some	indication	of	how	close	to	the	top	of	the	decision-making	structure	he	was,	and	indeed,	how	much	autonomy	he	was	likely	to	enjoy.	Policy-shifts	and	initiatives	can	of	course	be	analysed	from	the	point	of	how	they	were	effected,	but	it	remains	a	strong	assertion	in	this	thesis	that	these	are	not	spun	out	of	thin	air.	While	Kenney	may	not	have	been	the	spearhead	of	the	creation	of	policy	in	the	halls	of	politics	and	bureaucracy,	he	may	certainly	have	created	the	circumstances	and	fathered	the	push	for	policies.		 The	final	force	of	the	argument	in	this	thesis	is	based	on	the	idea	of	legacy.	An	effective	way	of	measuring	impact	is	in	discovering	the	trail	of	effects	from	an	original	event.	Therefore,	an	effort	will	be	made	to	very	generally	chart	the	course	of	propaganda	development	not	only	through	Kenney’s	lifetime,	but	also	beyond	it,	and	then	to	discover	whether	a	red	thread	can	be	pulled	back	and	tacked	reliably,	if	not	firmly,	on	Kenney’s	own	work.	The	focus	of	legacy	is	of	course	helpful	to	the	argument,	but	it	is	also	an	aesthetic	presentation:	in	unveiling	the	forgotten	life	of	a	very	interesting	man,	it	is	impossible	to	deny	the	impulse	in	this	author	to	create	for	him	a	vehicle	for	remembrance.			
Limitations		It	would,	of	course,	be	disingenuous	to	propose	that	any	thesis	of	this	kind	could	be	bulletproof.	In	keeping	with	good	academic	practice	it	is	important	to	be	fully	aware	of	the	limitations	of	the	research	and	to	keep	these	in	mind	throughout	the	process.	This	holds	the	argument	in	check	and	is	in	effect	a	practice	of	prophylaxis	against	unwarranted	assumption	and	intellectual	hubris.	It	also	
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cedes	to	the	reader	the	notion	that	what	is	offered	is	not	necessarily	the	truth,	but	rather	a	heuristic,	which	is	both	adaptable	and	fluid.		 Doubtless	the	most	glaring	limitation	lies	in	the	marriage	of	source	material	and	methodology:	relying	heavily	on	the	veracity	of	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	of	Rowland	Kenney.	The	reliance	on	this	material	cannot	be	circumvented,	since	it	remains,	after	thorough	and	exhaustive	searches,	the	only	resource	of	information	on	Kenney	for	large	swathes	of	his	career.	While	the	origin	of	the	material	has	been	ascertained	to	the	greatest	possible	degree,	it	remains	a	fact	that	with	regards	to	the	material’s	believability	a	non-zero	value	of	blind	trust	must	be	assumed.	While	highly	unlikely,	it	is	not	entirely	outside	the	realm	of	possibility	that	all	or	parts	of	the	material	are	not	representative	of	the	truth.	This	is	always	a	problem	when	one	uses	documentary	or	personal	accounts.	The	fact	that	the	papers	have	not	passed	through	any	official	archives	does	not	help	in	this	regard.		The	real	problem	here,	however—considering	the	unlikeliness	of	a	case	of	massive	forgery	or	intentional	falsehood—is	bias.	Kenney,	if	you	will,	is	the	curator	of	the	collection.	He	may	have,	and	it	is	indeed	likely	that	he	has,	omitted	negative	incidences	and	highlighted	positive	ones.	Care	has	therefore	been	taken	to	match	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	with	other	archival	and	non-archival	sources	where	possible,	and	also	to	appraise	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	with	a	critical	and	sceptical	gaze.	It	cannot	be	asserted	that	perfect	objectivity	has	been	reached—what,	if	anything,	can	indeed	be	truly	objective	in	such	a	field?—but	the	ideal	of	objectivity	has	certainly	been	paid	its	due	attention.	Nonetheless,	the	irony	of	relying	on	a	pioneer	of	propaganda	to	tell	his	own	story	without	bias	or	bent	does	not	escape	the	author.		 Another	limitation	with	regards	to	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	is	its	stupendous	scope.	This	author	has	no	exact	figure	for	the	number	of	documents	within	the	collection,	but	it	is	extensive	to	the	point	of	being	byzantine.	While	archival	research	is	in	itself	a	demanding	process,	the	sifting	through	of	wide-ranging	and	hitherto	uncatalogued	materials	is	considerably	more	challenging.	It	is	not	beyond	this	author	to	suggest	emphatically	that	details	have	been	missed.	In	arranging	and	rearranging	the	manuscriptal	remains	of	a	prolific	and	accomplished	individual,	it	is	impractical,	if	not	impossible,	to	guarantee	that	no	
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stone	has	been	left	unturned.	It	can	only	be	hoped	that	continuous	analysis	of	the	material	will	reveal	further	details	that	may	have	been	lost	in	the	flood.	This	particular	limitation	would	be	more	egregious	were	this	thesis	simply	a	biographical	exposé.	While	it	should	be	kept	in	mind	that	there	may	be	more	to	the	story,	this	does	not	meaningfully	take	away	from	the	question	being	explored.	In	what	way	and	to	what	extent	Kenney	was	significant	in	the	establishment	of	a	system	within	international	relations	does	not	much	hinge	on	trivia,	and	the	arguments	herein	are	made	fully	and	extensively	within	more	general	observations.		 Furthermore,	and	departing	slightly	from	the	limitations	of	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers,	the	very	nature	of	Kenney’s	work	makes	its	uncovering	a	challenge.	Propaganda	is	naturally	a	secretive	business.	Whether	there	are	elements	not	disclosed	by	Kenney	himself,	or	whether	there	have	existed	or	do	exist	records	that	would	greatly	aid	in	the	argument	of	this	thesis	which	have	been	redacted,	there	is	in	most	cases	simply	no	way	to	tell.	Fundamentally,	a	practice	which	relies	on	secrecy	and	tact	and	discretion	becomes	nearly	impervious	to	confident	and	full	analysis	and	there	remains	always	a	sense	of	doubt	as	to	obtaining	the	full	truth.	A	case	in	point	is	Kenney’s	involvement	with	the	Secret	Intelligence	Service.	Aside	from	a	very	clear	episode	(discussed	in	Chapter	VI),	there	are	a	few	compelling	hints	that	Kenney	may	have	acted	also	as	a	spy.	In	spite	of	this	author’s	attempts	to	follow	up	those	leads,	the	archives	on	the	Secret	Intelligence	Service	and	its	earlier	iterations	remain	closed	and	unapproachable.	In	this	way,	the	sensitive	nature	of	Kenney’s	work	adds	to	the	limitations	by	allowing	for	the	possibility	that	some	things	have	not	been	documented	or	publicised.	The	thesis	may	be	only	a	fraction	of	the	truth,	or	it	may	be	nearly	all	of	it,	it	is	impossible	to	know	for	sure.			 A	final	limitation	is	the	inherent	weakness	in	the	thesis	proposed.	It	is	admittedly	ambitious	to	suggest	that	much	can	be	proven	as	regards	a	single	man	taking	part	in	developing	a	massive	system.	The	size	of	the	bureaucracy	surrounding	the	creation	of	propaganda	policy	is	so	monumental	that	singling	out	any	one	individual—and	especially	an	individual	below	the	executive	level—becomes	a	somewhat	foolhardy	proposition.	Nonetheless,	the	work	does	present	a	few	clear-cut	cases,	and	while	many	instances	may	at	a	glance	seem	to	be	
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circumstantial,	the	argument	takes	this	into	account	and	is	aware	of	it.	Hard	proof	is	rare	in	the	social	sciences,	and	thus	the	quality	and	force	of	the	argument	is	all	the	more	important.	In	sum,	the	thesis	faces	a	not	insignificant	number	of	challenges.	In	spite	of	this,	it	is	this	author’s	position	that	simply	the	possibility	that	Kenney	has	had	an	impact	on	the	development	of	propaganda,	and	that	his	work	has	thus	far	remained	unknown,	not	only	validates	but	positively	necessitates	the	exploration	herein.			THE	ROAD	AHEAD		A	brief	outline	of	the	remaining	chapters	in	the	thesis	will	serve	the	purpose	of	lighting	the	way	ahead.	Chapter	II	concerns	itself	with	the	concept	of	propaganda.	While	this	thesis	is	not	particularly	theoretical,	it	is	important	to	be	closely	familiar	with	the	idea	in	order	to	fully	grasp	the	developments	at	the	centre	of	the	thesis.	A	very	brief	history	of	propaganda	up	until	the	First	World	War	highlights	a	few	developments	of	early	propaganda,	setting	the	stage	for	further	developments	during	and	between	the	First	and	Second	World	War.	This	is	followed	by	a	discussion	of	different	definitions	of	the	concept,	as	well	as	an	investigation	into	the	moral	and	ethical	position	and	a	look	at	propaganda’s	relationship	to	truth.	The	chapter	goes	on	to	discuss	the	conditions	required	for	propaganda,	mainly	a	glimpse	at	the	role	of	mass	media,	before	the	chapter	rounds	off	with	a	summary	explaining	how	propaganda	works,	and	in	which	disciplines	the	functioning	of	propaganda	is	rooted.		 In	Chapter	III,	the	thesis	begins	to	discuss	the	historical	and	political	background	to	the	First	World	War.	This	is	done	so	as	to	highlight	the	context	of	Kenney’s	work	and	enable	the	reader	to	have	a	perspective	of	the	situation	prior	to	Kenney’s	arrival.	The	British	position	immediately	before	and	during	the	First	World	War	is	discussed,	with	focus	on	Britain’s	relationship	to	neutral	countries,	the	power	structure	within	Britain	at	the	time,	and	the	role	of	the	media	and	propaganda	through	the	war.	The	Ministry	of	Information	is	given	its	own	section.	Its	genesis	is	brought	to	light	here,	including	a	discussion	of	the	people	involved	in	the	practice.	The	chapter	concludes	with	a	focus	on	the	Norwegian	
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position	before	and	during	the	war,	Norway’s	relationship	with	Britain,	and	finally	Norway’s	importance	to	the	warring	parties,	setting	up	the	argument	for	why	Kenney	would	have	been	sent	there.		 Chapter	IV	details	Kenney’s	work	and	activities	during	the	First	World	War.	This	is	the	first	of	the	three	central	chapters	in	the	thesis	and	is	closely	tied	with	Chapter	III.	The	main	thrust	of	the	chapter	lies	in	the	analysis	of	Kenney’s	role	and	position	in	the	development	of	propaganda.	First,	the	chapter	makes	a	narrative	case	for	Kenney’s	purpose	in	Norway,	as	well	as	his	many	and	varied	accomplishments.	Second,	the	chapter	investigates	Kenney’s	network	in	Norway	in	order	to	accurately	place	him	within	the	greater	structure	of	propaganda	work	both	in	Norway	and	Britain.	The	final	part	of	the	chapter	seeks	to	explain	some	general	developments	in	propaganda	at	the	time	and	to	link	these	to	Kenney’s	work.		 The	focus	of	Chapter	V	is	on	the	NTB-Reuters	affair,	a	particular	episode	from	the	First	World	War.	This	chapter	builds	on	the	details	from	Chapters	III	and	IV,	but	is	in	the	style	of	a	case	study,	designed	to	allow	for	the	detail	present	in	this	very	interesting	case.	Kenney’s	role	in	the	transfer	of	the	Norwegian	Telegram	Bureau	from	private	ownership	into	the	ownership	of	a	group	of	pressmen	is	an	integral	one.	In	the	first	section	of	the	chapter,	a	brief	history	of	the	Norwegian	bureau	is	offered	as	context.	Secondly,	the	chapter	turns	to	the	series	of	events	surrounding	the	takeover	of	the	company,	exploring	Kenney’s	role	in	the	matter.	Finally,	the	chapter	rounds	off	with	a	short	analysis	of	the	case.		 In	Chapter	VI,	the	timeline	shifts	to	the	interwar	years.	The	first	part	of	this	chapter	continues	to	follow	Kenney	and	his	labour,	focusing	on	his	professional	and	personal	life	with	regards	to	propaganda	during	this	period.	Particular	attention	is	given	to	Kenney’s	professional	advancement—or	lack	thereof—,	and	a	critical	discussion	is	given	space	here.	This	section	in	addition	explains	Kenney’s	role	in	the	establishment	of	the	British	Council.	The	next	section	in	this	chapter	concerns	itself	with	the	background,	build-up	and	context	of	the	Second	World	War	in	Britain.	Space	is	also	afforded	here	to	explain	how	the	propaganda	efforts	were	revitalised	and	spun	into	gear	ahead	of	the	war.	
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The	final	section	details	the	Norwegian	position	before	the	Second	World	War,	and	analyses	the	reasons	for	Norway’s	importance	to	the	warring	parties.		 Kenney’s	work	during	the	Second	World	War	is	the	subject	of	Chapter	VII.	This	chapter	is	thus	the	final	central	chapter	in	the	thesis,	and	rounds	off	the	discussion	about	Kenney’s	role	in	developing	propaganda.	The	first	section	of	this	chapter	is	dedicated	to	the	narrative	explanation	of	Kenney’s	work	during	the	period,	ranging	from	his	stay	in	Norway,	cut	short	by	the	German	invasion	and	his	escape,	to	his	position	within	the	Ministry	of	Information	in	London	and	secondment	to	the	Norwegian	Government.	The	second	section,	similarly	to	Chapter	IV,	analyses	Kenney’s	network	in	brief,	by	highlighting	a	few	of	the	people	around	him	in	order	to	place	him	in	a	suitable	context.	Finally,	the	chapter	steps	back	and	discusses	the	general	development	and	evolution	of	propaganda	during	the	war,	and	displays	how	these	can	be	linked	to	Kenney	and	his	efforts.		 The	final	and	concluding	chapter,	Chapter	VIII,	serves	to	gather	the	narrative	lines	and	the	conceptual	discussion	in	order	to	arrive	at	a	clear	argument.	A	summary	of	the	preceding	chapters	is	given	in	order	to	show	the	sweep	of	Kenney’s	story.	A	discussion	of	Kenney’s	impact	upon	the	development	of	propaganda	then	emerges	in	order	to	uncover	traces	of	a	Kenney	legacy.		
v v v		Propaganda	remains,	to	this	day,	a	powerful	force	in	international	politics.	It	also	is	granted	significantly	less	attention	than	more	overt	uses	of	power,	both	in	the	public	and	academic	spheres.	At	a	time	when	the	conventional	warfare	of	the	20th	Century	has	all	but	disappeared	from	the	global	playbook,	and	where	hybrid	wars	unfold	in	a	mesh	of	conflicting	stories	and	outright	lies,	it	is	more	important	than	ever	to	pay	attention	to	the	practice	of	influencing	public	opinion.	However,	in	order	to	reach	a	fuller	understanding	of	the	use	of	propaganda	today,	it	is	wise	to	investigate	the	roots	of	the	practice.	In	uncovering	the	work	of	Rowland	Kenney,	greater	truths	about	greater	questions	may	shift	a	little	more	into	the	light.				
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CHAPTER	II	
CONCEPTS	IN	PROPAGANDA		 …if	you	are	taking	up	the	general	running	of	the	propaganda	for	us…50			Before	engaging	with	Rowland	Kenney	and	his	specific	work,	it	is	useful	to	consider	the	conceptual	background	to	the	discussion.	This	background	concerns	itself	mainly	with	the	concept	of	propaganda.	Delineating	cleanly	the	ideas	involved	provides	for	a	much	more	unambiguous	argument,	where	definitions	are	set,	moral	judgments	are	reserved	and	conceptual	confusions	are	limited	if	not	entirely	avoided.	The	purpose	of	this	chapter,	therefore,	is	to	give	a	somewhat	brief	explanation	of	the	history	and	definition	of	propaganda	as	it	pertains	to	the	discussion	at	hand,	and	also	to	make	a	clear	case	for	the	borders	of	the	discussion	of	ideas	in	this	work.	In	essence,	this	chapter	presents	the	conceptual	side	of	what	will	be	discussed.	As	a	point	of	study,	propaganda	remains	less	understood	by	academics	than	the	public	may	expect.	In	popular	culture,	propaganda	is	most	often																																																									50	O’Neill,	Herbert	Charles.	Letter	to	Rowland	Kenney.	24	May	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	
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signposted	by	flagrant	and	highly	stylised	visuals	or	sounds	bringing	to	mind	the	heavy-handed	and	bludgeoning	version	of	propaganda	most	often	associated	with	Nazi	Germany	or	the	Soviet	Union.	Any	academic	foray	into	the	field,	therefore,	almost	necessarily,	becomes	an	entry	in	the	debate	on	what	propaganda	is,	what	it	is	not,	and	how	it	is	practiced.	This	thesis	is	no	exception.	First,	however,	it	is	useful	to	look	at	the	origins	of	the	idea.			THE	BEGINNING		It	becomes	an	exercise	of	broadening	definitions	to	attempt	to	pinpoint	the	very	first	usage	of	propaganda	as	a	technique.	Some	authors	go	so	far	as	to	suggest	that	the	practice	“predates	man”51	and	can	be	found	in	competitive	mating	rituals	among	animal	species.	Of	course,	ancient	rulers	and	civilisation	utilised	a	number	of	methods	of	communication	to	display	their	might	and	reach,	methods	certainly	possible	to	depict	in	terms	of	propaganda.	However,	what	is	generally	agreed	upon	is	that	sustained,	campaign-like	propaganda	arose	out	of	the	Catholic	Church	and	its	efforts	to	consolidate	its	socio-religious	control	over	Europe	and	the	Middle	East	in	the	eleventh	century.52	Propaganda	historian	Philip	Taylor	has	described	the	propaganda	of	the	Crusades	as	exceedingly	thorough,	and	cited	the	period	as	the	one	“with	the	most	fertile	evidence	to	date”53	of	medieval	propaganda	usage.	The	need	to	convince	the	Christian	population	to	take	up	arms,	as	well	as	the	use	of	grisly	tactics	in	order	to	frighten	and	subjugate	the	enemy,	suggest	very	early	forms	of	propaganda	and	psychological	warfare	were	understood	and	employed.54			 Another	great	event	in	the	early	history	of	propaganda	arrived	in	the	form	of	the	printing	press.	This	allowed	a	more	efficient	and	uniform	system	to	arise	in	order	to	spread	information	of	propagandistic	bent.	Propaganda’s																																																									51	Somerville,	Keith.	Radio	Propaganda	and	the	Broadcasting	of	Hatred:	Historical	
Development	and	Definitions.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2012.	p.	8.	52	Taylor,	Philip	M.	Munitions	of	the	Mind:	A	history	of	propaganda	from	the	
ancient	world	to	the	present	era.	3rd	ed.	Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	2003;		Somerville.	Radio	Propaganda.	53	Ibid.,	p.	73.	54	Ibid.	
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reliance	on	mass	media	was	given	its	first	true	push	here.55		While	precise	points	in	time	marking	a	change	in	eras	is	a	particularly	lazy	type	of	historicism,	even	seasoned	historians	would	designate	the	arrival	of	the	printing	press	as	an	“appropriate	dividing	line”56	separating	the	Middle	Ages	from	more	modern	times.	This	is	especially	the	case	with	the	history	of	propaganda,	since	printing	meant	that	“reading	and	writing	now	became	an	important	means	by	which	a	man	could	make	his	way	in	the	world	and	rise	up	through	society	other	than	the	time-honoured	method	of	warfare.”57	The	invention	of	printing	truly	bolstered	the	power	of	information	and	created	a	significantly	larger	point	of	access	not	just	for	the	privileged	few.	The	Reformation	and	Counter-Reformation	movements	were	simultaneously	born	out	of	and	also	the	first	true	test	of	the	printing	press	as	a	propagandistic	tool,	and	“it	is	difficult	to	overstate	the	significance	of	the	printing	press	as	a	medium	of	Reformation	propaganda.”58	Such	was	the	power	of	printing	that	King	Francis	I	of	France	ordered	a	temporary	ban	on	printing	following	the	distribution	of	Protestant	writings	in	Paris.59	The	Reformation	and	Counter-Reformation	movements	were	also	the	stage	upon	which	the	term	‘propaganda’	was	born.	Seeking	to	establish	Christendom	in	the	New	World,	as	well	as	to	counter	the	rise	of	Protestantism	in	Europe’s	Reformation,	Pope	Gregory	XV	established	the	Sacred	Congregation	for	the	Propagation	of	the	Faith	(Sacra	Congregatio	de	Propaganda	Fide)	in	1622.60			 Philip	Taylor’s	book,	Munitions	of	the	Mind,	details	a	few	of	the	major	steps	in	the	evolution	of	war	propaganda.	It	describes	the	internationalisation	and	massive	increase	in	scale	of	propaganda	during	the	Thirty	Years	War,	the	usage	of	propaganda	in	the	English	Civil	War,	the	role	of	the	practice	in	both	the	American	and	French	Revolutions	and	the	significance	of	propaganda	to	the	Napoleonic	Wars	of	the	19th	Century.61	Propaganda,	in	one	form	or	another	has	played	a	part	in	innumerable	wars	and	conflicts	throughout	history,	but	it	was	not	until	the	Boer	War	at	the	start	of	the	20th	Century,	however,	that	modern																																																									55	Somerville.	Radio	Propaganda.	56	Taylor.	Munitions	of	the	Mind.	p.	87.	57	Ibid.	58	Ibid.,	p.	97.	59	Ibid.	60	Somerville.	Radio	Propaganda;	Taylor.	Munitions	of	the	Mind.	61	Taylor.	Munitions	of	the	Mind.	
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propaganda	truly	began	to	take	shape.	The	Boer	War	became	the	first	war	where	a	series	of	conditions	allowed	propagandistic	material	to	reach	a	mass	audience—the	popularity	of	media,	the	increase	in	literacy	rates,	and	so	on.	Thus	this	became	a	moment	that	heralded	what	was	to	come,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	propaganda	did	not	emanate	from	a	particularly	centralised	source.62	The	Boer	War	appears	in	hindsight	to	be	a	kind	of	impromptu	dress-rehearsal	for	the	massive	propaganda	machinery	that	would	colour	the	20th	Century	and	beyond.	The	true	starting	shot	of	modern	propaganda	can	be	said	to	have	coincided	with	the	shots	fired	by	Gavrilo	Princip	on	Franz	Josef	Street	in	Sarajevo	in	1914.	Two	years	later,	Rowland	Kenney	would	begin	his	own	work,	which	is	the	subject	of	this	thesis.				PROPAGANDA	DEFINED		A	definition	of	propaganda	is	important,	not	only	in	the	context	of	this	thesis,	but	for	the	wider	study	of	the	term,	because	propaganda	is	manifestly	a	state	practice	which	has	a	clear	effect	on	the	masses.	However,	like	any	coherent	academic	field	of	study,	it	must	be	cordoned	off	and	distinctly	marked,	so	as	not	to	include	too	much	or	mean	too	little.	A	study	that	spans	from	the	work	of	Goebbels	to	the	misrepresentations	of	an	ill-informed	street-preacher	is	of	little	value	to	any	clear	taxonomy	of	the	concept,	and	it	risks	being	watered	down.	While	there	are	issues	which	are	certainly	challenging,	an	effort	will	here	be	made	to	examine	a	few	of	the	more	compelling	definitions	offered	in	academic	literature,	and	then	to	synthesise	this	author’s	own	definition.		 A	compelling	definition	is	surprisingly	difficult	to	find.	Propaganda	straddles	a	multitude	of	academic	fields	from	communication	studies63,	psychology64,	and	sociology65	to	history66	and	some	would	even	claim																																																									62	Ibid.	63	e.g.	Lasswell,	Harold	D.	Propaganda	Technique	in	the	World	War.	New	York:	Peter	Smith,	1938.	64	e.g.	Doob,	Leonard	W.,	and	Edward	S.	Robinson.	Psychology	and	Propaganda.	
Annals	of	the	American	Academy	of	Political	and	Social	Science,	vol.	179.	May	1935.	pp.	88-95.	
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philosophy67.	This	thesis	considers	propaganda	from	a	political	or	international	historical	point	of	view.	Instead	of	parsing	through	the	unnumbered	multitudes	of	possible	interpretations	of	the	word,	a	systematic	filter	is	employed	to	categorise	and	exemplify	broad	definitions;	the	academic	discussion	of	the	definition	of	propaganda	can	be	coarsely	divided	into	two	sub-categories:	form	and	function.	A	discussion	of	propagandistic	form	is	a	discussion	of	technique,	of	mechanism,	and	of	the	shape	of	propaganda	systems,	discussions	commonly	found	in	works	within	the	field	of	communications	studies	or	sociology.	A	discussion	of	propagandistic	function	is	a	discussion	of	aims,	results	and	intentions,	and	is	most	prevalent	in	works	concerned	with	psychology,	history	or	political	science.	This	distinction	will	be	carried	through	this	chapter.	Any	full	definition	of	propaganda,	in	order	to	be	relevant,	must	address	both	discussions.	A	definition	of	propaganda	as	pure	form	neglects	the	goal-oriented	motivation	of	trying	to	persuade	or	influence	the	masses.	Similarly,	a	definition	in	the	pure	terms	of	function	forgets	the	specific	methods	of	delivery	and	the	necessary	structure	of	the	system.	However,	in	a	joined	definition,	the	two	categories	may	be	weighted	differently,	and	it	is	vital	to	be	aware	of	the	fact	in	order	to	have	a	meaningful	understanding	of	any	definition	employed.		 One	of	the	first	great	scholars	of	modern	propaganda	was	Harold	D.	Lasswell.	Lasswell	was	very	interested	in	communications	studies,	a	perspective	which	informed	his	research	and	theorisation	on	the	topic.	His	broad	definition	of	propaganda	was	that	it	was	“the	control	of	opinion	by	significant	symbols”68	and	that	propaganda	was	significant	in	its	internal	method	of	social	suggestion,	as	opposed	to	a	method	of	altering	the	external	conditions	of	the	subject.	Lasswell	is	markedly	different	from	other	great	propaganda	scholars	in	his	continued	references	to	the	significance	of	‘symbols’69	or	‘representations’70	in	
																																																																																																																																																														65	e.g.	Ellul,	Jacques.	Propaganda:	The	Formation	of	Men’s	Attitudes.	Trans.	Konrad	Kellen	and	Jean	Lerner.	New	York:	Alfred	A.	Knopf,	1969.	66	e.g.	Taylor.	Munitions	of	the	Mind.	67	e.g.	Cunningham,	Stanley	B.	The	Idea	of	Propaganda:	A	Reconstruction.	Westport:	Praeger,	2002.			68	Lasswell,	Harold	D.	Propaganda	Technique	in	World	War	I.	Cambridge:	MIT	Press,	1971.	69	Ibid.	
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describing	method.	This	is	a	point	of	form,	which	remains	the	thrust	of	Lasswell’s	investigations.			 Perhaps	one	of	the	greatest	scholars	of	propaganda	theory	was	Jacques	Ellul.	His	book,	Propaganda:	The	Formation	of	Men’s	Attitudes	is	a	seminal	study	mainly,	again,	of	the	form	of	propaganda.	“Propaganda,”	writes	Ellul,	“is	a	technique	rather	than	a	science.”71	Further	definitions	abound	in	the	book,	the	most	concise	of	which	is	probably	given	to	the	concept	of	political	propaganda	which	“involves	techniques	of	influence	employed	by	a	government,	a	party,	an	administration,	a	pressure	group,	with	a	view	to	changing	the	behaviour	of	the	public.”72	While	always	acknowledging	the	inherent	function	present,	Ellul	remains	“focused	on	the	technique	of	propaganda.”73	Perhaps	overly	so.	Ellul’s	conception	leads	to	an	overuse	of	the	term	propaganda,	where	“nearly	all	biased	messages	in	society	were	propagandistic	even	when	the	biases	were	unconscious.”74	This	becomes	problematic,	because	it	risks	the	conflation	of	propaganda	with	simply	biased	information,	and	broadens	the	concept	to	the	point	of	being	ubiquitous	and	therefore	immaterial	(in	all	senses	of	the	word).	Lasswell’s	argument	from	form	has	a	similar	weakness.		 A	more	modern	and	equally	important	scholar	is	Philip	M.	Taylor,	who	has	written	a	series	of	books	and	articles	on	the	history	and	concept	of	propaganda.	Taylor’s	work	is	often	cited	throughout	the	thesis.	His	definition	of	propaganda	relies	heavily	on	the	aspect	of	form,	describing	propaganda	as	primarily	a	process	of	“targeted	persuasion	techniques”75,	focusing	on	the	information-bearing	content,	with	present	but	limited	reference	to	the	intent	behind	the	message—i.e.	that	it	is	targeted,	persuasive	and	strategic.	This	definition	limits	the	use	of	the	term	to	fairly	clear	cases,	where	specific																																																																																																																																																															70	Lasswell,	Harold	D.	Propaganda.	Propaganda.	Ed.	Robert	Jackall.	New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	1995.	pp.	13-25.	p.	13.	71	Ellul.	Propaganda.	p.	3.	72	Ibid.,	p.	62.	73	Jowett,	Garth	S.,	and	Victoria	O’Donnell.	Propaganda	and	Persuasion.	3rd	ed.	Thousand	Oaks:	Sage	Publications,	1999.	p.	4.	74	Ibid.,	p.	4-5.	75	Taylor,	Philip	M.	Third	Wave	Info-Propaganda:	Psychological	Operations	in	the	Post-Cold	War	Era.	Propaganda:	Political	Rhetoric	and	Identity	1300-2000.	Eds.	Bertrand	Taithe	and	Tim	Thornton.	Stroud:	Sutton	Publishing	Limited,	1999.	pp.	327-342.	p.	336.	
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techniques	are	highlighted	with	the	express	purpose	of	persuading	a	selected	group	of	people.	However,	Taylor	is	also	interested	in	propagandistic	function,	and	goes	so	far	as	to	suggest	“if	the	intent	is	to	persuade	people	to	think	and	behave	in	a	way	desired	by	the	source,	then	it	is	propaganda.”76	This	explicit	definition	of	propaganda	as	purely	function	in	at	least	one	iteration,	marks	Taylor	out	as	much	more	interested	in	function	than	for	example	Lasswell	and	Ellul.	A	purely	functional	argument	however,	suffers	the	same	overreach	as	the	previous	two	cases,	defining	propaganda	as	any	action	with	persuasive	intent.		 There	are	almost	as	many	definitions	as	there	are	scholars	writing	about	the	term,	which	naturally	speaks	to	the	difficulty	in	arriving	at	an	agreed-upon,	concise	definition.	Some	have	argued	that	defining	propaganda	is	impossible	due	to	the	complexity	of	socio-psychology	and	cultural	relativism.77	Garth	S.	Jowett	and	Victoria	O’Donnell	attempt	to	describe	propaganda	mainly	in	terms	of	
function:	“Propaganda	is	the	deliberate,	systematic	attempt	to	shape	perceptions,	manipulate	cognitions,	and	direct	behaviour	to	achieve	a	response	that	furthers	the	desired	intent	of	the	propagandist.”78	In	this	version,	Jowett	and	O’Donnell	again	make	the	mistake	of	relying	too	much	on	one	aspect,	risking	the	inclusion	of	absurd	scenarios.	Is	the	coaxing	of	a	class	of	children	by	a	schoolteacher	into	appreciating	the	beauty	of	mathematics	to	be	classed	as	propaganda?	The	schoolteacher	certainly	both	deliberately	and	systematically	tries	to	shape	the	children’s	perceptions,	manipulate	their	cognitions	and	direct	their	behaviour	to	achieve	the	goal	she	has	set	for	them.	The	definition	is	lacking	further	qualifying	clauses.		 Another	point	Jowett	and	O’Donnell	make	is	the	one-sidedness	of	the	trade-off.	They	claim	“propaganda	does	not	seek	mutual	understanding	or	mutual	fulfilment	of	needs,”	but	instead	“deliberately	and	systematically	seeks	to	achieve	a	response	that	furthers	the	desired	intent	of	the	propagandist.”79	In	a	kind	interpretation,	what	the	authors	mean	is	that	propaganda	never	specifically																																																									76	Taylor,	Philip	M.	Global	Communications,	International	Affairs	and	the	Media	
Since	1945.	London:	Routledge,	1997.	p.	17.	77	For	example,	Leonard	W.	Doob,	referenced	in:	Jowett	and	O’Donnell.	
Propaganda	and	Persuasion.	p.	4.	78	Jowett	and	O’Donnel.	Propaganda	and	Persuasion.	p.	6.	79	Ibid.,	p.	46.	
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seeks	mutual	gain,	though	it	may	occur	coincidentally.	Even	this	soft	interpretation	renders	the	supposition	incorrect.	Though	an	argument	can	be	levied	as	to	the	meaning	of	‘gain’,	‘understanding’	or	‘fulfilment	of	needs’,	it	would	take	fairly	incredible	semantic	acrobatics	to	suggest	that	the	domestic	propaganda	used	in	Britain	to	unite	the	British	during	the	Second	World	War,	to	name	one	of	many	examples,	was	not	an	intentionally	mutually	beneficial	exchange.	A	united	and	strong	British	identity	fostered	feelings	of	belonging	and	security,	while	at	the	same	time	strengthening	the	home	front.80	Thus,	it	cannot	be	gainfully	argued	that	propaganda	is	necessarily	beneficial	exclusively	for	the	propagandist.		 In	keeping	with	traditions	of	writing	academically	about	propaganda,	this	author	suggests	his	own	definition:	Propaganda	is	a	set	of	techniques	employed	
by	a	political	power	against	a	population	in	order	to	persuade	the	members	of	that	
population	to	accept	or	internalise	specific	and	intended	ideas	as	truth.	The	main	focal	point	is	the	form,	the	techniques.	However,	the	definition	limits	the	actor	into	necessarily	being	a	political	power,	which	is	not	necessarily	a	state,	but	does	demand	a	defined	power-relationship	present,	excluding	single	actors.	This	definition	also	defines	the	audience	dually;	that	propaganda	is	delivered	massively,	but	ingested	individually—an	idea	Ellul	also	promoted:	“propaganda	reaches	individuals	enclosed	in	the	mass	[…]	yet	it	also	aims	at	a	crowd.”81	Finally,	there	must	be	a	clearly	defined	and	pre-ordained	function	intended,	which	focuses	primarily	on	the	planting	of	ideas	as	truth.	Some	ideas	carry	with	them	behavioural	suggestions;	some	are	simply	ideas	of	identity	and	definition.	The	aspect	of	presentation	as	truth,	as	opposed	to	argument	or	claim,	is	also	very	important	and	will	be	discussed	in	its	own	section	later	in	this	chapter.	This	definition	intentionally	does	not	address	whether	the	propaganda	is	received	consciously	or	subconsciously,	whether	the	propaganda	is	benevolent	or	malicious,	or	whether	or	not	the	propagandist	holds	political	power	over	the	recipient	mass.	Importantly	for	the	thesis,	it	also	does	not	distinguish	between	
																																																								80	McLaine,	Ian.	Ministry	of	Morale:	Home	Front	Morale	and	the	Ministry	of	
Information	in	World	War	II.	London:	George	Allen	&	Unwin,	1979.	81	Ellul.	Propaganda.	p.	6.	
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hostile,	attacking	propaganda	and	cooperative,	allied	propaganda—which,	after	all,	is	the	type	of	propaganda	at	the	centre	of	this	work.		
The	Morality	Aspect		Perhaps	immediately	paradoxical	to	the	layman,	allied	propaganda	is	not	a	contradiction	of	terms.	A	view	held	by	a	small	minority82	of	scholars,	but	a	large	majority	of	the	masses,	is	the	inherent	vice	in	the	employment	of	propaganda;	that	it	is	somehow	corrupting	or	deplorable.	“Despite	the	efforts	of	many	scholars	to	argue	that	propaganda	is	a	value-neutral	process	which	should	more	appropriately	be	judged	by	reference	to	the	intentions	of	those	undertaking	it,	it	remains	a	pejorative	term	in	the	minds	of	most	people.”83	While	the	question	is	fairly	moot	in	the	literature	of	modern	academics,	the	nature	of	the	discussion	in	this	thesis,	a	discussion	precisely	of	allied	propaganda,	means	that	it	is	useful	to	tackle	here,	if	only	for	emphasis.		 Ellul	counters	the	notion	of	propaganda	as	evil	or	illegitimately	top-down	by	appealing	to	the	importance	of	“the	psychological	factor”84	in	the	construction	of	political	identities	and	in	fostering	political	participation.	Ellul’s	argument	is	one	of	necessity	out	of	pervasiveness	and	organisational	merits.	While	Ellul	is	generally	concerned	with	propagandistic	form,	this	is	an	argument	that	withdraws	into	function.	Necessity	and	merits	of	usage	are	fundamentally	functional	calculations.	Taylor,	on	the	other	hand,	defends	what	he	calls	propaganda’s	‘value-neutrality’	by	citing	its	form.	Referring	to	other	scientific	uses	of	the	term,	he	writes	that	propaganda	is	“a	process	for	the	sowing,	germination	and	cultivation	of	ideas	and,	as	such,	is	–	or	at	least	should	be	–	
																																																								82	An	example	of	this	minority	view	can	be	found	to	a	degree	in	Randal	Marlin’s	book	Propaganda	and	the	Ethics	of	Persuasion,	where	Marlin	argues	for	the	employment	of	techniques	to	counteract	the	deleterious	effects	of	propaganda.	The	book	received	praise	from	relatively	radical	scholars	like	Noam	Chomsky.	Marlin,	Randal.	Propaganda	and	the	Ethics	of	Persuasion.	Peterborough:	Broadview	Press,	2003;	another	example	is	found	in:	Cunningham.	The	Idea	of	
Propaganda.			83	Taylor.	Third	Wave	Info-Propaganda.	p.	336.	84	Ellul.	Propaganda.	p.	119.	
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neutral	as	a	concept.”85	An	argument	of	function,	such	as	Ellul’s,	suffers	from	a	particularly	stretched	version	of	morality	which	would	have	to	rest	on	the	premise	that	all	things	necessary	are	at	least	not	morally	bad.	Any	lazy	examination	of	such	a	proposal	would	yield	staggering	counterpoints.	Therefore,	the	argument	out	of	form	is	the	most	compelling	in	defending	the	amorality	of	propaganda.		 This	is	not	to	say	that	propaganda	cannot	be	malicious,	which	would	be	a	self-evidently	preposterous	proposal.	The	argument	is	simply	that	propaganda,	in	itself,	must	be	considered	neutrally	if	it	is	to	be	useful.	Morality	enters	only	into	the	discussion	in	terms	of	modulated	function.	If	the	intended	purpose	of	the	propaganda	is	malicious,	then	so	is	the	propaganda.	If	the	intended	purpose	is	benevolent,	the	propaganda	may	be	judged	as	benevolent.	The	point	is,	in	essence,	that	persuasion	in	itself	cannot	be	said	to	be	immoral.			Perhaps	one	other	reason	for	the	popular,	though	mistaken,	view	of	propaganda	as	a	morally	dubious	practice	rests	in	the	very	nature	of	propaganda	as	a	tool	that	is	self-destructive	when	it	is	discovered.	Like	any	covert	action,	once	made	overt	it	must	be	demonised,	and	usually	demonised	by	the	offended	party.	The	best	way	to	counter	propaganda	defensively	is	to	expose	it	for	what	it	is,	and	to	vilify	it	and	its	propagators.	An	offended	party	will	turn	to	“denouncing	the	other’s	devious	techniques	and	lack	of	credibility,”86	while	making	no	reference	to	its	own	use	of	the	tool.	Often,	then,	propaganda	is	seen	publicly	as	a	practice	favoured	by	the	other,	and	is	necessarily	and	without	fail	portrayed	as	deceitful	and	immoral.	It	becomes	entertaining	to	imagine	that	this	thesis,	in	its	uncovering	of	Kenney’s	work,	could	somehow	make	Kenney’s	work	deplorable.	It	is,	of	course,	faulty	logic.																																																													85	Taylor.	Munitions	of	the	Mind.	p.	2.	86	Taithe,	Bertrand,	and	Tim	Thornton.	‘Propaganda:	A	Misnomer	of	Rhetoric	and	Persuasion.’	Propaganda:	Political	Rhetoric	and	Identity	1300-2000.	Eds.	Bertrand	Taithe	and	Tim	Thornton.	Stroud:	Sutton	Publishing	Limited,	1999.	pp.	1-26.	p.	1.	
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To	Lie	or	not	to	Lie	
	One	aspect	of	the	belief	that	propaganda	is	inherently	malicious	derives	from	the	idea	that	propaganda	necessarily	is	deceitful	and	has	a	casual	relationship	with	truth.	“The	real	paradox	of	propaganda	arises	from	the	fact	that	most	readers	will	assume	that	it	is	largely	composed	of	lies	and	deceits	and	that	propagandists	are	ultimately	manipulators	and	corrupt.”87	The	obvious	fact	is	that	some	propaganda	is	deceitful	and	false,	while	other	propaganda	is	true.	It	is	valuable,	however,	to	establish	the	academic	thought	surrounding	propaganda’s	relationship	to	truth,	in	order	to	firmly	plant	as	complete	a	conception	of	the	practice	as	possible	in	the	discussion.	The	point	of	this	section	is	to	claim	that	propaganda	is	not	in	any	and	all	cases	devoid	of	truth,	a	point	rather	useful	to	make	when	discussing	allied	propaganda.	Ellul	distinguished	between	two	categories	of	expression	in	propaganda,	with	opposed	relationships	to	truth.	Propaganda	explicitly	addressing	values,	he	argued,	was	necessarily	false.	This	follows	from	the	logic	that	values	are	subjective,	and	therefore	cannot	be	adequately	proven	to	be	true.	Alternatively,	some	propaganda	deals	only	in	selected	factual	statements,	which	must	be	said	to	be	true.88	This	author	would	suggest	that	such	a	distinction	is	meaningless	if	not	banal.	Expressions	of	values	are	not	only	impossible	to	link	to	truth,	but	also	impossible	to	link	to	falsity.	There	is	a	conceptual	distance	embedded	in	any	value	statement	that	disqualifies	its	own	relationship	to	fact.	When	being	told	that	something	is	bad,	a	listener	may	agree,	and	may	even	accept	the	statement	as	if	it	were	fact,	but	semantically	and	logically,	there	is	no	confusion	between	a	value	‘fact’	and	fact.	The	human	languages	are	all	steeped	in	metaphor	and	semantic	abbreviations,	the	understanding	of	which	are	entirely	necessary	for	correct	social	functioning.	In	essence,	language	semantics	necessarily	separate	values	from	fact,	creating	a	filter	whereby	values	remain	entirely	distinct	from	hard,	factual	interpretation.	Neglecting	this	filter	for	the	purposes	of	discussing	propaganda	is	disingenuous.	
																																																								87	Ibid.	88	Ellul.	Propaganda.	p.	59.	
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A	sub-argument	to	be	followed	up	here	is	the	fact	that	propaganda,	especially	in	value	formulations,	must	remain	consistent	and	truthful	within	itself.	It	must	be	“convincing,	viable	and	truthful	within	its	own	remit.”89	Relative	or	reflexive	truth	then	becomes	a	necessary	characteristic	of	successful	propaganda.	Both	Ellul	and	Taylor	have	argued	similarly,	that	propaganda	is	“a	reciprocal	message,	self-reinforcing	and	flexible,	which	must	contain	the	logic	and	elements	of	truth,	which	must	explain	and	make	sense	of	political	and	social	reality	to	the	point	that	the	propaganda	message	will	become	significant	of	a	whole	political	cosmology.”90	Propaganda	enters	into	a	description	of	a	total	worldview,	what	Ellul	calls	“a	complete	system	for	explaining	the	world,”91	and	informs	the	receiver	within	this	defined	boundary.	This	is	not	an	unimportant	observation,	since	it	uncovers	a	particularly	structural	aspect	of	truth	in	propaganda,	that	it	is	internally	logical,	self-referential	and	part	of	real,	true	context.	Propaganda	is,	and	must	be,	a	truth	and	not	an	argument.	It	is	a	vitally	important	distinction.	Regardless	of	its	relationship	to	real-world	truth,	it	must	present	itself	as	truth.		Taylor	describes	the	historical	and	ideological	relationship	of	propaganda	to	truth	succinctly:		Scholars	of	propaganda,	as	well	as	practitioners,	are	only	too	aware	of	the	legacy	of	Dr	Goebbels	and	his	‘Big	Lie’.	Indeed,	as	the	western	democracies	were	increasingly	forced	to	engage	in	propaganda	from	the	First	World	War	onwards,	they	developed	an	appreciation	of	the	need	to	adopt	a	‘strategy	of	truth’.	This	meant	that	the	tradition	of	democratic	propaganda	in	this	century	was	factually	based	upon	information	closely	linked	to	the	truth.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	the	whole	truth	was	told,	but	rather	that	democratic	propaganda	was	rooted	in	the	principle	encapsulated	by	Lord	Reith	that	‘news	is	the	shocktroops	of	propaganda’.	And	if	accurate	news	and	information	form	the	basis	of	the	historical	tradition,	it	remains	a	fundamental	principle	of	contemporary	democratic	propaganda.92																																																										89	Taithe	and	Thornton.	Propaganda.	p.	2.	90	Ibid.	91	Ellul.	Propaganda.	p.	11.	92	Taylor.	Third	Wave	Info-Propaganda.	p.	336.	
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It	is	an	intuitive	thought,	that	propaganda	is	more	effective	if	it	is	factual	and	true	than	if	it	is	false,	and	this	intuition	did	not	and	does	not	escape	practicing	propagandists.	Selecting	which	truths	are	disseminated	becomes	the	best	method	by	which	to	achieve	the	desired	effect.	Lying	by	omission	is,	of	course,	a	counterpoint	here,	but	it	becomes	rather	desperate	when	one	considers	the	amount	of	information	omitted	by	even	the	most	comprehensive	descriptions.		The	emphasis	on	not	only	the	possibility	of	truth	in	propaganda,	but	the	desirability	of	it	is	fundamental	to	the	understanding	of	the	type	of	propaganda	discussed	in	this	thesis.	It	also	sets	the	work	apart	from	the	most	flamboyant	representations	of	propaganda,	those	which	continually	focus	on	cases	of	flagrant	insincerity.	While	studies	on	efficiently	deployed	lies	are	doubtless	interesting,	it	is	arguably	more	interesting—and	indeed	more	valuable—to	consider	the	power	of	efficiently	deployed	truths.			THE	CONDITIONS	FOR	PROPAGANDA		Having	detailed	the	definition	and	moral	standing	of	propaganda,	as	well	as	its	complex	relationship	to	truth,	it	is	important	also	to	understand	how	it	arises	and	how	it	grows.	This	is	not	least	because	the	thesis	concerns	itself	with	propaganda	development,	and	thus	requires	an	investigation	into	the	general	conditions	of	development.	Primarily,	these	conditions	centre	around	the	technological	capabilities	of	the	actor,	more	specifically,	the	media	used	to	convey	the	propagandistic	message.	This	section	therefore	has	a	strong	focus	on	the	role	of	the	mass	media	in	propaganda,	as	well	as	the	consequences	of	such	a	role.	 The	mass	media	is	without	doubt	one	of	the	primary	conditions	which	allow	the	usage	and	development	of	propaganda.	Without	“the	inventions	that	produced	press,	radio,	television,	and	motion	pictures,”	the	practice	“could	not	exist.”93	This	is	because	the	mass	media	offers	the	channels	through	which	propaganda	is	delivered	and	becomes	as	such	the	cornerstone	of	propagandistic	
form.	The	proof	of	propaganda’s	reliance	on	mass	media	can	be	seen	throughout																																																									93	Ellul.	Propaganda.	p.	86.	
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history,	with	techniques	and	developments	in	the	practice	in	close	lockstep	with	techniques	and	developments	of	new	media.94	Propaganda	is	almost	without	fail	a	very	early	adopter	of	new	media	channels	since	these	have	“extended	considerably	the	range	of	propaganda	techniques	available.”95	Indeed,	very	clear	correlations	can	be	found	when	analysing	the	development	of	media	use	and	technology	and	the	development	of	propaganda.	In	the	First	World	War,	the	early	adoption	of	cartoons	and	films	had	a	massive	impact	on	the	range	and	effect	of	propaganda,96	and	some	scholars	credit	the	success	of	British	propaganda	in	the	Second	World	War	to	its	commitment	to	“innovate	and	use	many	new	techniques	which,	contrasted	with	some	of	the	cruder	attempts,	reveal	great	ingenuity	and	manipulation.”97	Propaganda	then	rests	at	the	cutting	edge	of	media	technology,	and	its	successes	or	failures	can	often	be	traced	back	to	its	adoption	of	emerging	techniques.	This	is	a	particularly	interesting	idea	when	studying	contemporary	or	emerging	propaganda	channels.	Another	point	to	make	about	the	use	of	mass	media	for	propaganda	is	the	implicit	context	it	lends	to	the	message.	A	great	number	of	traditionally	useful	media,	such	as	cinema,	radio,	television	and	cartoons	to	name	a	few,	are	sources	of	entertainment	for	the	masses.	Not	only	is	the	success	of	propaganda	dependent	on	the	reach	and	scope	of	those	delivery	mechanisms,	but	also	on	the	voluntary	seeking	out	of	the	material.	This	context	allows	propaganda	to	be	snapped	up	hungrily	by	people	seeking	entertainment,	which	adds	to	the	value	of	the	channel.98	Propagandists	are	aware	of	this	advantage.	During	the	Second	World	War,	for	example,	the	British	Ministry	of	Information	had	as	one	of	its	principles	that	for	“film	to	be	good	propaganda	it	must	also	be	good	entertainment.”99	In	this	vein	it	is	not	surprising	that	British	propagandists	
																																																								94	See	for	example	Taylor.	Munitions	of	the	Mind.	95	Taithe	and	Thornton.	Propaganda.	p.	10.	96	Demm,	Eberhard.	Propaganda	and	Caricature	in	the	First	World	War.	Journal	
of	Contemporary	History,	vol.	28.	Sage	Publications,	1993.	pp.	163-92.			97	Taithe	and	Thornton.	‘Propaganda’.	p.	15.	98	Taylor.	Munitions	of	the	Mind.	99	Taylor,	Philip	M.	British	Propaganda	in	the	20th	Century.	Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	1999.	p.	178.	
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systematically	sought	out	and	worked	with	Hollywood	filmmakers	and	other	grand	entertainers.100	A	caveat	to	the	discussion	of	the	media	arises	in	the	idea	of	media	control.	It	is	not	enough	for	a	state,	or	any	political	power,	to	simply	coincide	with	a	burgeoning	and	innovative	mass	media	sector;	it	must	be	able	to	effectively	utilise	such	a	sector.	In	addition,	such	a	utilisation	must	be	efficient	and	importantly	secretive,	calling	to	mind	a	controlling	relationship	between	the	political	power	and	the	mass	media.	Furthermore,	the	media	themselves	must	be	effectively	and	centrally	controlled.	Ellul	took	this	caveat	to	heart:	“where	film	production,	the	press,	and	radio	transmission	are	not	centrally	controlled,	no	propaganda	is	possible.”101	Ellul	unpacks	the	idea	by	discussing	media	power	and	the	related	ability	to	“hold	the	individual	constantly	and	through	all	channels.”102	This	is	a	necessity	of	consistency.	As	has	been	discussed,	propaganda	constructs	its	own	view	of	the	world,	indeed	its	own	political	cosmos.	The	viability	of	that	cosmos	is	necessary	to	maintain	the	full	force	of	propaganda.	Aberrant	influences	weaken	propaganda	efforts	considerably,	and	chip	away	at	the	claim	to	the	propaganda’s	own	reflexive	truth.	Nevertheless,	Ellul	certainly	did	not	imagine	some	shrouded	cabal	exercising	authoritarian	power	over	a	centralised	media.	As	both	propaganda	and	the	media	interact	in	the	cultural	sphere,	the	concept	here	of	power	is	also	one	of	cultural	power.	Centralisation	may	be,	and	most	realistically	is,	seen	as	a	soft	concept	of	cultural	allegiances	which	shepherd	the	media	into	the	fold.		
How	propaganda	works		Having	accounted,	as	much	as	possible,	for	what	propaganda	is,	it	is	now	pertinent	to	discuss	how	it	works,	and	the	mechanisms	of	the	practice.	There	is	of	course	some	overlap	between	what	something	is	and	how	it	works,	but	focusing	here	on	the	more	systematic	process	by	which	propaganda	influences	an	audience	gives	a	practical	understanding	of	the	process.	This	is	helpful																																																									100	Ibid.,	p.	188.	101	Ellul.	Propaganda.	p.	102.	102	Ibid.	
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because	it	can	be	used	as	a	metric	to	separate	efficient	propaganda	from	inefficient	propaganda,	and	it	also	allows	for	a	closer	understanding	of	the	propagandist’s	process	in	achieving	his	or	her	objective.			On	a	basic	level,	propaganda	must	ultimately	be	described	as	“a	form	of	communication”103	with	a	goal	of	“changing	ideas	or	opinions,	of	making	individuals	‘believe’	some	idea	or	fact,	and	finally	of	making	them	adhere	to	some	doctrine—all	matters	of	mind.”104	Ellul’s	work	in	particular	focuses	on	these	psychological	mechanisms	of	persuasion	used	in	propaganda.	Such	a	view	of	the	technique	falsely	insinuates	a	simple	mechanism.	One	can	imagine	a	model	based	on	the	idea	that	a	message	is	received,	processed	and	then	acted	upon.	While	rudimentarily	true,	this	in	turn	implies	that	a	propagandistic	message	can	be	fairly	simple	and	biased,	since	it	is	only	delivering	an	idea.	However,	“propaganda	works	not	by	being	simple	or	deceitful	but	in	being	credible	and	complex.”105	It	essentially	constructs	a	version	of	reality,	or	an	alternate	reality,	and	invites	or	coerces	the	audience	to	engage	with	it.	This	is	a	mode	of	meta-persuasion,	where	not	only	the	message	is	designed	to	be	persuasive,	but	also	its	context,	delivery	and	its	multitude	of	cultural,	ideological	and	conceptual	referents.			While	propaganda	necessarily	is	dressed	up	and	presented	as	truth	or	fact,	its	main	push	does	not	concern	itself	with	imparting	these	directly	onto	the	audience.	And	this	is	important:	those	facts	and	truths	are	only	the	vehicle	of	the	final	objective,	they	are	used	to	legitimise	and	deliver	the	underlying	impetus	of	psychological	action.	Ellul	illustrates	this	wonderfully:		 After	having	read	an	article	on	wheat	in	the	United	States	or	on	steel	in	the	Soviet	Union,	does	the	reader	remember	the	figures	and	statistics,	has	he	understood	the	economic	mechanisms,	has	he	absorbed	the	line	of	reasoning?	If	he	is	not	an	economist	by	profession,	he	will	retain	an	over-all	impression,	a	general	conviction	that	‘these	Americans	(or	Russians)	are	amazing	…	They	have	methods...	Progress	is	important	after	all,’	and	so	on.	Similarly,	emerging	from	the	showing	of	a	film	such	as	Algérie	française,	he	forgets	all	the																																																									103	Jowett	and	O’Donnell.	Propaganda	and	Persuasion.	p.	46.	104	Ellul.	Propaganda.	p.	25.	105	Taithe	and	Thornton.	Propaganda.	p.	12.	
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figures	and	logical	proofs	and	retains	only	a	feeling	of	rightful	pride	in	the	accomplishments	of	France	in	Algeria.	Thereafter,	what	remains	with	the	individual	affected	by	this	propaganda	is	a	perfectly	irrational	picture,	a	purely	emotional	feeling,	a	myth.	The	facts,	the	data,	the	reasoning—all	are	forgotten,	and	only	the	impression	remains.	And	this	is	indeed	what	the	propagandist	ultimately	seeks,	for	the	individual	will	never	begin	to	act	on	the	basis	of	facts,	or	engage	in	purely	rational	behaviour.	What	makes	him	act	is	the	emotional	pressure,	the	vision	of	a	future,	the	myth.106		The	point	then	becomes	that	propaganda,	in	a	manner	of	speaking,	seeks	to	plant	seeds	of	fact,	which	then,	sprout	and	rise	into	an	irrational	space	of	values,	judgements	and	deep-set	emotions.	Propaganda	works	by	influencing	the	indirect,	almost	subconscious	level	of	being,	which	in	turn	describes	and	informs	behaviour	on	an	ideological	level.107	Indeed,	“propaganda	works	primarily	on	the	emotions	and	feelings	[…]	it	is	essentially	emotional	manipulation	through	the	transmission	of	ideas	and	ideology.”108	Operationally,	in	terms	of	this	tiered	process,	propaganda	is	undeniably	a	psychological	tool,	and	it	may	be	said	to	have	developed	into	a	highly	sophisticated	one.		 Indeed,	the	development	of	sociology	and	psychology	coincides	fairly	well	historically	with	the	development	of	propaganda.	As	Ellul	notes,	“the	findings	of	social	psychology,	depth	psychology,	behaviourism,	group	sociology,	sociology	of	public	opinion	are	the	very	foundations	of	the	propagandist’s	work.”109	Understanding	psychology	is	fundamental	to	propaganda’s	functioning.	Propaganda,	after	all,	must	act	on	the	psychological	underpinnings	already	present	in	the	minds	of	the	audience.	It	references	not	only	the	external	cultural	or	ideological	currents	within	a	group	or	society,	but	also	that	which	“already	exists	in	the	individual.”110	The	process	of	propaganda	can	therefore	be	said	to	be	both	communicative	and	psychological.		
v v v																																																									106	Ellul.	Propaganda.	p.	86.	107	O’Shaughnessy,	Nicholas	Jackson.	Politics	and	Propaganda:	Weapons	of	Mass	
Seduction.	Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	2004.	108	Somerville.	Radio	Propaganda.	p.	7.	109	Ibid.,	p.	89.	110	Ibid.,	p.	38.	
	 44	
	The	history	of	propaganda	development	is	extensive,	possibly	even	going	beyond	the	scope	of	recorded	history.	Various	elements	of	propaganda	have	been	in	use	for	millennia.	It	was	the	invention	of	the	printing	press	and	the	struggles	of	the	Reformation	that	truly	began	to	lead	to	a	system	of	propaganda,	however.	It	was,	after	all,	the	Catholic	Church	that	gave	the	practice	the	name	propaganda	in	1622.	Wars	both	before	and	after	utilised	propagandistic	practices,	with	varying	degrees	of	success.	The	Boer	War	at	the	turn	of	the	19th	Century	was	the	first	test	of	modern,	mass	propaganda,	whereas	the	First	World	War	truly	centralised	the	practice	and	created	many	of	the	systems	of	propaganda	that	run	through	this	thesis.		 A	definition	of	propaganda	is	very	difficult	to	ascertain,	with	nearly	every	academic	entry	into	the	field	offering	up	some	new,	nuanced	delineation.	Scholars	like	Lasswell,	Ellul	and	Taylor	do	well	to	provide	their	own	limits	on	the	concept,	but	at	the	same	time	fail	to	find	the	right	balance	between	the	definitional	form	and	function	of	propaganda,	resulting	in	definitions	that	are	much	too	broad.	A	better	definition	would	be	a	synthesis	of	several	differing	definitions	in	order	to	maintain	a	particular	focus.	This	thesis,	as	mentioned,	defines	propaganda	as:	a	set	of	techniques	employed	by	a	political	power	against	a	
population	in	order	to	persuade	the	members	of	that	population	to	accept	or	
internalise	specific	and	intended	ideas	as	truth.		 While	morality	is	a	problematic	facet	of	propaganda	for	the	layman	as	well	as	for	a	handful	of	critical	academics,	most	scholars	agree	that	propaganda	is	not	inherently	immoral.	It	certainly	can	be	immoral,	if	the	intention	is	immoral,	but	in	and	of	itself,	it	is	not	necessarily	so.	This	allows	the	conception	of	beneficial	allied	propaganda.	The	practice’s	relationship	to	truth	is	also	an	interesting	and	convoluted	one.	Much	of	modern	propaganda,	and	especially	British	propaganda	(which	of	course	is	the	subject	of	the	thesis),	generally	seeks	to	employ	truthful	propaganda,	and	not	to	lie.	Perhaps	more	importantly,	propaganda	must	always	present	itself	as	truthful,	and	remains	true	relative	to	the	ideological	framework	in	which	it	is	built.		 A	mass	media	is	necessary	for	propaganda	to	function.	Propaganda	requires	channels	of	distribution	that	can	reach	a	great	number	of	individuals,	
	 45	
and	it	is	no	coincidence	that	the	development	of	propaganda	mirrors	rather	finely	the	development	of	communications	technologies.	The	usage	of	many	of	these	media	also	aid	in	the	dissemination	of	propaganda	in	that	it	arrives	in	an	entertainment	context.	Propaganda	is	often	not	force-fed	to	its	audience,	but	rather	the	audience	seeks	it	out,	embedded	as	it	often	is,	in	entertaining	and	beguiling	programming.	A	final	condition	as	regards	the	media	is	that	media	control	is	vital.	Propaganda	requires	a	centralised	structure	from	which	to	flow	in	order	to	maintain	its	ideological	persuasion.	This	centralisation	often	arises	in	the	form	of	cultural	cohesion,	and	not	in	direct	control	of	media	outlets.		 Finally,	it	is	vital	to	understand	how	propaganda	works.	Propaganda	is,	at	its	most	basic	level,	a	communicatory	practice,	but	it	is	not	a	simple	one.	It	seeks	to	construct	a	reality,	and	does	so	through	the	usage	of	symbols	and	representations.	It	is	also	important	to	acknowledge	that	while	propaganda	in	essence	spreads	what	it	claims	to	be	facts,	these	are	not	the	final	objective.	Propaganda	seeks	to	impart	facts	not	for	their	own	utility,	but	for	their	transformation	into	emotional	or	ideological	imperatives.	Propaganda	therefore	is	a	highly	psychological	and	complex	practice	which	rests	upon	the	study	of	psychology	and	sociology.	While	this	chapter	focused	on	the	concept	of	propaganda,	it	is	important	to	remember	that	Rowland	Kenney	was	not	a	theorist,	but	a	practitioner.	The	thesis	will	not	aim	to	show	Kenney’s	influence	on	the	development	of	propaganda	as	a	concept,	but	rather	as	a	practice,	institution	or	technique.	The	concept	is	of	course	still	highly	relevant	in	any	such	discussion,	not	least	in	informing	interpretations	of	Kenney’s	professional	actions.	It	also	provides	useful	conceptual	context	to	the	development	of	propaganda	institutions	and	the	adoption	of	new	techniques	throughout	history,	a	point	central	to	the	thesis.	Finally,	a	rigorous	conceptual	analysis	maintains	a	close	quarantine	on	terms	used	throughout.		 	
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CHAPTER	III	
THE	FIRST	WORLD	WAR:	TIME	AND	PLACE		 Mr.	Carnegie	will	tell	you	how	necessary	it	is	to	shepherd	the	Norwegians	if	you	want	them	to	enter	any	fold	at	a	given	time.111		The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	build	the	backdrop	to	the	first	part	of	the	thesis,	namely	Kenney’s	work	in	the	First	World	War.	This	does	not	mean	that	the	thesis	will	here	outline	the	First	World	War	in	its	entirety,	or	indeed	the	British	or	Norwegian	position	entirely.	Whole	books	(and	indeed	multi-volume	works)	are	written	on	these	subjects.	Instead,	this	chapter	takes	a	variety	of	topics	and	unifies	them	under	a	few	given	premises	of	Kenney’s	work.	First,	the	British	position	is	outlined,	which	includes	the	grand	war	aims	of	Britain,	the	social	structure	of	power	at	the	outbreak	of	war,	and	the	role	of	the	British	press	and	of	Reuters	at	this	time.	In	the	following	section,	the	focus	turns	to	the	Ministry	of	Information	and	the	British	propaganda	machinery,	outlining	its	development	through	the	war,	highlighting	key	players	in	the	bureaucracy	as	well	as	discussing	the	idea	of	soft	power	as	it	related	to	this	wing	of	British	wartime	policy.	The	final	section	discusses	Norway	in	the	First	World	War,	examining	the																																																									111	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Mair.	15	June	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	
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country’s	position,	Norwegian	sentiment	to	the	warring	parties	and	then	Norway’s	value	to	the	warring	parties.	This	thread	should	trace	the	context	of	Kenney’s	work	in	several	ways.	In	the	purely	practical	sense,	the	findings	in	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	would	be	difficult	to	discuss	without	this	background	work	in	place.	It	would	be	a	hindrance	to	the	point	of	the	thesis	to	discuss	the	work	of	Rowland	Kenney	without	addressing	what	kind	of	significance	he	had	within	the	larger	system	around	him.	In	this	background	chapter,	as	well	as	the	background	chapter	for	the	Second	World	War	(Chapter	VI),	the	main	thread	to	follow	is	this	of	significance	within	context.	It	is	also	important	to	understand	why	certain	policies	were	followed	and	what	kind	of	situation	Kenney	was	operating	in,	in	order	to	properly	understand	his	work.	This	allows	us	to	pursue	the	line	that	Kenney’s	work	impacted	international	society	and	formulated	significant	portions	of	propaganda	technique.			BRITAIN	IN	THE	FIRST	WORLD	WAR		This	section	serves	to	describe	the	British	position	and	its	relevance	to	the	topic	of	propaganda	in	neutral	countries.	The	importance	of	neutral	countries	to	British	policy	is	an	interesting	point	to	examine,	considering	that	Norway	was	a	neutral	country	in	the	First	World	War,	and	considering	Kenney’s	placement	there.	Parallel	to	this,	there	are	also	points	to	be	made	about	the	basis	for	British	propaganda	policy;	the	methods	followed	in	propaganda	work	were	no	accident,	but	rather	flowed	directly	from	an	overarching	strategy.	A	discussion	of	British	policy	towards	Norway	and	greater	Scandinavia	will	appear	in	the	final	section	of	this	chapter,	under	the	examination	of	why	Norway	was	interesting	to	the	warring	parties	(this	is	primarily	because	many	points	of	interest	for	Britain	as	regards	Norway	were	also	points	of	interest	for	Germany).					
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The	British	Position		Before	the	start	of	what	would	become	known	as	the	First	World	War	in	1914,	Great	Britain	had	enjoyed	an	undeniably	strong	position	of	power	on	the	global	stage.	Industrialisation	and	imperial	reach	gave	the	small	island	nation	a	powerful	economic	position	backed	up	and	supported	by	the	most	powerful	navy	in	the	world.	British	leaders	desired	to	maintain	this	position	at	the	outbreak	of	war,	especially	against	the	potentially	expansive	growth—both	economical	and	military—of	Germany.		 Thus,	perhaps	the	clearest	aim	of	British	wartime	policy	was	that	Britain	should	retain	this	position	as	a	world	leader.	To	this	end,	British	strategy	relied	to	a	large	extent	on	its	allies	tapping	the	resources	of	the	Central	Powers.112	It	is	an	interesting	recognition	of	the	‘world	war’	nature	of	the	conflict,	since	it	required	deft	international	diplomatic	navigation	as	well	as	persuasive	methods	(i.e.	propaganda)	to	sway	neutrals	to	their	side.	Furthermore,	in	contrast	to	the	imposing	clout	of	the	maritime	forces,	Britain’s	land	army	was	small	and	volunteer-based.	The	continental	conscript	armies	were	much	larger,	and	so	again	Britain	would	rely	on	allies,	or	convincing	neutrals	to	fight	on	the	British	side.113	Neutrals	were	an	important	aspect	of	British	war	aims,	given	more	than	a	passing	thought.	 		 Kenney’s	work	in	Norway,	just	based	on	the	value	of	neutrals,	can	be	supposed	to	be	in	some	way	significant.	As	the	following	chapter	(Chapter	IV)	details,	his	task	seems	to	fall	perfectly	under	the	purview	of	swaying	neutrals,	which,	as	demonstrated,	was	a	key	priority.	This	certainly	speaks	to	significance,	and	thus	to	the	idea	that	Rowland	Kenney	and	his	work	indeed	are	worth	examining.	To	further	establish	this	significance,	it	might	also	be	useful	to	examine	the	loci	of	power	in	Britain	at	the	time	before	and	during	the	war.	This	should	help	again	in	placing	Kenney	into	a	suitable	context	and	in	showing	to	what	extent	he	should	be	seen	as	a	key	player.	
																																																									112	French,	David.	British	Strategy	&	War	Aims:	1914-1916.	London:	Allen	&	Unwin,	1986.	113	Bourne,	J.	M.	Britain	and	the	Great	War,	1914-1918.	London:	Edward	Arnold,	1989;	DeGroot,	J.	Gerard.	The	First	World	War.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave,	2001.	
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The	People	in	Power		The	power	to	in	some	way	affect	policy	is	an	important	aspect	of	this	thesis.	If	Rowland	Kenney	is	to	be	said	to	have	had	a	role	in	the	development	of	some	part	of	international	society,	then	the	relevant	networks	and	routes	of	power	must	be	understood.	In	the	next	chapter	about	Kenney’s	work	in	Norway	during	the	First	World	War	(Chapter	IV)	and	in	the	corresponding	chapter	on	the	Second	World	War	(Chapter	VII),	the	importance	of	this	aspect	is	put	in	relief	by	highlighting	‘persons	of	interest’.	Establishing	Kenney’s	position	within	these	networks	helps	to	underscore	his	relevance	to	the	project.	Before	that,	however,	it	is	also	necessary	to	establish	the	nature	of	the	power	networks	of	the	time:	to	what	extent	it	was	exclusive,	meritocratic,	effective,	and	so	on.	The	power	structure	of	British	society	in	the	19th	and	early	20th	Century	has	been	characterised	as	aristocratic	and	fairly	rigid.	Especially	those	government	offices	concerned	with	diplomacy,	international	affairs	and	the	military	were	populated	by	a	small	group	of	people	connected	closely	through	their	elite	education	and	their	family	ties.114	The	political	elites	were	generally	from	a	higher	social	standing,	and	to	some	degree	exclusively	so.	“The	aristocracy	still	remained	the	leading	group	within	the	ruling	classes,	and	it	continued	to	fill	half	the	places	and	all	the	top	positions	in	the	cabinets	of	both	political	parties.”115	This	was	certainly	true	of	jobs	where	candidates	were	approached	or	appointed.	But	even	for	civil	service	jobs,	this	sort	of	nepotism	was	prevalent.	In	fact,	“over	a	quarter	of	those	who	entered	[civil	service]	by	open	competition	in	the	years	preceding	1914	had	been	at	one	of	the	nine	Clarendon	schools.”116	What	all	this	means	is	that	power	was	localised	in	rather	small	circles	where	people	were	known	to	each	other	prior	to	their	professional																																																									114	Guttsman,	W.	L.	The	British	political	elite	and	the	class	structure.	Elites	and	
Power	in	British	Society.	Eds.	Philip	Stanworth	and	Anthony	Giddens.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1974.	pp.	22-44.	p.	24;	Hewitt,	Christopher	J.	Elites	and	the	distribution	of	power	in	British	society.	Elites	and	Power	in	British	
Society.	pp.	45-64.	p.	62.	115	Reid,	Alastair	J.	Social	Classes	and	Social	Relations	in	Britain,	1850-1914.	Basingstoke:	Macmillan	Education,	1992.	p.	17.	116	Kelsall,	R.	K.	Recruitment	to	the	higher	civil	service:	how	has	the	pattern	changed?	Elites	and	Power	in	British	Society.	pp.	170-184.	p.	176.	
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engagement.	If	you	were	in	a	position	of	power,	you	were	likely	to	have	childhood	or	family	friends	crop	up	in	corresponding	positions	throughout	the	political	and	professional	structure	of	the	country.	Members	of	this	kind	of	close-knit	socio-political	milieu	can	be	said	to	have	been	able	to	exercise	more	power	and	influence	than,	say,	members	of	broader	classes.	In	other	words,	with	the	power	structure	so	small	and	self-referential,	if	one	was	within	it,	one	had	a	relatively	considerable	effect	on	national	and	international	policy.	In	spite	of	this	aristocratic	exclusivity,	there	were	of	course	exceptions	to	the	rule,	and	it	cannot	be	denied	that	Rowland	Kenney	was	one	such	exception.	He	was	a	member	of	the	civil	service,	though	he	was	far	from	an	aristocrat.	His	autobiography,	Westering,	published	in	1939,	tells	the	story	of	a	large,	working	class,	poor	family.	At	the	age	of	9	he	describes	himself	as	“reaching	bread-winning	age.”117	Before	eventually	landing	in	the	civil	service,	Kenney	worked	his	way	from	a	cotton	mill	(where	his	sister—the	famous	suffragette	Annie	Kenney—lost	a	finger)	through	a	coalmine	and	a	railway	goods	yard	and	much	else,	finally	becoming	a	London	journalist	and	newspaper	editor.118	His	arc	was	an	extraordinary	one	by	far;	it	nonetheless	makes	his	later	achievements	all	the	more	impressive.	Kenney	must	have	been	very	talented	to	take	such	strides	from	the	fields	of	the	West	Riding	of	Yorkshire	onto	the	grand	politics	of	the	world	stage.	 And	Kenney	was	not	the	only	exception.	In	fact,	Sir	Roderick	Jones,	Director	of	Reuters	news	agency,	was	another	man	who	had	clawed	his	way	up	the	ranks,	and	he	and	his	company	also	played	a	very	significant	role	in	the	war.	Jones	was,	like	Kenney,	born	close	to	Manchester,	but	of	a	slightly	higher	class,	as	his	father	was	a	hat	salesman.	Through	self-study	and	determination,	and	purportedly	self-imposed	grandeur	to	a	fault,	he	eventually	managed	to	climb	to	the	very	top	of	the	then-struggling,	though	undeniably	powerful	news	agency	Reuters.119	An	examination	of	Reuters	and	Jones’	role	in	the	First	World	War	will	exemplify	the	power	of	these	cliques	as	well	as	provide	some	detail	to	the	part	played	by	the	media	in	propaganda.																																																									117	Kenney,	Rowland.	Westering.	London:	J.M.	Dent	&	Sons,	1939.	p.	15.	118	Kenney,	Westering.	119	Read,	Donald.	The	Power	of	News:	The	History	of	Reuters.	2nd	ed.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999.	
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The	Sword	and	the	Pen		It	is	not	enough,	when	discussing	propaganda,	to	only	describe	the	politics	and	people	involved	in	it.	Propaganda	is	inherently	a	function	of	popular	information,	and	the	arbiters	of	popular	information	are	the	media.	The	role	of	the	British	media	in	the	propaganda	efforts	of	the	First	World	War	was	not	a	small	role,	and	it	had	a	particular	part	to	play	in	the	work	of	Rowland	Kenney.	Assessing	the	role	of	the	press	serves	to	set	the	stage	of	Kenney’s	operation,	exemplifies	the	power	of	a	small	group	of	people,	and	explores	the	deep	(and	sometimes	unsettling)	dynamic	of	information	and	power.	There	were	of	course	many	novel	developments	of	media	usage	in	the	First	World	War.	Everything	from	photography	and	front-line	journalism	to	war-poetry	and	rudimentary	filmmaking	took	some	sort	of	new	turn,	and	there	has	already	been	written	an	extensive	amount	on	the	subject.	While	these	themes	are	certainly	interesting,	they	bear	little	relevance	to	Kenney’s	work	and	to	the	kind	of	propaganda	this	thesis	explores,	and	the	author	would	for	that	reason	direct	the	reader	toward	other	works	for	more	information	on	and	discussion	of	them.	In	Kenney’s	case,	in	the	First	World	War,	the	main	objects	of	interest	in	terms	of	media	are	the	news	agencies	and	international	correspondents.		Ties	between	loci	of	power	were	close	and	this	was	also	true	of	the	relationship	between	the	press	and	government.	Most	striking,	perhaps—at	least	on	the	surface	of	things—is	the	well-known	connection	of	Lloyd	George	with	the	powers	that	be	at	Fleet	Street.120	But	more	fundamentally,	the	role	of	the	news	agencies,	the	core	machinery	of	news	on	the	international	scale,	became	more	and	more	enmeshed	in	the	politics	of	war.		 Since	their	creation	in	the	mid	19th	Century,	the	three	major	European	news	agencies	had	coexisted	to	some	extent	symbiotically.	A	ring	agreement	guaranteed	the	three	bureaux—Havas	of	France,	Wolff	of	Germany	and	Reuters	of	Britain—a	virtual	monopoly	on	the	international	markets,	with	carefully																																																									120	Badsey,	Stephen.	'The	Missing	Western	Front':	British	Politics,	Strategy,	and	Propaganda	in	1918.	War	and	the	Media:	Reportage	and	Propaganda,	1900-2003.	Eds.	Mark	Connelly	and	David	Welch.	London:	I.B.	Tauris,	2005:	47-64.	p.	50.	
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crafted	borders	marking	certain	sectors	as	belonging	to	certain	agencies.	In	somewhat	of	a	generalisation,	Havas	owned	the	southern	European	market,	Wolff	the	northern	(ergo	Norway	and	the	rest	of	Scandinavia),	and	Reuters	had	access	to	the	British	Empire.	This	agreement	generally	stood	fast,	though	this	is	not	to	say	the	agencies	did	not	from	time	to	time	attempt	to	deceive	and	outcompete	each	other.	However,	it	was	not	until	the	First	World	War	that	the	political	and	national	tendencies	of	these	agencies	came	into	full	view.121		 It	would	also	be	a	mistake	to	suggest	that	these	agencies	had	previously	operated	in	a	political	vacuum.	The	mix	of	press	and	politics	was	not	a	new	cocktail,	not	even	in	1914.	In	1869,	for	example,	the	German	government	obtained	a	secret	deal	with	Wolffs,	trading	subsidies	and	prioritised	network	usage	in	return	for	control	of	the	flow	of	news.122	The	same	was	true	for	Reuters,	and	it	has	been	suggested	that	“during	the	last	forty	years	of	the	nineteenth	century	Reuters	news	agency	functioned	increasingly	as	a	semi-official	institution	of	the	British	Empire.”123	In	a	similar	fashion	to	Wolffs,	Reuters	reached	an	agreement	with	the	Foreign	Office	in	July	1894:		 That	[Reuters]	will	forward	all	political	telegrams	to	the	person	designated	by	the	Secretary	of	State	as	soon	as	they	are	received.		 That	in	regard	to	any	telegrams	of	which	the	correctness	may	seem	doubtful,	or	the	publication	inexpedient,	time	will	be	given	for	rectification	before	they	are	sent	to	the	press.		 That	confidential	reports	of	information	received	from	your	Agents	on	the	Continent	will	be	compiled	by	Dr	Engländer	[Reuters’	representative	in	the	negotiations]	and	forwarded	for	the	Secretary	of	State’s	information.	That	the	Company	will	publish	on	its	own	authority	through	its	Agents	abroad	any	statements	or	announcements	which	may	be	requested	by	the	Secretary	of	State,	strict	secrecy	being	observed	as	to	the	source	from	which	they	are	derived.	The	sum	to	be	paid	to	the	Company	in	consideration	of	the	above	to	be	£500	per	annum.124																																																										121	Read,	The	Power	of	News;	Storey,	Graham.	Reuters'	Century:	1851-1951.	London:	Max	Parrish,	1951.	122	Ibid.	123	Ibid.,	p.	49.	124	Ibid.,	91.	
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It	is	an	interesting	point	to	make	that	it	was	Reuters	who	initiated	the	agreement	and	not	the	Foreign	Office	with	Engländer	approaching	Permanent	Under-Secretary	of	the	Foreign	Office,	Sir	Thomas	Sanderson.125	What	is	clear	is	that	both	the	major	bureaux	and	their	states	recognised	the	value	in	a	symbiotic	relationship,	but	also	maintained	an	independent	position	outward.		 It	was	only	natural	that	nationally	based,	territorial	information	empires	would	support	their	domestic	counterparts	in	the	territorial	First	World	War.	“After	a	year	of	war,	Wolff	and	Havas	were	acting	avowedly	and	aggressively	as	national	Agencies.”126	This,	of	course,	demanded	some	sort	of	a	response	from	Reuters,	a	demand	that	was	not	unwelcome	to	the	agency.	Six	months	after	the	start	of	the	war,	Baron	Herbert	Reuter	himself	tellingly	wrote	to	Roderick	Jones,	the	man	who—unbeknownst	to	them	both—would	soon	lead	the	company:		 We	here	who	have	professionally	to	watch	and	follow,	and,	for	the	proper	conduct	of	the	Reuter	organisation,	interpret	the	meaning	of	all	that	unfolds	itself	to	the	eye	of	the	observer,	are	staggered	by	the	energy,	resources,	organisation,	and	skill	with	which	the	Germans	entered	into,	and	have	conducted	this	stupendous	conflict.	Every	day	I	realise	more	deeply	the	colossal	task	before	us,	and	the	necessity	of	sparing	no	sacrifice	to	succeed	where	failure	spells	ruin	to	three	Empires,	and	will	involve	the	unspeakable	blight	of	German	military	tyranny	over	the	whole	Continent.127			It	was	clear	that	Reuters	was	to	be	partisan	in	its	interpretation.	This	became	all	the	more	important	when	the	German	origin	of	the	Reuter	family	became	a	public	question	at	the	start	of	the	war.128	Reuters	had,	in	the	years	leading	up	to	and	into	the	war,	experienced	a	distinct	downturn	due	to	business	gambles	involving	a	failed	advertising	section	and	a	banking	section.	A	weakening	company,	coinciding	with	a	war	that	more	and	more	demonstrated	the	value	of	controlling	information,	meant	that	fears	arose	concerning	the	political	allegiance	of	its	shareholders.	When,	upon	hearing	the	news	of	his	wife’s	sudden	death,	director	Baron	Herbert	committed	suicide,																																																									125	Ibid.	126	Storey,	Reuters’	Century.	p.	157.	127	Read,	The	Power	of	News.	p.	118.	128	Read,	The	Power	of	News.	
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the	cup	finally	flowed	over.	Roderick	Jones	jostled	his	way	into	the	position	of	managing	director	in	October	1915,	and	within	a	month	the	company	had	been	turned	out	of	net	loss.129		 Jones	and	the	Chairman	of	the	company,	Mark	Napier,	then	began	a	campaign	to	completely	restructure	the	company	so	as	to	function	without	being	“exposed	to	the	whims	of	a	large	body	of	shareholders.”130	In	Jones’	own	blunt	words:	“the	only	way	to	make	certain	of	Reuters’	safety,	and	of	our	own	personal	security	in	Reuters,	was	to	get	rid	of	the	shareholders	altogether.”131	Napier	had	shared	lawyers’	chambers	with	the	then-Prime	Minister	H.	H.	Asquith	and	thus	had	inroads	to	the	kind	of	political	support	that	would	help	in	such	a	situation.	It	was,	however,	not	an	easy	task,	and	the	final	attempt	to	restructure	the	firm	was	successful	in	the	autumn	of	1916,	a	year	after	Jones	had	begun	his	efforts.	The	reconstruction	in	itself,	however,	is	a	brilliant	example	of	the	role	Reuters	came	to	embody	in	the	war.132			 The	familial	connections	of	power	are	again	here	apparent:	Asquith’s	brother-in-law	was	Lord	Glenconner,	the	chairman	of	the	Union	Bank	of	Scotland	and	a	friend	of	Napier.	It	sounds	almost	like	the	premise	of	a	bad	joke:	the	Prime	Minister,	the	banker	and	the	Reuters	chairman	arranged	for	the	shareholders	to	receive	a	windfall	sum	to	buy	them	out	of	the	company.	The	sum,	borrowed	from	the	Union	Bank	had	been	secretly	guaranteed	by	the	British	Government	to	be	repaid	within	three	years.	The	new	company	was	to	be	owned	equally	by	Jones	and	Napier,	though	this	was	also	kept	secret.	999	shares	were	issued	at	the	launch	of	the	new	Reuters,	498	of	which	were	divided	between	Jones	and	Napier.	The	Foreign	Office,	through	the	virtue	of	the	loan	guarantee,	divided	500	of	the	shares	between	three	more	or	less	nominal	“public	figures	above	suspicion.”133	The	final	remaining	share	was	designated	a	public	policy	share	which	in	effect	“allowed	the	Foreign	Office	secretly	to	nominate	one	director	with	powers	to	veto	the	appointment	of	any	other	director;	to	veto	any	
																																																								129	Ibid.	p.	128.	130	Ibid.	p.	129.	131	Ibid.	p.	130.	132	Ibid.	133	Ibid.	p.	131.	
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share	transfer;	and	to	exercise	a	veto	on	questions	of	public	policy.”134	The	arrangement	was	described	by	the	Foreign	Office	to	Napier	in	1916:		 …the	Foreign	Office	should	be	able	both	to	prevent	the	Company	from	taking	any	action	which	might	be	contrary	to	public	policy	(such	as	the	dissemination	of	reports	prejudicial	to	the	national	interest,	the	employment	of	undesirable	correspondents	or	other	employees,	the	undertaking	or	continuation	of	undesirable	contracts	with	other	news	agencies,	or	the	admission	of	undesirable	persons	as	shareholders	or	directs)	and	also	to	secure	that	the	Company’s	operations	and	actions	are	in	conformity	with	the	public	policy	or	the	national	interest,	and	that	information	of	national	importance	is	properly	collected	and	circulated.135		This	is	clearly	a	significant	measure	of	control	held	by	the	Foreign	Office	over	the	agency.	Indeed,	several	authors	describe	the	terms	of	the	establishment	of	Reuters	Ltd.	as	an	effective	government	takeover	of	the	agency	at	least	for	the	remainder	of	the	war.136		 An	even	clearer	example	of	Reuters’	role	is	the	Agence-Reuter	service	launched	in	1914.	Officially	kept	apart	from	Reuters’	operations,	the	agency	still	used	the	Reuter	name	and	operated	out	of	Reuters’	headquarters	in	London.	It	was	set	up	in	order	to	distribute	wartime	news	propaganda	to	Allied	and	neutral	countries	and	was	attached	to	the	regular	Reuters	dispatches.	Jones	wrote	about	the	service:	“Its	object	is	to	secure	that	a	certain	class	of	news,	of	propaganda	value,	is	cabled	at	greater	length	than	would	be	possible	in	the	normal	Reuter	service.”137	Reuters	made	very	little	financially	from	this	service	and	in	a	very	real	sense	put	its	own	credibility	on	the	line,	it	can	thus	be	seen	as	a	nationalistic	sacrifice	for	the	good	of	the	country.138			 Reuters’	new	practices	certainly	had	an	effect.	By	1915,	concentrated	efforts	were	being	made	in	Germany,	for	example,	to	expose	Reuters’	partisan																																																									134	Ibid.	p.	131.	135	Ibid.,	p.	131-132.	136	Redley,	Michael.	Origins	of	the	Problem	of	Trust:	Propaganda	during	the	First	World	War.	Communication	in	the	Age	of	Suspicion:	Trust	and	the	Media.	eds.	Vian	Bakir	and	David	M.	Barlow.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2007.	pp.	27-38;	Putnis,	Peter.	Share	999.	Media	History,	vol.	14,	no.	2.	Aug.	2008.	pp.	141-165.	137	Read,	The	Power	of	News.	p.	134.	138	Ibid.	
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bent.139	Jones	was	rather	proud	of	this	effect,	which	is	unsurprising	given	the	sort	of	awe-like	descriptions	that	were	lavished	on	the	company.	In	November	1917	he	quoted	an	article	from	the	Vossische	Zeitung	of	Berlin:	“We	might	march	into	Petrograd	or	Paris	tomorrow…	If	Reuter,	the	day	after,	assured	the	honest	neutral	that	it	was	of	no	importance,	he	would	be	believed.	Reuter	rules	the	market,	not	Wolff;	London	makes	foreign	opinion,	not	Berlin.”140	This	is	a	meaningful	concession	from	the	German	media	at	a	critical	point	in	the	war	and	should	demonstrate	the	flair	and	success	with	which	Reuters	commanded	public	opinion.		 Even	this	Agence-Reuter	service,	clearly	cooperative	as	it	was,	pales	in	comparison	to	Roderick	Jones’	own	personal	involvement	in	the	propaganda	mission.	When	the	Department	of	Information	came	into	being	in	1917	(an	event	described	in	the	next	section	on	the	Ministry	of	Information),	Jones	was	offered	a	position	in	its	cable	and	wireless	propaganda	section.	Though	he	purportedly	took	the	position	without	pay,	the	dual	role	as	head	of	the	office	that	created	content	and	also	head	of	the	office	that	distributed	this	content	is	undeniably	a	conflict	of	interest.141		 When	the	Department	was	reformed	to	become	a	Ministry	under	Lord	Beaverbrook,	Jones	was	made	the	director	of	propaganda,	still	unpaid	and	still	managing	director	of	Reuters.	This	drew	public	criticism	and	finally,	in	July	1918,	the	Select	Committee	on	National	Expenditure	began	an	enquiry.	Large	sums	of	money	were	of	course	being	paid	from	the	Ministry	to	Reuters	and	the	Select	Committee	found	this	objectionable	on	principle.	Despite	unquestionably	being	involved	in	the	negotiation	of	these	payments,	Jones	continually	defended	his	dual	capacity.	With	pressure	mounting,	Jones	finally	resigned	from	the	Ministry	of	Information	in	September	1918,	having	earned	the	gratitude	of	Beaverbrook	and	made	his	own	impact	on	the	official	propaganda	services.142		 There	was	thus	clearly	heavy	involvement	from	Reuters,	and	indeed	all	of	the	major	national	news	agencies,	in	the	war.	It	cannot	be	said	to	be	surprising,	given	the	unprecedented	nature	of	the	war.	New	technologies	were	being																																																									139	Storey,	Reuters’	Century.	140	Read,	The	Power	of	News.	p.	135.	141	Ibid.	142	Ibid.	
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employed	in	national	service	on	all	fronts,	and	one	would	have	to	be	a	particularly	entrenched	sort	of	idealist	to	suppose	that	communications	and	information	technology	would	remain	aloof.	This	cooperation	between	press	and	politics	will	of	course	be	further	explored	in	the	case	of	Kenney’s	work				THE	MINISTRY	OF	INFORMATION		The	title	of	this	section	reflects	only	the	late	iteration	of	the	British	propaganda	machine,	though	the	section	itself	deals	with	relevant	developments	before	and	beyond	the	point	at	which	the	Ministry	was	created.	Significant	to	the	argument	is	especially	the	structure	and	hierarchy	present	in	the	system,	described	first	in	its	bureaucratic	development,	and	then	in	its	particularly	significant	members.		
The	Making	of	the	Machine143		The	development	of	the	British	propaganda	machinery	is	a	cornerstone	of	the	thesis	argument.	One	important	feature	to	take	note	of	is	the	chaos	present	in	the	bureaucracy,	raising	questions	about	efficiency.	Contrasting	this	development	section	with	Kenney’s	rather	uniform,	stable	work	in	Norway	(laid	out	in	Chapter	IV),	one	can	begin	to	wonder	who	were	the	true	creators	of	propaganda	policy:	the	London	bureaucracy	or	the	men	on	the	ground?	In	addition	to	the	comparison,	this	section	also	serves	to	illustrate	more	context	around	Kenney’s	work,	especially	the	larger	links	in	the	chain	of	command	and	the	priority	given	to	propaganda	work.	British	propaganda	had	been	a	relative	priority	since	the	start	of	the	war.	Anti-British	propaganda	in	neutral	countries	had	bloomed	as	a	consequence	of	German	efforts	at	the	outbreak,	and	the	Cabinet	quickly	found	that	a	counter-																																																								143	This	section	evolved	from	a	paper	presented	at	the	British	International	Studies	2013	conference	in	Birmingham.	The	paper	was	presented	at	a	British	International	History	Group	sponsored	panel	entitled	‘Anglo-Scandinavian	Relations	in	the	20th	Century’.	The	paper	can	be	found	and	downloaded	at	http://bisa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_bisa&task=download_paper&no_html=1&passed_paper_id=339.	
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measure	was	necessary.	The	Foreign	Office	[FO],	being	the	primary	department	to	deal	with	international	affairs,	quickly	seized	upon	what	it	felt	was	in	its	rightful	domain.	This	became	the	formation	of	the	News	Department	in	the	FO.	The	News	Department	was	created	to	handle	the	demand	for	news	about	the	war	from	both	foreign	and	domestic	correspondents.	It	functioned	mainly	as	a	distribution	office,	not	necessarily	creating	propaganda	products,	but	rather	monitoring	and	controlling	the	flow	of	information.	A	novel—and	to	many,	a	distasteful	task—,	it	received	hesitant	acceptance	as	the	war	proved	to	drag	on.144	It	can	be	said	that	the	News	Department	was	the	first	reluctant	step	into	the	field	of	propaganda	for	the	British	government.		 Parallel	to	this,	the	Foreign	Office,	through	the	course	of	the	war,	became	gradually	weakened	as	an	institution	of	the	state.	This	was	not	all	that	surprising;	in	war,	the	practice	of	foreign	relations	becomes	much	more	complicated,	and	priorities	become	shuffled.	So	when	war	broke	out	in	1914,	the	whole	structure	of	decision-making	was	altered.	Matters	previously	left	to	the	Foreign	Office	and	the	Foreign	Secretary	were	now	war	matters	and	the	final	say-so	on	these	had	to	come	from	the	Cabinet.	Furthermore,	the	rather	troubled	leadership	of	Sir	Edward	Grey,	Foreign	Secretary	until	1916,	also	depleted	the	power	of	the	Foreign	Office	in	these	first	two	years.145	Perhaps	because	of	this	slow	weakening	of	the	Foreign	Office,	and	its	hesitance	to	fully	engage	with	the	topic	of	offensive	propaganda,	new,	more	direct	measures	were	taken.	One	of	the	major	offices	that	came	into	being	soon	after	the	News	Department	was	the	War	Propaganda	Bureau,	headed	by	Charles	Masterman.146	Masterman	coloured	the	methods	and	practices	of	early	British	propaganda	in	such	a	way	that	they	differed	from	the	German	style.	He	was																																																									144	Taylor,	Philip	M.	The	Foreign	Office	and	British	Propaganda	during	the	First	World	War.	The	Historical	Journal,	vol.	23,	no.	4.	Cambridge	University	Press	,	Dec.	1980.	pp.	875-898.	pp.	876-880.	145	Warman,	Roberta	M.	The	Erosion	of	Foreign	Office	Influence	in	the	Making	of	Foreign	Policy,	1916-1918.	The	Historical	Journal,	vol.	15,	no.	1.	Cambridge	University	Press,	Mar.	1972.	pp.	133-59,	p.	134.	146	Messinger,	Gary	S.	British	Propaganda	and	the	State	in	the	First	World	War.	Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	1992.	p.	38.	;	Reeves,	Nicholas.	Film	Propaganda	and	Its	Audience:	The	Example	of	Britain's	Official	Films	during	the	First	World	War.	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	vol.	18,	no.	3.	Sage	Publications,	July	1983.	pp.	463-94.	p.	463.	;	Taylor,	The	Foreign	Office,	p.	877.	
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intent	on	that	the	government	programme	was	to	be	kept	secret	from	the	public.	He	also	stressed	the	importance	of	facts,	as	opposed	to	falsities,	rather	relying	on	selective	representation	of	those	facts	for	political	effect.	The	German	propaganda	effort	was	ruled	heavy	handed	and	simple-minded,	so	Masterman	made	an	effort	to	promote	subtler	material,	with	a	keen	sense	of	who	the	audience	was	in	order	to	tailor	the	effort	accordingly.147			 This	new	model	of	propaganda	practice	was	not	without	drawbacks.	Masterman’s	effort	to	keep	secret	his	and	his	bureau’s	work	meant	that	his	labour	went	largely	unnoticed.	The	War	Propaganda	Bureau	had	been	headquartered	at	Wellington	House,	a	moniker	by	which	the	bureau	itself	soon	began	to	be	called.	Wellington	House	was	also	the	headquarters	of	the	National	Health	Insurance	Commission,	Masterman’s	previous	employer,	which	meant	that	traffic	in	and	out	of	the	building	was	nothing	noteworthy,	and	the	bureau	thus	remained	hidden	in	plain	sight.	The	British	government	faced	quite	a	bit	of	criticism	from	its	own	people	due	to	the	apparent	lack	of	engagement	with	the	question	of	popular	opinion.148		The	truth	was,	as	is	now	known,	very	different.	The	War	Propaganda	Bureau	quickly	outgrew	the	FO	News	Department	to	become	the	most	productive	propaganda	office.149	Masterman’s	organization	was	large	and	sprawling	and	the	sub-departments	and	management	structure	were	unprecedented	for	this	type	of	work	in	Britain.	Again,	as	with	the	Foreign	Office,	the	main	thrust	of	the	bureau,	the	Cabinet	decided,	was	to	be	employed	in	commanding	public	opinion	in	neutral	and	allied	countries.150	This	was	again	a	departure	from	strident	methods	of	propaganda,	the	kind	used	offensively	by	Germany	at	this	time.151		The	different	departments	of	the	War	Propaganda	Bureau	were	tasked	with	monitoring	the	public	opinion	in	their	respective	geographical	areas.	This	meant	studying	newspapers	and	gathering	information	on	whatever	might	be																																																									147	Messinger,	British	Propaganda,	p.	38	;	Taylor.	The	Foreign	Office.	p.	877.	148	Messinger,	British	Propaganda;	Reeves,	Film	Propaganda.	149	Taylor,	The	Foreign	Office.	p.	877.	150	Messinger,	British	Propaganda	;	Reeves,	Film	Propaganda.	p.	463.	151	Bernays,	Edward	L.	The	Marketing	of	National	Policies:	A	Study	of	War	Propaganda.	Journal	of	Marketing,	vol.	6,	no.	3.	American	Marketing	Association,	Jan.	1942.	pp.	236-44;	Messinger,	British	Propaganda,	p.	38.	
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useful	for	propaganda	purposes.	Of	course,	the	region	of	the	highest	priority	was	that	of	the	United	States,	but	other	neutral	and	allied	countries	were	also	targeted,	like,	in	our	case,	the	Scandinavian	countries	whose	department	was	headed	by	William	Archer.152	From	time	to	time,	specific	situations	called	for	the	bureau	to	send	out	its	own	people	to	assess	their	regions	in	person	and	to	provide	strategies	for	propaganda	production.	The	information	gathered	was	subsequently	translated	into	the	appropriate	language	and	produced	as	content.	Once	content	had	been	created,	the	material	was	passed	on	to	the	Foreign	Office	News	Department,	which	disseminated	it	to	its	various	officials	abroad,	mostly	within	diplomatic	or	consular	circles.	Often	the	diplomatic	officers	in	the	targeted	region	would	function	as	direct	agents	for	the	News	Department,	as	was	true	in	Kenney’s	case.153		The	broad	range	of	British	war	publicity	work,	under	which	Masterman’s	bureau	and	the	News	Department	can	be	categorised,	was	indeed	a	byzantine	construction,	and	subsequently,	the	mess	of	offices,	responsibilities	and	contradictory	departments,	eventually	led	to	Masterman’s	fall	and	the	fundamental	restructuring	of	the	system.	Aside	from	the	described	work	of	the	War	Propaganda	Bureau,	the	Press	Bureau	handled	newspaper	censorship,	the	War	Office	took	care	of	censorship	of	communication	through	post,	cable	and	wireless,	working	together	with	a	separate	censorship	office	at	the	Admiralty,	and	the	Foreign	Office	News	Department	and	the	Home	Office	Neutral	Press	Committee	both	carried	out	the	publishing	of	news	articles.154		This	confusing,	lateral	structure	of	war	publicity	kept	escalating	and	by	the	close	of	1915,	the	system	had	developed	two	opposing	camps.	The	civilian	Foreign	and	Home	Offices	on	the	one	side	(with	their	respective	News	Department	and	Neutral	Press	Committee	bodies)	were	pitted	against	the	military	offices	at	the	War	Office	and	the	Admiralty	on	the	other;	each	side	trenchantly	concerned	with	their	own	views	on	what	was	necessary,	desirable	and	prudent.155		
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A	good	example	of	the	lack	of	structure	in	the	British	propaganda	effort	at	this	point	is	the	position	of	George	Herbert	Mair,	who	incidentally	is	also—in	all	probability—Kenney’s	first	point	of	entry	into	the	business.	Mair	had	been	first	given	charge	of	the	Neutral	Press	Committee,	the	third	major	propaganda	office	next	to	the	News	Department	and	the	War	Propaganda	Bureau.	This	Committee	officially	operated	under	the	Home	Office.	The	Foreign	Office	believed	this	was	a	mistake	as	the	nature	of	Mair’s	operations	was	more	in	line	with	the	News	Department	than	any	department	within	the	Home	Office.	Even	the	home	secretary,	Sir	John	Simon	admitted	to	this	in	part,	writing	to	Lord	Robert	Cecil	in	December	1915:	“so	far	as	[Mair’s]	operations	are	guided	by	any	Government	Department,	it	is	by	the	Foreign	Office.”156	It	was	in	fact	this	conflict	over	Mair	and	his	Neutral	Press	Committee	that	threw	the	problem	into	stark	relief.	By	January	1916,	an	inter-departmental	conference	was	called	and	despite	conflicts	mounting	even	here,	there	was	consensus	that	something	had	to	be	done.	Disregarding	the	calls	for	complete	restructuring,	Cecil	decided	to	increase	the	efficiency	of	the	existing	system	with	some	minor	changes.	Mair’s	committee	was	handed	to	the	Foreign	Office,	Masterman	was	promised	to	be	left	in	peace	at	his	bureau,	and	the	Foreign	Office	News	Department	was	restructured	and	streamlined	so	it	could	function	as	the	main	hub	of	international	propaganda.	The	War	Office	received	next	to	nothing	in	Cecil’s	new	scheme	and	the	conflict	between	the	Foreign	and	War	Office	steadily	rose.157	Cecil’s	scheme	did	improve	the	system	slightly,	but	the	confusion	remained	clear.	Even	Mair,	with	his	new,	seemingly	clear	directive	proved	to	have	difficulties	in	practice	as	he	reportedly	as	late	as	in	1917	“drifted	between	the	Home	Office,	Press	Bureau	and	the	Foreign	Office.”158	Less	than	a	year	later,	towards	the	end	of	1916,	the	whole	machinery	of	British	propaganda	again	underwent	a	major	restructuring.	This	was	prompted	by	the	instatement	of	Lloyd	George	as	Prime	Minister	on	December	7th,	1916.	With	Asquith’s	departure,	and	the	establishment	of	Lloyd	George’s	War	Cabinet,	the	Foreign	Office’s	position	was	further	weakened.	The	War	Cabinet	was																																																									156	Taylor,	The	Foreign	Office.	p.	882.	157	Ibid.,	p.	884.	158	Ibid.,	p.	879.	
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designed	to	streamline	war	policy	by	eliminating	structural	and	departmental	confusion.	It	was	a	direct	result	of	the	mess	experienced	in	the	field	of	propaganda,	only	on	a	larger	scale.	The	Cabinet	only	had	five	members,	and	Balfour,	the	new	Foreign	Secretary,	was	not	one	of	them.	Although	in	practice	Balfour	was	present	at	many	of	the	meetings,	he	had	no	direct	power	to	influence	policy.	Balfour	and	the	Foreign	Office	were	therefore	in	a	weakened	position	at	this	point,	though	they	still	had	a	proverbial	foot	in	the	door	when	it	came	to	the	distribution	of	propaganda	material.159		The	arrangement	of	propaganda	offices,	however,	was	to	be	shaken	up	considerably.	Previously,	Asquith	had	shown	little	interest	in	the	topic	of	propaganda,	and	the	mess	of	departments	had	been	sustained	due	to	inaction	on	his	part	and	the	part	of	his	Cabinet.	However,	three	days	after	Lloyd	George	assumed	power,	at	his	very	first	meeting	with	the	War	Cabinet,	the	new	Prime	Minister	stressed	the	importance	of	propaganda	and	within	a	month,	the	War	Cabinet	decided	to	create	a	department	of	propaganda.	This	was	in	line	with	the	recommendation	from	the	War	Office	and	the	Admiralty,	but	in	some	act	of	compromise	or	characteristically	British	moderation,	the	new	Department	of	Information	was	headquartered	with	the	Foreign	Office.160	It	was	John	Buchan	who	was	given	the	position	at	the	head	of	the	new	Department	of	Information.	Buchan	formally	reported	directly	to	the	Prime	Minister,	and	his	Department	absorbed	Masterman’s	War	Propaganda	Bureau,	the	Neutral	Press	Committee,	and	the	Foreign	Office	News	Department.	The	Department	was	then	structured	so	as	to	maintain	the	production	integrity	of	the	War	Propaganda	Bureau	in	one	section,	pushing	the	distribution	of	news,	cables,	film	and	wireless	into	another	section,	and	political	intelligence	into	a	third.	The	process	of	dissemination	remained	much	the	same,	with	the	Foreign	Office’s	diplomatic	network	serving	as	the	main	channel.	Thus,	the	Foreign	Office	had	largely	maintained	and	consolidated	its	control	over	the	propaganda	machinery.161		
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The	solution	of	the	Department	ultimately	still	proved	to	be	unsatisfactory.	Buchan,	as	department	head,	had	little	influence	in	the	greater	structure	of	policymaking.	Furthermore,	his	bias	toward	the	Foreign	Office	made	matters	difficult	when	dealing	with	other	offices	of	the	state.	The	Department	also	suffered	since	it	was	not	a	ministry	and	thus	was	not	properly	represented.	Deadlock	on	the	fields	of	war	added	pressure	to	reform	alternative	methods	of	warfare,	of	which	the	Department	of	Information	was	one.	With	all	of	these	factors	weighing	heavily	on	Buchan	and	his	Department,	the	decision	was	made	in	January	1918	to	create	a	Ministry	of	Information.162	The	new	Ministry	was	set	up	the	following	month,	with	Lord	Beaverbrook	at	its	helm.	A	parallel	department	designed	to	engage	in	enemy	propaganda	was	also	established	under	Lord	Northcliffe	at	the	same	time.	Beaverbrook	did	not	carry	forward	Buchan’s	special	relationship	with	the	Foreign	Office.	The	Foreign	Office,	in	fact,	experienced	a	renewed	decline	in	influence	and	existed	in	conflict	with	other	departments,	especially	the	War	Cabinet,	the	War	Office,	the	Cabinet	Secretariat,	and	even	Lloyd	George	himself.	But	the	greatest	opponent	to	the	Foreign	Office	during	the	war	was,	pertinently,	the	Ministry	of	Information.	Since	1917,	the	then	Department	of	Information	had	begun	to	include	policy	suggestions	in	its	memoranda.	Under	Beaverbrook,	this	practice	expanded	and	the	Ministry	began	to	champion	its	own	interpretations	of	established	foreign	policy,	causing	rifts	in	the	practical	cooperation	of	the	Foreign	Office	diplomats	and	Ministry	of	Information	agents.	Although	both	the	Foreign	Office	and	the	Ministry	fought	through	the	summer	of	1918	to	clear	up	the	issue,	no	solution	was	reached.163		In	the	restructuring,	the	News	Department	had	been	transferred	out	of	the	Foreign	Office	into	the	new	Ministry.	In	return	for	giving	up	the	News	Department,	the	Foreign	Office	received	the	political	intelligence	section	previously	housed	under	the	Department	of	Information.	This	section	was	renamed	the	Political	Intelligence	Department,	and	was	a	major	stumbling	block	in	the	ensuing	conflict	between	the	Ministry	and	the	Foreign	Office.	In	a	dramatic	move	in	March	1918,	Beaverbrook	managed	to	regain	the	Political	Intelligence																																																									162	Taylor,	The	Foreign	Office.	p.	891.	163	Warman,	The	Erosion	of	Foreign	Office	Influence.	p.	140.	
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Department	from	the	Foreign	Office	through	an	inter-departmental	conference	decision.	Immediately,	the	staff	of	the	Political	Intelligence	Department	resigned	
en	masse,	forcing	Beaverbrook	to	backtrack	and	before	long,	the	department	was	again	housed	at	the	Foreign	Office.164	The	bureaucratic	gridlock	remained.	And	as	the	war	sputtered	to	a	close,	no	grand	unifying	solution	had	been	reached.	The	Ministry	remained	decidedly	unpopular	with	civil	servants	due	to	its	heavy,	labyrinthine	structure,	where	management	was	given	to	bureaucrats	in	place	of	practitioners.	As	will	be	evident	in	Chapter	IV,	there	are	often	instances	in	which	a	civil	servant	functioned	under	several	different	departments	simultaneously	while	only	being	paid	by	one.	This	often	occurred	when	departmental	politics	hindered	particular	work	in	being	carried	out,	or	when	colleagues	reached	across	the	structure	that	split	them.	In	Kenney’s	case,	for	example,	he	jumped	between	the	News	Department,	the	Ministry	of	Information	and	the	Political	Intelligence	Department.	What	is	understood	is	that	the	machinery	developed	from	the	sport	of	amateur	gentlemen	into	a	burgeoning	office	of	the	state,	not	without	teething	issues	and	growing-pains.	Kenney’s	operation	in	Norway	must	be	seen	in	light	of	these	developments,	and	they	will	be	cross-referenced	in	the	discussion	of	his	work.	So	far,	an	apt	description	of	the	machine	is	one	whose	end	product	matches	with	greater	wartime	strategy,	but	whose	cogs	and	flywheels	are	too	intricate	to	appropriately	describe	tactics.	An	examination	of	those	significant	persons	who	coloured	the	development	will	serve	to	further	contextualise	Kenney’s	labour.		
Persons	of	Interest:	The	Propagandists		In	placing	value	on	Kenney’s	position	within	an	international	system,	it	is	necessary	to	also	be	familiar	with	the	context	of	this	position.	Position	in	itself	depends	entirely	on	context,	of	course,	as	it	is	necessarily	a	property	of	relation.	This	is	the	reason	for	the	inclusion	of	this	particular	section	of	the	chapter,	as	well	as	the	corresponding	‘Persons	of	Interest’	sections	in	Chapters	IV	and	VII.																																																									164	Taylor,	The	Foreign	Office.	p.	894.	
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Perhaps	the	most	obvious	clues	to	look	for	are	the	persons	with	whom	Kenney	had	contact,	what	sort	of	people	these	were	and	what	positions	they	held.	Kenney’s	relation	to	powerful	characters	is	doubtless	a	qualitative	measure	of	his	own	import	to	the	system.		 This	particular	section,	however,	so	as	to	avoid	overlap	(with	the	section	in	Chapter	IV),	focuses	less	on	persons	who	had	direct	contact	with	Kenney.	Such	persons	will	of	course	be	much	more	interesting	to	examine	in	the	context	of	Kenney’s	work.	Therefore,	this	section	seeks	rather	to	frame	the	population	of	the	British	propaganda	machine,	in	order	to	give	an	overview	of	what	kind	of	people	were	involved.	This	is	again	useful	as	a	reference	for	Kenney’s	involvement	in	the	greater	sense,	defining	the	stratum	of	which	he	was	a	part,	and	adding	context	to	later	encounters.	It	may	also	be	useful	to	keep	in	mind	the	idea	of	the	small	cores	of	power,	as	were	discussed	previously,	as	examples	of	these	are	prevalent	in	this	section.		 Perhaps	the	most	interesting	and	renowned	personalities	from	the	early	history	of	British	official	propaganda	are	the	Lords	Northcliffe	and	Beaverbrook,	John	Buchan	(later	styled	Lord	Tweedsmuir),	Charles	Masterman,	Prime	Ministers	Herbert	Asquith	and	David	Lloyd	George,	and	Lord	Robert	Cecil,	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	Foreign	Affairs.	An	excellent	resource—at	least	for	the	first	half	of	this	list,	the	half	containing	those	who	can	be	considered	primarily	propagandists,	as	opposed	to	politicians—is	Gary	S.	Messinger’s	book	
British	Propaganda	and	the	State	in	the	First	World	War.	Messinger	relates	the	history	of	the	propaganda	bureaucracy	from	this	period	through	a	series	of	biographical	chapters,	and	it	is	highly	recommended	as	a	more	in-depth	analysis	of	those	populating	this	new	venture.		 Chronologically,	it	makes	the	most	sense	to	begin	with	Prime	Minister	Asquith.	Asquith	had	of	course	been	the	natural	successor	to	Prime	Minister	Campbell-Bannerman,	having	served	as	his	chancellor	of	the	exchequer.	Winston	Churchill	praised	his	work	ethic,	even	comparing	the	new	Prime	Minister	to	Sir	Robert	Peel.165	It	almost	goes	without	saying	that	Asquith	belonged	to	a	highly																																																									165	Hazlehurst,	Cameron.	Asquith	as	Prime	Minister,	1908-1916.	The	English	
Historical	Journal,	vol.	85,	no.	336.	Oxford	University	Press,	July	1970.	pp.	502-531.	
	 66	
privileged	set	of	men.	His	stance	toward	the	need	for	propaganda	was	a	reluctantly	pragmatic	one,	as	evidenced	by	the	snail’s	pace	at	which	the	mess	of	offices	congealed	in	the	early	years	of	the	war.	He	recognised	its	value,	but	was	more	comfortable	with	the	work	being	carried	out	by	“private	or	quasi-governmental	organisations.”166	Lloyd	George,	even	during	Asquith’s	time,	worked	within	these	bounds,	though	he	would	push	the	limits	from	time	to	time,	consorting,	as	he	did,	with	Fleet	Street	journalists	and	taking	an	interest	in	the	topic.167	After	Lloyd	George	had	cleverly	manoeuvred	his	way	into	Asquith’s	seat,	however,	he	shed	these	restraints	and	pushed	a	much	more	active	propaganda	campaign,	playing	a	key	role	in	centralising	the	offices	into	first	the	Department	and	later	the	Ministry	of	Information.168	Lloyd	George	as	well	moved	natively	in	the	corridors	of	power.	Lord	Robert	Cecil’s	social	stature	can	also	be	summarily	stated	as	a	high	one,	given	his	title.	Anyone	with	any	knowledge	of	these	three	people,	their	accomplishments	and	their	networks,	would	certainly	not	hesitate	to	mark	them	out	as	people	who	belonged	to	the	highest	of	tiers	in	the	British	social	structure	of	the	time.	Their	personal	and	varyingly	deep	involvement	in	the	propaganda	policy	of	the	time	is	a	testament	both	to	the	importance	of	said	policy	and	also	to	the	kind	of	work	being	done.		 Those	who	worked	more	practically	with	propaganda	can	also	be	described	more	or	less	chronologically,	starting	then,	with	Charles	Masterman.		This	was	the	man	who	headed	the	War	Propaganda	Bureau	from	its	outset,	and	certainly	coloured	the	propaganda	policy	of	Britain.	Some	describe	him	as	a	natural	choice	“if	one	were	to	pick	a	single	person	who,	more	than	any	other,	caused	the	British	state	to	become	a	major	actor	in	the	propaganda	arena.”169	Asquith	appointed	Masterman	to	the	position	of	Under	Secretary	of	the	Local	Government	Board	in	1908.	The	move	was	praised	as	a	good	one,	Masterman	characterised	as	a	“most	unpractical	politician.”170	Masterman’s	rise,	unconventional	as	he	was,	can	be	attributed	in	part	to	social	manoeuvring.	For	example,	he	married	Lucy	Lyttleton,	whose	father	was	a	renowned	military	man																																																									166	Messinger,	British	Propaganda,	p.	4.	167	Ibid.	168	Ibid.	169	Messinger,	British	Propaganda,	p.	25.	170	Hazlehurst,	Asquith	as	Prime	Minister.	p.	506.	
	 67	
and	a	politician.	This	opened	doors	for	him,	leading	him	eventually	to	work	closely	with	Lloyd	George.	However,	Masterman	was	never	to	be	considered	a	member	of	the	cliques	of	power,	regarded	as	“small	fry”	and	“whitebait”171	by	Asquith	and	his	family.	This	is	perhaps	simply	a	demonstration	of	Asquith’s	disdain	for	the	propaganda	work	at	the	start	of	the	war.	Masterman	may	not	have	represented	the	proverbial	cream	of	the	crop,	but	he	was	not	unconnected.	He	in	one	sense	signifies	the	lowest	threshold	of	social	stature	given	a	foothold,	at	a	time	when	the	propaganda	services	were	looked	upon	with	the	lowest	regard.	This	was	due	to	change,	of	course,	when	Lloyd	George	took	over.		 Lloyd	George’s	increased	and	increasing	interest	in	propaganda	matters,	as	well	as	the	difficulties	emerging	between	the	offices	engaged	in	it,	encouraged	a	restructuring	of	the	system.	John	Buchan,	the	novelist,	was	given	the	task	of	constructing	and	directing	the	Department	of	Information.	Buchan	had	come	from	a	religious	family,	and	had,	after	attaining	a	scholarship	for	Oxford	and	taken	the	bar,	gone	with	Lord	Milner	to	South	Africa	“as	one	of	his	assistant	private	secretaries.”172	After	this,	he	had	a	busy	career	both	as	a	lawyer	as	well	as	a	writer,	and	was	held	in	high	regard	by	many	of	the	powerful	people	of	the	time.	For	his	position	at	the	Department,	he	was,	of	course,	appointed	by	Lloyd	George	and	had	prior	to	that	been	recommended	for	the	position	by	Lord	Milner.	Lloyd	George	had	fruitlessly	searched	for	“some	highly	prominent	figure”173	but	Buchan	would	have	to	do.	Again,	he	was	no	aristocrat,	but	had	gained	his	position	in	the	propaganda	machine	through	his	connections	to	the	aristocracy.		The	Lords	Northcliffe	and	Beaverbrook	were	of	course	self-made	men,	though	they	both	quickly	gained	impressive	wealth	and	power.	Beaverbrook	started	out	his	career	under	the	name	of	William	Aitken,	born	without	means	in	Canada.	By	his	thirties	he	had	worked	up	both	wealth	and	influence	through	a	series	of	business	investments.	He	decided	to	use	this	to	obtain	“a	place	for	himself	within	the	Establishment	in	Britain.”174	Earning	his	seat	in	parliament	by	way	of	a	lavish	campaign,	he	then	consolidated	his	power	by	buying	the	Daily	
Express	and	the	Globe.	During	the	war,	Beaverbrook	made	his	influential	and																																																									171	Messinger,	British	Propaganda,	p.	30.	172	Ibid.,	p.	87.		173	Ibid.,	p.	50.	174	Ibid.,	p.	123.	
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eclectic	network	useful	by	strengthening	the	Canadian	and	British	coalition,	earning	a	lot	of	experience	in	publicity	and	press	work.	He	also	grew	close	to	Lloyd	George	and	was	asked	by	him	to	head	the	new	Ministry	of	Information	once	this	took	shape.175	Beaverbrook	being	a	close	friend	to	Lloyd	George,	as	well	as	an	immensely	powerful	press-owner	and	politician,	certainly	points	to	the	seriousness	with	which	the	Cabinet	began	to	regard	propaganda	work	toward	the	close	of	the	war.	Lord	Northcliffe	was	a	similar	sort	of	man.	Born	Alfred	Harmsworth,	to	an	excessively	talented	generation	of	a	semi-successful	family,	Northcliffe	showed	early	proclivities	for	journalism.	He	set	up	his	own	publishing	firm	in	1887	and	quickly	earned	enough	money	to	buy	up	and	found	a	series	of	newspapers	around	the	country,	among	them	the	Daily	Mail176,	The	Times,	and	the	Evening	
News.177	By	the	outbreak	of	war,	Northcliffe	was	the	most	powerful	press-baron	of	Fleet	Street,	indeed,	as	many	said,	“The	Most	Powerful	Man	in	the	Country.”178	He	was	of	course	closely	in	touch	with	the	political	elite,	though	his	relationship	with	Lloyd	George	would	be	a	turbulent	one.	Northcliffe	was	consulted	and	involved	in	much	of	the	higher	policymaking	on	a	casual	level	until	in	1918,	when	the	Ministry	of	Information	was	set	up	under	Lord	Beaverbrook,	and	Beaverbrook	convinced	Lloyd	George	to	give	Northcliffe	the	position	of	Director	of	Propaganda	in	Enemy	Countries.179	Here	again	is	a	testament	to	the	radical	shift	in	importance	placed	on	the	issue.	There	should	be	no	mistaking	that	the	tight-knit	cliques	of	power	described	in	the	earlier	section	extended	well	into	the	arena	of	propaganda	policy.	A	growing	interest	in	the	work	was	expressed	in	the	increasing	stature	of	those	assigned	to	it.	This	is	not	a	surprise,	of	course,	given	the	times,	but	it	does	offer	some	observations	on	the	state	of	the	industry	that	Kenney	entered	into.																																																									175	Ibid.	176	Interestingly,	Northcliffe	hired	Robert	Blatchford	to	write	for	the	Daily	Mail	in	1909.	Blatchford	was	an	early	fascination	of	Kenney’s,	and	perhaps	the	principal	catalyst	for	Kenney’s	staunch	socialist	views.	Ibid.,	p.	149.		177	Ibid.	178	McEwen,	J.	M.	Northcliffe	and	Lloyd	George	at	War,	1914-1918.	The	Historical	
Journal,	vol.	24,	no.	3.	Cambridge	University	Press,	Sep.	1981.	pp.	651-672.	p.	651.	179	Messinger,	British	Propaganda.	
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Working	for	organisations	that	extended	up	to	the	likes	of	Lloyd	George	and	Northcliffe	certainly	speaks	to	the	possibility	of	large-scale	impact.			NORWAY	IN	THE	FIRST	WORLD	WAR		Having	explored	at	length	the	different	facets	of	the	British	position	in	the	First	World	War,	it	is	time	to	look	briefly	at	Norway.	Norway	is	of	course	the	second	country	of	relevance	to	this	paper,	and	much	of	Kenney’s	work	described	in	this	thesis	takes	place	there.	In	this	section,	the	first	point	of	interest	is	Norway’s	position	and	aims	in	the	war;	the	second,	Norwegian	sentiment	toward	the	warring	parties;	before,	finally,	we	examine	the	reasons	for	Norway	being	a	target	of	the	belligerent	states.		 The	purpose	here,	as	has	been	the	purpose	throughout	this	background	chapter,	is	one	of	context.	It	would	be	silly	to	go	into	any	detail	of	Kenney’s	activities	in	Norway	without	understanding	the	specific	situation	in	the	country.	With	regards	specifically	to	the	thesis,	parts	of	this	section	is	also	useful	as	a	justification	for	why	his	activities	in	Norway	can	be	seen	in	the	light	of	international	society—put	simply:	Norway’s	significance.	The	sources	for	this	section	are	in	some	cases	Norwegian	sources.	This	author	has	done	his	best,	as	a	native	speaker	of	Norwegian,	to	translate	these	effectively	while	keeping	faithful	to	their	meaning.	Another	point	on	sources:	Kenney	himself	wrote	an	ambitious	political	history	of	the	Scandinavian	countries	in	1946,	entitled	The	Northern	
Tangle.	Given	that	Kenney	is	the	subject	of	the	thesis,	it	is	amusing	to	use	this	resource	where	it	is	relevant.		
The	Norwegian	Position		By	the	start	of	the	war	in	1914,	Norway	had	been	a	fully	independent	country,	freed	from	its	union	with	Sweden,	for	only	nine	years.	Although	the	union	had	recognised	Norwegian	independence	internally,	Norway’s	foreign	affairs	and	its	crown	were	new	institutions.	The	dissolution	of	the	union	had	been	a	remarkably	peaceful	affair,	and	although	there	were	some	minor	diplomatic	
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tensions	in	the	immediate	aftermath,	the	Scandinavian	countries	quickly	settled	into	what	could	only	be	described	as	a	spirit	of	peace	and	cooperation.180		 Almost	a	century	prior	to	its	full	independence,	Norway	had	passed	a	liberal	constitution—the	first	of	its	kind	in	the	region,	and	thus	enjoyed	a	robust	and	entrenched	democratic	system.	It	had	also	been	the	first	in	the	region	to	adopt	a	parliamentary-style	government	in	1884,	and	by	1912	it	had	granted	full	voting	rights	to	both	men	and	women.	The	pre-war	politics	were	dominated	largely	by	the	Conservative	(Høire)	and	Liberal	(Venstre)	parties,	the	latter	with	“a	clear	social-liberal	profile.”181	It	was	Venstre	who,	in	1912,	secured	a	majority	and	would	guide	the	country	through	the	war.182		 The	Norwegian	economy	was	engaged	in	the	throes	of	industrialisation.	It	was	still	largely	an	agricultural	economy,	but	with	a	distinctive	trend	of	ever-increasing	commercialism	and	export.	The	mining	and	chemical	industries	were	especially	in	bloom,	feeding	raw	materials	to	the	large	European	powers.	Topographically,	the	country	is	a	long	mountain	chain,	offering	little	respite	to	grow	crops	and	greatly	hampering	travel.	For	this	reason,	the	Norwegian	merchant	marine	was	a	key	economic	asset.	This	fleet	was	the	fourth	largest	of	its	kind	in	the	world,	which	is	remarkable	considering	the	relatively	diminutive	size	of	the	Norwegian	population	and	economy.	The	losses	incurred,	both	materially	and	financially	to	the	fleet	would	remain	one	of	the	hottest	topics	of	the	war	to	Norwegians,	and	would	sincerely	test	the	flexibility	of	Scandinavian	and	Norwegian	diplomacy.183		 Militarily,	the	position	was	rather	weak.	Prior	to	the	dissolution	of	the	union,	armament	had	been	somewhat	of	a	priority,	but	only	in	case	of	Sweden	attempting	to	keep	the	union	by	might.	These	forces	were	by	no	means	substantial	enough	to	withstand	or	even	meaningfully	resist	any	of	the	greater	European	powers.	A	relaxation	of	military	preparedness	after	the	successful	dissolution	made	matters	even	more	precarious.	At	the	root,	Norway	expected,																																																									180	Kenney,	Rowland.	The	Northern	Tangle:	Scandinavia	and	the	Post-War	World.	London:	J.	M.	Dent	and	Sons,	1946.		181	Hobson,	Rolf,	et	al.	Introduction:	Scandinavia	in	the	First	World	War.	
Scandinavia	in	the	First	World	War:	Studies	in	the	War	Experience	of	the	Northern	
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in	any	eventuality,	to	be	under	the	protection	of	the	British	Royal	Navy	if	its	neutrality	was	violated.184			 The	Norwegian	position,	culturally	and	politically,	was	decidedly	neutral,	a	decision	made	in	agreement	with	both	Denmark	and	Sweden.	Neutrality	had	been	declared	resolutely	on	the	8th	of	August,	1914,	at	least	by	Norway	and	Sweden.	Five	months	into	the	war,	to	demonstrate	their	position,	the	three	kings	of	their	respective	countries—King	Gustav	V	of	Sweden,	King	Haakon	VII	of	Norway	and	King	Kristian	X	of	Denmark—met	in	Malmö,	Sweden,	alongside	their	entourage	of	foreign	ministers	and	policymakers.	Despite	significantly	divergent	interests,	this	unified	neutrality	would	last	through	the	war,	reaffirmed	in	late	1917	in	Christiania,	Norway.185		Interestingly,	the	initiative	for	the	agreement	came	from	the	Swedish	side,	emerging	out	of	a	more	radical	proposal	from	Swedish	Foreign	Minister	Knut	Wallenberg.	Wallenberg’s	idea	was	to	create	an	offensive-defensive	military	alliance	between	Norway	and	Sweden.	The	alliance	would	prevent	Norway,	whose	natural	proclivities	tended	towards	Britain,	to	ally	itself	with	the	British	and	Russia,	which	in	turn	would	have	forced	Sweden—conversely	tending	towards	Germany—to	ally	with	the	Central	Powers,	thus	avoiding	bringing	the	war	to	their	own	doorstep.	It	would	also,	perhaps	more	fancifully,	attempt	to	keep	Britain	out	of	the	war	by	introducing	an	imposing	neutral	alliance	“instead	of	an	isolated,	controllable	Norway.”186	It	is	not	surprising	that	this	proposal	fell	on	deaf	ears,	however,	given	the	natural	suspicion	of	the	Norwegians	of	any	move	giving	ground	to	the	Swedes.	Nevertheless,	common	neutrality	was	agreed	upon,	and	the	meeting	of	the	three	kings	in	Malmö	cemented	this	pact.		The	Scandinavian	neutrality	however,	was	not	embedded	in	international	treaties,	like	the	neutrality	of	other	small	European	states.	Nor	was	there	really	an	agreed-upon	set	of	rules	to																																																									184	Ibid.;	Salmon,	Patrick.	'Between	the	Sea	Power	and	The	Land	Power':	Scandinavia	and	the	Coming	of	the	First	World	War	1993.	Transactions	of	the	
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govern	neutral	status.	Indeed,	as	Olav	Riste	writes:	“the	world	was	to	enter	the	Great	War	without	a	common	legal	framework	for	the	distribution	of	rights	as	between	neutrals	and	belligerents.”187	In	1865,	in	the	Declaration	of	Paris,	the	rules	of	neutral	trade	in	times	of	war	had	been	set	down.	This	was	the	first	agreement	of	its	kind	and	had	been	signed	by	Great	Britain,	Russia,	Prussia	and	by	1914	had	been	given	the	nod	in	all	but	a	handful	of	countries	(most	notably	the	United	States).	After	this,	a	series	of	additional	declarations	and	agreements	were	proposed,	particularly	the	Hague	Conventions	of	1907	which	dealt	with	contraband,	and	the	London	Declaration	which	was	included	in	the	Naval	Prize	Bill	submitted	to	Parliament	and	voted	down	by	the	House	of	Lords	on	the	12th	of	December,	1911.188	Thus,	it	was	not	entirely	new	territory,	but	the	details	had	yet	to	be	ironed	out	on	the	international	stage.	Therefore,	Scandinavian	neutrality	was	of	a	more	pragmatic	nature,	since	Scandinavia	was	composed	of	small	countries	with	small	military	might	that	depended	on	vast	and	open	economic	ties.	Neutrality	was	rather	a	cultural	tradition	than	a	legal	one.	Indeed,	the	Norwegian	“armed	forces	had	not	been	to	war	or	fired	a	shot	in	anger	since	1814.”189	As	had	been	set	down	in	some	of	the	international	agreements,	there	were	obligations	that	went	along	with	neutrality.	The	neutrals	were,	for	example,	obliged	to	protect	their	waters	from	use	by	warring	parties.	Norway,	on	the	5th	of	August,	mobilized	its	entire	Navy,	as	well	as	a	host	of	supporting	systems	for	a	neutrality	guard.	This	force	would	be	active	and	on	alert	for	the	duration	of	the	war.190		
Not	Quite	Friends	but	Not	Quite	Strangers		Perhaps	one	of	the	most	influential	accounts	of	the	relationship	between	Norway	and	the	warring	parties	is	Professor	Olav	Riste’s	book	The	Neutral	Ally.	The	title	of	the	book	is,	in	any	case,	widely	regarded	as	an	apt	description	of	the	Norwegian	attitude	toward	Britain	during	the	First	World	War;	officially,																																																									187	Riste,	Olav.	The	Neutral	Ally:	Norway’s	Relations	with	Belligerent	Powers	in	the	
First	World	War.	Olso:	Universitetsforlatet,	1965.	p.	26.	188	Ibid.	189	Hobson,	et	al.	Introduction.	p.	25.	190	Ibid.	
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Norway	remained	neutral,	but	unofficially	it	leaned	toward	Britain.	A	major	indication	of	the	Norwegian	inclination	prior	to	the	war	was	its	choice	of	king.	A	plebiscite	had	been	held	in	the	country	after	the	dissolution	of	the	union,	with	a	vast	majority	rejecting	republicanism	in	favour	of	monarchism.	But	who	was	to	be	the	king	of	Norway?	The	Swedish	king	refused	to	accept	the	initial	request	for	one	of	his	own	family,	a	Bernadotte,	to	sit	on	the	new	throne.	So	Norway	turned	to	Denmark	and	their	Prince	Carl.	Incidentally,	Prince	Carl’s	wife,	and	thus	the	new	queen	of	Norway	was	Maud	of	Wales,	daughter	of	Edward	VII.191	Reminiscent	of	royal	diplomacy	from	bygone	centuries,	this	new	constellation	showed	the	clear	pro-British	sympathies	of	the	Norwegians.	The	new	king,	eager	to	demonstrate	his	willingness	to	adopt	the	throne,	took	the	name	King	Haakon,	an	Old	Norse	name	used	by	Norwegian	kings	of	the	past.		 More	indicative,	surely,	was	the	economic	reliance.	With	its	rich	merchant	marine,	Norway	operated	widely	as	a	“carrier	nation.”192	Western	Europe	was	Norway’s	main	focus	of	trade	before	the	war;	in	1913	there	were	“over	7,000	calls	at	British	ports,	more	than	4,000	calls	in	Norway,	and	about	2,300	visits	to	ports	in	the	United	States.”193	Conversely,	France	only	received	1,900	calls;	Germany,	1,700;	and	the	West	Indies	1,400.194	The	deepest	connections	were	made	to	Britain	and	the	United	States.	Somewhat	of	the	same	tendency	can	be	noted	when	looking	at	export	figures,	with	24.31%	of	Norwegian	exports	destined	for	Britain	in	1913,	higher	than	the	20.84%	to	Germany.195	Nevertheless,	over	1/5	of	exports	going	to	Germany	did	mean	a	distinct	reliance	also	on	Germany.	This	was	a	major	case	for	open	neutrality.	The	case	is	even	clearer	with	imports	from	the	same	year,	with	almost	30%	of	Norwegian	imports	arriving	from	Germany,	and	just	shy	of	25%	from	Britain.	It	was	not	clear-cut,	but	the	frequency	of	visits,	as	well	as	the	economic	advantage	vested	in	exportation,	leaned	in	the	British	direction.		 There	were	still	obvious	reservations	to	be	had.	As	will	be	seen	in	the	next	chapter,	the	Norwegian	Foreign	Minister	during	the	war,	Nils	Claus	Ihlen,																																																									191	Salmon,	Patrick.	Between	the	Sea	Power.	192	Riste,	The	Neutral	Ally,	p.	42.	193	Ibid,	p.	42.	194	Ibid.	195	Ibid.	
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was	seen	as	perhaps	the	most	difficult	political	figure	in	Norway	for	the	British	to	stomach.	Interestingly,	Ihlen’s	sometimes	pernicious	attitude	to	the	British	can	be	explained	by	personal	traits.	Ihlen	did,	for	example,	receive	part	of	his	higher	education	at	the	Technical	Institute	of	Zurich,	and	so	“spoke	German	and	French,	but	not	English.”196	And	this	language	question	was	important;	since	the	British	Minister	for	Norway,	Mansfeldt	Findlay,	did	not	speak	Norwegian,	communication	between	the	two	was	done	in	French,	a	language	Ihlen	mastered	better	than	Findlay.197	Perhaps	at	least	some	of	the	troubles	between	these	two	derived	from	a	simple	misunderstanding	and	irritation	of	language.		 The	Norwegian	language	is	of	course	of	Germanic	roots,	as	are	other	aspects	of	its	culture	that	complicate	the	picture	of	Norwegian	allegiances.	Trade	and	economics	held	close	ties	to	the	British,	but	much	of	the	political	culture	(some	translated	through	the	other	Scandinavian	countries)	had	a	distinct	German	bent.	This	was	true	of	education	systems,	arts	and	literature,	as	well	as	political	movements	such	as	the	burgeoning	socialist	movement	which	“owed	much	of	its	inspiration	to	German	sources.”198	In	spite	of	this,	Norway	clearly	leaned	in	favour	of	Britain.		 The	Norwegian	sentiment	was	governed	mainly	by	its	economics.	Official	neutrality	meant	that	it	could	maintain	its	heavily	dependent	trade	network.	A	purely	neutral	stance,	however,	could	have	lost	Norway	the	protection	from	Britain;	protection	that	Norwegian	officials	even	openly	relied	upon.199	This	also	answers	to	political	opportunism,	“simply	because	it	was,	after	all,	less	dangerous	to	antagonize	Germany	than	to	incur	the	wrath	of	Great	Britain.”200		 		
Why	Visit?		The	only	piece	remaining	is	Norway’s	relevance	to	the	warring	parties.	Essentially,	the	question	is:	why	were	Britain	and	Germany	interested	enough	in	Norway	to	spend	time	and	resources	there,	in	this	particular	case,	on																																																									196	Ibid.,	p.	44.		197	Ibid.	198	Ibid.,	p.	43.	199	Salmon,	Between	the	Sea	Power.	200	Riste,	The	Neutral	Ally,	p.	226.	
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propaganda?	Part	of	this	has	already	been	discussed	in	the	first	section	of	this	chapter,	namely	that	Britain	sought	to	use	neutral	countries	to	its	advantage	in	tiring	its	enemies.	The	truth	is	that	it	was	both	in	Britain	and	Germany’s	interest	that	Norway	remain	neutral,	at	least	outwardly	so.	The	reasoning	for	this,	again,	was	the	trade	network.	Both	Britain	and	Germany	benefitted	enormously	from	trade	flowing	peaceably	in	and	out	of	Norway.	Risking	to	upset	this	network	by	an	act	of	aggression	was	out	of	the	picture,	at	least	unless	the	circumstances	changed	dramatically.		 This	was	at	least	the	bigger-picture	position	during	the	war,	but	there	had	been	serious	and	sincere	considerations	of	alternatives	for	a	long	time	prior.	An	internal	memorandum	from	the	British	Admiralty,	dated	the	24th	of	June,	1908	and	entitled	‘Preparation	of	War	Plans’,	reserves	a	special	place	for	Scandinavia.	The	paper	is	not	signed,	but	is	confidently	supposed	to	have	been	drafted	by	“Rear-Admiral	Edmond	Slade,	the	Director	of	Naval	Intelligence,	and	Julian	Corbett,	the	eminent	naval	historian.”201	In	a	passage	concerned	with	the	geographical	regions	of	particular	importance	to	any	eventual	campaign,	Denmark	and	Sweden	are	given	lengthy	consideration,	alongside,	almost	even	superimposed,	to	countries	like	Russia,	Japan,	France	and	Germany.	“Denmark	and	Sweden,”	the	memorandum	states,	“are	hovering	between	the	Sea	Power	[Britain]	and	the	Land	Power	[Germany],	uncertain	with	which	to	throw	in	their	lot,	most	anxious	to	remain	free	from	all	complications,	but,	from	their	geographical	position,	almost	certain	to	be	drawn	into	the	struggle	in	certain	eventualities.”202	The	two	Scandinavian	countries’	weight	in	this	paper	is	surprising;	also	surprising	is	the	omission	of	Norway	(though	it	can	most	likely	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	the	state	had	come	into	its	own	only	three	years	prior,	and	that	its	interests	rested	relatively	squarely	with	British	interests).		 What	is	certainly	the	case	is	that	Scandinavia—and	by	extension,	Norway—was	taken	seriously	in	the	run-up	to	war.	The	main	thrust	of	the	concern	centred	on	the	Baltic	Sea,	a	vital	access	region	for	the	German	and	Russian	navies.	A	series	of	dramatic	rapprochement	plans	and	diplomatic	manoeuvrings	between	various	constellations	of	Russia,	Germany	and	Great																																																									201	Salmon,	Patrick.	Between	the	Sea	Power.	202	Ibid.	p.	23.	
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Britain	played	out	over	this	area	in	the	period	1905-8,	illustrating	its	importance.203	The	crux	lay	in	the	fact	that	access	to	the	Baltic	Sea	demanded	routes	that	crept	into	Scandinavian	maritime	territories	(the	safest	route	passing	well	within	Norwegian	maritime	borders).	If	the	British	Navy	would	block	the	English	Channel,	this	would	be	the	only	access	route	to	the	North	Sea	or	the	Atlantic	available	to	German	and	Russian	maritime	forces.204	Naturally,	the	military	minds	of	the	Great	Powers	began	thinking	about	the	possibility	of	taking	and	controlling	Norwegian	ports	in	the	event	of	war.		 Primarily,	the	idea	was	that	either	the	Germans	would	try	to	establish	free	passage	into	the	Atlantic	by	setting	up	their	own	naval	bases	on	the	western	coast	of	Norway,	or	that	the	British	would	pre-empt	this	possibility	by	seizing	a	defensive	post	on	the	southern	coast.	Since	the	German	fleet	was	more	modest	than	its	British	counterpart,	it	was	assumed	that	the	first	possibility	was	foolhardy,	though	not	beyond	the	realm	of	reason.	Lord	Lansdowne,	the	British	Foreign	Secretary	(1900-1905),	purportedly	said	even	as	early	as	1905	that	a	German	move	of	this	kind	would	be	“a	serious	blow	to	British	interests”205	and	that	it	had	to	be	avoided	at	all	costs.	The	second	possibility,	of	Britain	seizing	ground	in	Norway,	was	held	as	a	viable	option,	even	to	the	extent	of	influencing	the	1907	Integrity	Treaty	for	Norway	so	that	it	would	omit	“any	reference	to	Norwegian	neutrality.”206		 The	Norwegian	authorities	certainly	took	this	into	consideration	by	the	start	of	the	war	in	1914.	Believing,	perhaps,	in	British	naval	superiority,	the	most	likely	event	was	deemed	to	be	a	British	move	to	gain	the	port	of	Kristiansand	on	the	southern	coast	of	the	country.207	This	would	naturally	be	resisted.	The	French	Minister	to	Norway,	Abel	Chevalley,	on	the	31st	of	July,	1914	reported	to	his	superiors	that	“’high	sources’	had	assured	him	of	Norway’s	preparedness	to	defend	herself	against	possible	British	or	German	attempts	to	capture	bases	on	
																																																								203	Ibid.	204	Riste,	The	Neutral	Ally.	205	Ibid.,	p.	34.	206	Ibid.,	p.	34.	207	Ibid.	
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the	south	or	west	coasts.”208	It	would	eventually	become	fairly	clear,	however,	that	no	such	measures	would	be	taken,	and	Norway	would	be	allowed	to	remain	neutral,	and—for	all	intents	and	purposes—ostensibly	unengaged	in	the	war.	So	this	was	the	context	of	Kenney’s	situation	as	he	landed	in	Norway	in	August,	1916.	The	image	to	consider	is	that	Kenney	landed	in	a	neutral	country	of	substantial	interest	both	to	Britain	and	to	Germany.	Considering	the	extent	to	which	the	Norwegians	were	involved	in	wartime	trading,	it	is	not	difficult	to	imagine	the	interests	involved	in	swaying	the	Norwegian	public	opinion	in	one	direction	or	the	other.	Kenney,	in	one	sense,	had	home	advantage,	but	these	were	uncertain	times,	and	there	would	doubtless	be	challenges	that	had	to	be	overcome.			
v v v		The	objective	of	this	chapter	has	been	to	paint	a	picture	of	the	time	and	place	wherein	Kenney	began	his	work	as	a	propagandist	and	secret	agent	for	the	British	Government.	Britain	was	at	war,	and	was	keen	to	employ	allies	and	neutrals	in	order	to	whittle	down	their	enemy,	a	position	which	could	make	use	of	Norway	in	an	indirect	sense.	Kenney’s	work	is	interesting	in	part	because	those	in	charge	of	these	wartime	policies	generally	belonged	to	powerful	cliques	and	had	friends	in	high	places.	This	power	structure	was	also	true	of	the	British	press,	and	of	Reuters,	which	certainly	did	not	object	to	taking	the	British	side	and	fighting	for	the	British	cause.	Recognizing	the	need	to	counter	German	propaganda	efforts,	the	British	organized	their	own	departments	which	grew	from	the	small	ventures	of	gentlemen	amateurs	to	a	sprawling	bureaucratic	beast	by	the	end	of	the	war.	Like	other	power	structures,	the	propaganda	bureaucracy	was	populated	by	powerful	and	influential	people,	increasing	in	influence	in	step	with	the	build-up	of	bureaucracy.	Norway,	in	tune	with	Sweden	and	Denmark,	quickly	declared	neutrality	at	the	start	of	the	war,	mainly	to	protect	its	position	as	a	naval	trade	powerhouse.	In	spite	of	this	declaration	of																																																									208	Interestingly,	Riste	continues:	“He	also	reported	on	German	attempts	to	influence	public	opinion	in	Norway.”	Ibid.,	p.	36.		
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neutrality,	the	Norwegian	sentiment	remained	largely	pro-British	throughout	the	war.	Both	Britain	and	Germany	had	a	vested	interest	in	Norwegian	neutrality,	and	although	these	had	considered	active	plans	including	Norway,	the	development	of	the	war	made	these	plans	unnecessary.		 With	Norway	firmly	planted	outside	the	theatre	of	war,	the	struggle	began	behind	the	curtain.	Propaganda	matters,	though	they	were	often	poorly	regarded	and	initially	poorly	understood,	began	to	take	centre	stage.	Onto	this	stage	stepped	Rowland	Kenney,	32	years	old.	Having	come	from	nothing,	he	would	direct	and	execute	propaganda	policy	in	Norway	for	the	final	two	years	of	the	war.	He	would	construct	a	system	of	information	gathering	and	distribution,	the	likes	of	which	had	not	been	seen.	He	would	topple	a	national	news	agency,	become	a	shepherd	of	Norwegian	popular	opinion,	and	help	shape	the	genesis	of	a	dangerous	and	subtle	discipline.	The	story	begins	in	1916.					 	
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CHAPTER	IV	
THE	FIRST	WORLD	WAR:	ROWLAND	KENNEY	IN	NORWAY		 ‘You	are,	then,	in	effect’,	he	blurted	out	the	first	day,	in	the	lounge	of	the	Grand	Hotel,	the	most	dangerous	place	in	Christiania,	‘a	secret	agent	of	the	Foreign	Office.’209		
	Having	accounted	for	the	background	to	Rowland	Kenney’s	work	in	the	First	World	War	as	a	British	agent	in	Norway,	this	chapter	details	his	activities	and	operations	during	this	period.	This	chapter	examines	the	general	nature	of	his	work,	whereas	the	next	chapter	looks	at	a	more	in	depth	analysis	of	a	specific	and	influential	episode.	The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	display	Kenney’s	work	as	it	is	relevant	to	the	establishment	of	a	system.	Again,	one	of	the	primary	objectives,	then,	is	to	demonstrate	his	position	and	his	influence.	This	is	accomplished	by	reference	back	to	the	context	aspect	presented	in	the	previous	chapter.	This	chapter	also	begins	to	outline,	in	specific,	Kenney’s	role	in	the	development	of	systems,	institutions	and	dynamics.		 In	order	to	meet	this	purpose,	the	chapter	is	composed	of	three	parts.	First,	there	is	the	pseudo-narrative	explanation	of	what	he	was	doing	in	Norway;																																																									209	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Carnegie.	24	July	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	2-3.	
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his	specific	purpose	and	what	he	managed	to	accomplish.	Second,	Kenney’s	network	is	examined,	detailing	persons	of	interest	in	contact	with	Kenney	and	his	relationship	to	them.	Finally,	the	development	of	the	system	of	propaganda	is	given	central	stage	and	an	assessment	is	made	as	to	what	extent	Kenney	had	an	influence	in	advancing	it.			A	MAN	BEHIND	MANY	MOVEMENTS	AND	EVENTS210		It	is	difficult	to	date	Rowland	Kenney’s	exact	arrival	in	Norway,	but	his	general	movements	are	clear.	It	is	known	from	his	autobiography,	Westering,	that	he	went	with	his	new	wife	to	Norway	in	1910	for	their	honeymoon.	After	returning	to	London	and	working	in	Fleet	Street	for	some	time,	he	went	back	to	Norway	in	August	1916,	two	years	after	the	start	of	the	war.	He	would	remain	there,	with	his	family,	throughout	the	war,	save	for	a	handful	of	trips	elsewhere,	mainly	to	Sweden	and	Britain.211			
The	Mission			It	is	useless	to	contemplate	Kenney’s	work	and	influence	without	taking	into	account	the	purpose	for	which	he	was	taken	aboard,	so	to	speak.	Discussing	purpose	assists	in	establishing	a	frame	of	reference	for	his	operations	in	Norway,	and	accomplishing	this	purpose	signifies	some	effect	of	influence.	In	addition,	where	this	purpose	arises	from	can	have	a	lot	to	say	about	what	segment	of	the	institution	Kenney	partook	in,	where	development	may	be	found,	and	the	relative	importance	of	his	task.	Perhaps	the	most	basic	hint	at	purpose	could	be	found	in	the	questions	of	why	he	was	sent	and	who	sent	him.	The	previously	discussed,	chaotic																																																									210	This	subheading	title	is	taken	from	a	Times	Literary	Supplement	review	of	
Westering.	The	phrase,	of	course,	refers	to	Kenney.	McLaren,	Moray	David	Shaw.	Wanderings	of	a	Revolutionary.	Times	Literary	Supplement	[London,	England].	23	Dec.	1939:	739.	Times	Literary	Supplement	Historical	Archive.	Web.	8	Mar.	2013.	211	Kenney,	Westering.	
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development	of	the	relevant	institutions	of	Britain	muddles	this	task	considerably.	Kenney	himself	writes	in	answer	to	the	first	question	that	he	“had	been	sent	to	study	the	attitude	of	the	Norwegian	public	and	press	to	war	problems.”212	He	also	notes	to	the	second	question	that	his	“first	connection	with	official	propaganda	was	through	[Sir	William]	Tyrrell	and	his	assistants.”213	One	of	these	assistants	was	George	Herbert	Mair.	Kenney	had	met	Mair	in	the	course	of	his	work	as	a	journalist	in	1911,	when	Mair	had	been	at	the	Manchester	
Guardian.	Whether	by	choice,	coincidence	or	command214,	Mair	would	be	Kenney’s	primary	point	of	contact	in	Britain	for	the	first	part	of	Kenney’s	stay	in	Norway.		 If	the	reader	takes	care	to	remember	the	complicated	process	out	of	which	the	Department	and	subsequent	Ministry	of	Information	was	born,	then	they	will	see	that	neither	of	these	institutions	were	in	place	at	the	time	of	Kenney’s	arrival	in	Norway.	In	January,	1916,	however,	Mair’s	almost	free-floating	Neutral	Press	Committee	had	been	handed	from	the	Home	Office	to	the	Foreign	Office	where	Tyrrell	worked.	Kenney	could	therefore	be	assumed	to	be	working	for	the	Foreign	Office	and	its	News	Department.	This	is	certainly	corroborated	by	archival	papers.	In	search	of	purpose,	it	is	necessary	to	examine	Kenney’s	first	stay	in	Norway.	In	the	archives	the	earliest	record	of	Kenney’s	being	taken	on	as	a	civil	servant	lies	in	the	correspondence	between	Ben	Tillett,	General	Secretary	of	the	Dock,	Wharf,	Riverside	&	General	Workers	Union	of	Great	Britain	&	Ireland,	and	Sir	Edward	Grey,	Foreign	Secretary	at	the	time.	Whether	on	his	own	volition,	or	on	the	urging	of	Kenney	himself,	Tillett	appealed	several	times	in	the	spring	of	1916	for	the	Foreign	Office	to	take	on	Kenney’s	services	in	the	war	effort.	A	May	9th	letter,	for	example,	urges	Grey	to	use	Kenney	to	counteract	“the	Germans	having	drained	the	Scandinavian	countries	of	food	and	having	there	their	secret	
																																																								212	Kenney,	Westering,	p.	219.	213	Ibid.,	p.	231.	214	Command	is	by	far	the	most	likely	of	these	three,	but	the	other	options	are	not	outside	of	the	realm	of	possibility.	For	example,	in	describing	Mair,	Kenney	makes	a	point	to	mark	him	out	as	a	man	whom	it	was	“possible	to	deal	with…	on	a	natural,	human	basis	instead	of	through	the	usual	official	channels,	festooned	with	red	tape.”	Ibid.,	p.	232.	
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service,	especially	journalists,	very	effectively	organised.”215	The	overture	by	Tillett	was	first	rebuffed	by	Grey216	and	then	by	Masterman’s	War	Propaganda	Bureau,	though	in	this	second	answer,	Kenney’s	qualifications	are	deemed	to	be	“rather	in	Mair’s	line	than	in	ours.”217	The	front	of	the	archival	docket	corroborates	this	by	noting	that	Mair	has	written	a	letter	to	Kenney.		In	July,	Mair	wrote	to	Montgomery	at	the	Foreign	Office,	referencing	a	memorandum	drawn	up	by	Carnegie	on	the	Norwegian	situation,	and	also	suggesting	that	Kenney	go	to	Christiania	to	file	a	report	from	location.218	Carnegie’s	attached	memorandum	also	supports	this	idea:	“It	would	seem	advisable	to	send	a	man	[to	Christiania]	with	a	knowledge	of	the	Norwegian	people	and	language,	to	study	the	subject	on	the	spot	and	advise	as	to	what	steps	should	be	taken.”219	The	subject	at	hand	appears	to	be	the	problem	of	untying	the	Norwegian	press	from	the	German	Wolff’s	Bureau.	Meanwhile,	Tillett,	eager	to	promote	Kenney,	continued	to	send	letters	to	the	Foreign	Office	until	when,	in	August,	he	was	informed	“that	it	has	already	been	arranged	through	Mr	Montgomery	that	Mr	Kenney	shall	proceed	to	Norway	on	behalf	of	the	Foreign	Office.”220	It	would	appear	thus	that	Ben	Tillett	advocated	that	Kenney	be	made	use	of	internationally,	a	view	adopted	by	Mair	and	Carnegie,	who	in	turn	advised	Montgomery	to	accept	him.		 His	first	trip	only	lasted	for	three	weeks,	and	his	task	was	presumably	completed	with	the	filing	of	a	short	series	of	reports	from	the	end	of	August	through	the	beginning	of	September.	The	first	of	these,	from	the	29th	of	August,	is	missing	from	Kenney’s	own	collection,	but	it	is	found	in	the	British	National	Archives.	This	report	is	the	earliest	report	referenced,	so	this—together	with	a	
																																																								215	Tillett,	Ben.	Letter	to	Sir	Edward	Grey.	9	May,	1916.	London.	The	National	Archives	(TNA):	FO	371/2845,	no.	89336.		216	Newton.	Letter	to	Tillett.	16	May,	1916.	London.	TNA:	FO	371/2845,	no.	9562.	p.	1.	217	Gowers,	Ernest.	Letter	to	Montgomery.	17	May,	1916.	London.	TNA:	FO	371/2845,	no.	9562.	p.	2.	218	Mair.	George	Herbert.	Letter	to	Montgomery.	11	July,	1916.	London.	TNA:	FO	395/29,	no.	134704.	p.	1.	219	Ibid.,	p.	3	220	Newton.	Letter	to	Tillett.	2	Aug.,	1916.	London.	TNA:	FO	371/2845,	no.	9562.	p.	6.	
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three-week	estimate	cited	in	his	autobiography	before	writing	his	reports221—makes	for	a	decent	guess	as	to	the	timeline	of	this	first	wartime	visit.		 The	first	report	appears	to	have	been	written	somewhat	reluctantly,	at	the	suggestion	of	Mair.	This	is	inferred	from	Kenney’s	introduction,	acknowledging	his	receipt	of	Mair’s	letter	some	days	prior	and	then	justifying	his	own	lack	of	reporting	by	citing	the	need	to	dig	deeper	and	gain	a	better	perspective.	A	comprehensive	5-page	report	then	follows,	outlining	in	the	first	instance	German	efforts	in	Christiania	and	the	German	Minister’s	connection	to	certain	papers	and	editors.	Next	Kenney	discusses	the	shortfalls	of	the	British	effort	of	propaganda	in	the	country	and	a	few	solutions	to	these	problems,	before	concluding	that	“it	would	be	unwise	to	start	a	News	Bureau	in	Christiania”222	due	to	the	fact	that	the	Germans	had	poisoned	the	well	with	their	own,	too	strong	propaganda.	The	final	paragraph	deals	with	the	news	that	a	German	press	agent	is	developing	a	news	bureau	and	that	therefore	the	British	need	to	counter,	and	counter	fast.223	This	appears	to	give	credence	to	the	idea	that	Kenney’s	purpose	was	to	formulate	an	on-the-ground	report	on	the	conditions	of	the	Norwegian	press	and	public	opinion.		 A	report	dated	September	6th,	titled	‘Report	on	the	Norwegian	Press’,	is	probably	the	most	important	document	relating	to	Kenney’s	First	World	War	purpose.	In	this	document,	Kenney	himself	lays	down	what	he	believes	needs	to	be	done.	The	passage	is	important	enough	to	warrant	being	cited	in	full:		 We	require	a	British	representative	in	Christiania	who	is	an	accredited	representative	of	the	British	press;	He	must	do	his	best	to	get	live	matter	through	to	Britain;	He	must	be	in	constant	touch	with	the	British	Legation	and	well	informed	on	all	British-Norwegian	affairs;	By	personal	contact	with	Norwegian	Editors,	who	will	wellcome	[sic]	him	if	he	is	the	right	type	of	man,	he	will	influence	Norwegian	feeling	and	opinions;	Whenever	German	efforts	are	made	he	will	be	ready	to	counter	them.	The	extension	of	his	sphere	of	influence	will	depend	largely	upon	the	enemy	and	upon	circumstances	that	cannot	be	foreseen.	I	imagine	that	it	would	ultimately	be	well	worth	while	for	him	to	get	hold	of	a																																																									221	Kenney,	Westering.	222	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	George	Herbert	Mair.	29	Aug.,	1916.	TNA:	FO	395/29,	no.	182558.	p.	3.	223	Ibid.	
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competent,	trustworthy	Norwegian	journalist	and	develope	[sic]	a	bureau	that	would	fight	out	or	absorb	the	Norsk	Telegrambureau.	But	this	must	not	be	attempted	or	even	mentioned	until	the	British	press	representative,	as	such,	has	established	himself.224		Effectively,	Kenney	himself	had	here	proposed	a	comprehensive	British	press	and	propaganda	strategy	for	Norway.	Although	the	collection	does	not	contain	any	reply	to	the	report,	Kenney	wrote	that	on	his	return	to	London	it	“was	immediately	accepted	and	I	was	asked	to	return	to	Norway	to	carry	out	the	plans	I	had	formulated.”225	This	in	itself	is	obviously	a	good	point	to	be	made	for	the	thesis;	without	Kenney’s	formulation	(provided	its	success),	British	information	policy	in	Norway	could	very	well	have	been	markedly	different.		 Thus,	Kenney’s	purpose,	formulated	by	himself,	can	be	said	to	circle	around	creating	an	efficient	channel	of	information	between	Britain	and	Norway,	influencing	Norwegian	public	opinion,	and	recreating	the	Norwegian	news	agency.	This	final	point,	that	of	outcompeting	or	absorbing	the	Norwegian	Telegrambureau	(NTB),	deserves	more	attention	than	this	chapter	alone	can	give	it.	Therefore,	the	entire	next	chapter	(Chapter	V)	concerns	itself	with	this	highly	interesting	case.	Exploring	the	way	the	other	two	objectives	were	tackled,	however,	can	give	a	good	perspective	to	how	influential	Kenney	was,	and	how	his	actions	helped	in	the	development	of	a	global	system.		
The	Department		This	section	marks	the	entry	into	the	very	core	of	the	thesis,	which	is	Kenney’s	role	within	the	system.	What	follows	is	an	in-part	detailed	account	of	his	work	in	Norway	during	the	First	World	War.	Since	his	story	is	not	commonly	known,	if	known	at	all,	this	author	must	take	care	to	tell	it,	and	thus	a	sizeable	portion	of	this	section	is	dedicated	to	pseudo-chronological	narration.	This	is	in	order	to	maintain	the	idea	of	Kenney’s	developing	role	and	to	remain	faithful	to	events	and	to	context.	A	collateral	objective	lies	in	also	establishing	Kenney’s	story	in	the	broader	sense	of	historical	narrative.	Nevertheless,	care	has	been	taken	to																																																									224	Kenney,	Rowland.	Report	on	the	Norwegian	Press.	6	Sept.,	1916.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	pp.	11-12.	225	Kenney,	Westering.	p.	223.	
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commit	to	relevance	and	to	summarise	or	generalise	where	possible,	so	as	to	enable	more	efficient	analysis.	The	main	line	to	follow	is	to	trace	his	work	in	terms	of	responsibility	and	authority	and	get	a	sense	of	his	task	and	his	execution	of	that	task.	Following	this	section,	the	same	time-period	is	analysed	in	terms	of	the	people	around	Kenney	after	which	a	more	analytical	section	pulls	everything	together.	Kenney’s	real	work	began	upon	his	return	to	Norway	after	presenting	his	reports	to	his	superiors	in	London.	In	his	autobiography,	he	writes	that	he	returned	to	Norway	in	“the	beginning	of	January,	1917.”226	This	is	not	entirely	true,	as	drafts	of	letters	from	November	and	December	tell	of	a	short	trip	to	Norway	at	this	time	for	the	duration	of	about	a	month	or	more.227	It	is	possible	to	read	into	his	omission	in	his	autobiography.	For	example,	it	could	have	something	to	do	with	the	establishment	of	the	Department	of	Information	during	the	transition	of	1916	to	1917,	but	it	could	also	just	be	deemed	uninteresting	or	superfluous—his	work	in	Norway	was	dealt	with	in	Westering	only	over	twenty	pages,	with	generous	portions	devoted	to	certain	notable	personalities	and	events.	In	any	case,	there	are	some	relevant	pieces	of	information	found	in	the	documents	from	this	short	stay.		 Perhaps	the	most	striking	line	is	from	a	handwritten,	unaddressed	draft,	probably	written	in	November	1916.	In	this	document,	Kenney	discusses	current	events	and	issues,	as	well	as	the	stance	toward	the	war	of	‘Social	Demokraten’,	a	Norwegian	newspaper.	He	also	tells	of	a	German	Press	Agent,	by	the	name	of	Dr.	Harthen,	and	his	much-too-brusque	attempt	to	have	Norwegian	editors	print	German	news.	Careful	not	to	make	the	same	mistake	as	the	German,	Kenney	proposed	a	cover.	“I	could	do	very	much	better	work	here,”	Kenney	writes,	“if	I	were	an	accredited	representative	of	some	newspaper	or	some	News	Agency,	say	Reuters."228	This	cover	is	eventually	established,	giving	Kenney	a	much	better	position	from	which	to	work,	especially	with	the	NTB	affair	detailed	in	the	next	chapter.																																																									226	Ibid.	227	Unknown.	1916.	1916.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	Unknown.	Letter	to	Mair.	12	Dec,	1916.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	Unknown.	Letter	to	Carnegie.	12	Dec,	1916.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.		228	Unknown.	1916.	p.	7.	
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	 From	this	short	stay,	the	reports	seem	mainly	to	concern	themselves	with	the	problem	of	getting	British-slanted	news—for	all	intents	and	purposes,	propaganda—out	into	the	Norwegian	press.	Kenney	lamented	the	lack	of	material	coming	through	from	Britain,	and	seemed	exasperated	by	the	quality	of	that	material	which	actually	surfaced.	One	prime	example	of	this	problem—and	of	Kenney’s	witty	phrasing:	“A	good	deal	of	space	has	been	devoted	during	the	past	few	days	to	the	British	Ministerial	crisis,	but	that	is	not	a	subject	which	lends	itself	to	enthusiastic	reports.”229	The	lack	of	British	material	was	especially	dangerous	considering	the	large	volume	of	German	material	saturating	the	news	market.	Kenney	wrangled	with	a	series	of	phrases	struck	through	before	he	settled:	“We	can	only	counter	with	news;	preferably,	of	course,	good	news.”230	Notably,	it	was	Kenney	who	observed	the	problems	and	Kenney	who	devised	the	solutions.	This	was	true	almost	throughout	his	stay	during	the	war.		 After	a	short	trip	back	to	London,	Kenney	did	indeed	return	to	Norway	in	January	1917,	and	continued	his	work.	He	made	connections	with	several	Norwegian	pressmen	and	distributed	stories	and	news	items	among	them.		Whenever	there	was	some	notable	domestic	or	international	event,	he	either	countered	it	or	relayed	its	effects	back	to	the	now-running	Department	of	Information.	These	were	not	the	only	tricks	in	his	repertoire,	however.	In	a	letter	to	Mair	dated	the	24th	of	January,	1917,	Kenney	brought	up	a	man	by	the	name	of	Nils	Vogt,	incidentally	the	brother	of	the	Norweigan	Ambassador	in	London.	Vogt	was	a	correspondent	for	The	Times,	and	also	worked	with	Morgenbladet,	a	problematic	Norwegian	paper	headed	by	an	anti-British	editor,	Carl	Hambro.	Vogt—working	closely	with	the	Norwegian	Foreign	Minister	Mr.	Ihlen	(a	notable	critic	of	Britain	during	the	war)—had	published	an	article	in	The	Times	that	was	viewed	as	an	attack	on	the	British	Minister	to	Norway,	Sir	Mansfeldt	de	Cardonnel	Findlay.	Kenney’s	proposed	solution	was	emphatic:	“As	a	tainted	man	Hr.	Vogt	should	no	longer	be	Times’	correspondent,	or	his	telegrams	should	be	subjected	to	the	strictest	censorship.”231	A	week	later,	another	letter	talks	of	the	further	developments	of	the	Vogt	story,	reiterating	Kenney’s	suggestion	that																																																									229	Unknown.	Letter	to	Mair.	p.	2.	230	Ibid.,	p.	6.	231	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Mair.	24	Jan.,	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	3.	
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Mair	“approach	the	Times.”232	The	tools	at	his	disposal	were	varied,	it	seems,	and	he	chose	them	carefully.	Another	ominous	example	of	what	Kenney	could	do	lies	at	the	completion	of	a	settlement	of	British	trade	restrictions	imposed	on	Norway	in	early	1917.	In	Kenney’s	view,	the	ideal	course	of	action	was	to	lay	the	blame	for	the	trade	restrictions	at	the	feet	of	the	previously	mentioned	Ihlen,	and	some	Norwegians	were	turning	around	to	this	idea.	However,	when	matters	were	settled	and	an	agreement	was	reached,	the	focus	returned	in	part	to	the	British	and	in	effect	vindicated	Ihlen	from	the	crisis.	In	releasing	the	settlement	as	early	as	possible,	the	problem	was	solved,	to	Kenney’s	unmistakeable	regret:	“I	am	afraid	we	have	saved	Hr.	Ihlen	when	we	should	have	broken	him.”233	The	exact	meaning	of	the	phrase	is	of	course	up	to	interpretation,	but	with	an	earlier	line	citing	mounting	pressure	for	Ihlen	to	step	down,	the	idea	seems	at	least	imaginable.	Matters	of	blacklisting	journalists	and	deposing	ministers—certainly	ministers	of	such	high	stance	as	foreign	ministers—must	certainly	be	matters	of	grave	policy.	The	fact	that	Kenney	suggests	these	speaks	to	his	position	of	influence.		 A	recurring	report	titled	‘Lectures	and	Literature’	also	began	in	late	February	1917.	This	report,	true	to	its	title,	consists	of	Kenney’s	dry	observations	regarding	the	presence	of	propaganda	or	biased	literature	(to	one	side	or	the	other)	in	Norwegian	bookstores,	as	well	as	accounts	of	current	lecturers	touring	the	country,	their	attendance,	content,	and	so	on.	After	these	observational	remarks,	there	was	usually	some	sort	of	discussion	on	what	steps	to	take	in	order	to	enhance	pro-British	material.234	Again,	Kenney	observed,	reported	and	proposed	solutions.	There	appears	to	be	no	request	for	ideas	or	orders.	In	a	traditional	working	structure,	the	character	of	Kenney’s	reports	would	make	it	seem	like	he	was	in	a	managerial	position,	in	charge	and	self-sufficient.	
																																																								232	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Mair.	31	Jan.,	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	233	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Mair.	21	Feb.	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	234	Kenney,	Rowland.	Lectures	and	Literature.	31	Feb.	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	Kenney,	Rowland.	Lectures	and	Literature.	21	Mar.	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	Kenney,	Rowland.	Lectures	and	Literature.	26	Mar.	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	Kenney,	Rowland.	Lectures	and	Literature.	9	May,	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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	 Kenney,	it	appears,	was	the	spearhead	of	the	British	propaganda	system	in	Norway.	This	demanded	a	lot	from	him,	and	those	demands	were	constantly	on	the	rise.	With	a	system	in	development—that	is,	not	yet	streamlined—there	are	bound	to	be	missteps	and	misappropriations.	In	a	March	12th	telegram	to	Mair,	Kenney	appears	to	have	been	burdened	with	the	responsibility	for	the	entire	Reuters	service	in	Norway.	Kenney’s	frustration	is	palpable	in	his	use	of	the	exclamation	mark:	“these	wires	from	Reuters	have	a	tone	(if	they	are	not	so	wroded	[sic])	which	seems	to	imply	that	I	am	responsible	for	their	Norwegian	service!”	The	paragraph	continues:	“That,	of	course,	is	frankly	impossible.	I	cannot	accept	responsibility	for	something	which	I	do	not	control;	and	I	have	no	control,	and	can	conceive	no	possible	circumstances	or	arrangement	which	would	give	me	any	measure	of	control.”235	Kenney’s	emphatic	wording	may	be	amusing,	but	it	seems	pertinent	to	take	note	of	the	level	of	responsibility	and	even	authority	vested	in	this	one	man;	a	point,	of	course,	integral	to	the	thesis.	Further	to	the	point,	it	appears	that	Kenney	had	a	meeting	with	a	certain	Mr.	Jones	prior	to	arriving	in	Norway.	Mr.	Jones,	of	course,	can	be	none	other	that	Sir	Roderick	Jones,	the	fresh	Director	of	Reuters	and	arguably	the	most	powerful	press	figure	of	Britain	at	the	time;	though	more	on	that	in	the	next	section.		 On	the	topic	of	creating	propaganda,	Kenney	also	had	a	say.	He	suggested	not	only	content	for	propaganda	circulars,	but	also	form.	He	critiqued	the	‘War	Monthly’	as	having	similar	value	for	Germany	as	for	Britain,	and	called	for	particular	picture	subjects,	such	as	colonial	troops	and	naval	operations.	Kenney	also	suggested	that	readers	should	be	reminded	of	past	atrocities	of	the	war	and	that	the	circular	should	employ	a	less	official	style	of	writing.236	This	was	also	the	case	in	the	articles	sent	to	him	for	the	purpose	of	being	published	in	Norwegian	papers.	He	dismissed	lengthy	work,	silly	titles,	material	irrelevant	to	the	Norwegian	perspective,	hack	work,	thoughtless	photographs	and	on	and	on.	On	polemical	pieces,	he	wrote	they	are	counterproductive	and	ham-fisted:	“If	an	unfortunate	German	should	get	anything	printed,	I	can	phone	to	any	one	of	half	a	dozen	well	known	Norwegians	and	get	him	bucketed	to	pieces	–	which	is	
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infinitely	better	than	starting	arguments	from	London.”237	He	clearly	had	a	good	perspective	on	what	was	necessary,	and	had	useful	and	important	connections.	Kenney	was	well	on	board	with	the	British	view	on	truthful	propaganda.	This	is	of	course	a	major	aspect	of	the	propaganda	concept	as	discussed	in	Chapter	II.	He	claimed	he	“never	made	a	statement	that	was	even	partly	untrue,”	and	that	“in	my	reports	to	London	I	stressed	the	need	for	letting	the	facts	speak	for	themselves.”238	A	pertinent	letter	on	this	was	sent	to	Mair	on	June	16th	1917:		It	should	be	realised	that	“pro-British”	is	vastly	different	to	“anti-German”.	Neutrals	will	appreciate	pride	of	race,	real	patriotism,	self	confidence,	whereas	they	look	askance	at	continual	denunciations	of	the	enemy,	with	all	kinds	of	pinpricks,	jibes	and	jeers.	The	neutral	who	appreciates	constant	“exposures”	of	the	enemy	does	not	need	to	be	converted.	For	the	rest,	we	should	give	them	the	virtues	of	the	British	(we	have	still	got	to	live	down	the	reputation	of	our	ghastly	censor)	and	leave	the	beastliness	and	the	brutality	of	the	German	to	speak	for	itself	–	Heaven	knows	it	is	eloquent	and	loud	enough.	Scarcely	any	of	the	writers	of	our	propaganda	articles	seem	to	realise	this.239		By	the	spring,	he	had	begun	to	acquire	the	network	necessary	to	push	out	more	propaganda	material	into	both	major	and	minor	papers.	Procuring,	writing	and	disseminating	material	appears	to	take	up	more	and	more	of	his	time	at	this	point.240	By	the	end	of	the	war,	he	claimed	this	activity	as	one	of	his	most	fruitful	undertakings.	“In	February,	1917,	three	of	our	articles	were	used;	in	July,	1917,	sixty-eight	appeared;	and	in	January,	1918,	the	number	had	increased	to	223.”241	These	numbers	are	likely	deflated,	as	Kenney	noted	that	with	increased	volume,	already	in	April,	it	was	difficult	to	keep	up	with	what	had	been	published,	and	where.	Thus	it	is	impossible	to	calculate	with	any	strong	sense	of	accuracy	how	many	articles	were	published.	However,	in	March,	1918,	Kenney	provided	a	list	of	the	numbers.	The	total	number	of	articles	published	between	February	1917	and	February	1918	was	1,226.	There	is	no	indication	of	the	amount	of	articles																																																									237	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Mair.	6	June	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	3-4.	238	Kenney.	Westering.	p.	229.	239	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Mair.	16	June	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	240	Kenney.	Letter	to	Mair.	26	Apr.	1917.	241	Kenney.	Westering.	p.	229.	
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published	for	the	months	after	February	1918,	but	it	is	surely	possible	to	assume	that	it	had	stabilised	around	200	articles	per	month,	as	this	had	been	the	trend	for	six	months	prior.	This	would	put	the	number	at	the	end	of	the	war	at	roughly	3000	articles	over	a	period	of	22	months,	averaging	over	136	articles	per	month,	or	just	under	5	articles	a	day.	These	are	impressive	figures	by	all	accounts,	especially	for	Norway.	And	behind	it	all	was	Kenney.		 Late	in	June,	1917,	Kenney	was	sent	to	Stockholm,	Sweden	for	a	little	over	two	weeks.	The	instruction	to	do	so	had	come	from	the	British	Legation,	to	which	Kenney	was	closely	attached.	His	purpose	was	to	be	the	British	eyes	and	ears	at	the	Conference	of	the	Socialist	International;	his	own	leftist	convictions	probably	had	their	part	to	play	in	his	being	delegated	this	task.	He	still	used	his	Reuters	cover,	handwriting	letters	to	Mair	on	Reuters	stationary,	marked	with	his	name,	title	of	Reuters	Correspondent	and	phone	number.	This	is	the	earliest	instance	of	this	stationery	being	used,	though	he	had	been	using	the	cover	position	for	quite	some	time	already.242		 It	appears	his	visit	was	difficult	in	several	ways.	“I	assume	that	I	must	report,	and	yet	there	is	little	I	can	report.”243	Apart	from	the	lack	of	mentionable	impressions,	the	fact	that	Kenney	had	to	assume	his	purpose	is	a	little	surprising.	Had	the	Legation	not	been	specific	in	its	instructions?	Perhaps	again,	this	is	a	demonstration	of	the	entrepreneurial	position	Kenney	held,	that	he	should	himself	determine	the	purpose	and	value	of	what	he	heard	and	saw.	This	explanation	lines	relatively	neatly	up	with	the	gentleman	amateurism	that	permeated	the	propaganda	services	throughout	most	of	the	war,	and	argues	similarly	neatly	for	Kenney’s	importance	and	value	to	the	development	of	the	whole	ordeal.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	Kenney	(perhaps	in	part	due	to	his	political	leanings,	but	also	due	to	his	ability)	was	entrusted	with	these	responsibilities.	Had	he	been	simply	a	pawn	in	a	much	greater	structure,	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	him	traipsing	between	Scandinavian	capitals.	Sweden,	most	certainly,	had	its	own	collection	of	British	agents,	so	the	choice	of	Kenney	is	interesting.	Underlining	this	analysis	is	the	opening	line	from	his	next	letter,																																																									242	The	letter	in	question	contains	the	phrasing:	“I	came	on	to	Stockholm…	still	as	Reuters	correspondent.”	[Emphasis	mine].	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Mair.	26	June	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	243	Ibid.,	p.	1.	
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dated	July	17th:	“I	left	Stockholm	on	July	12th,	as	I	wished	to	get	in	touch	with	Norwegian	affairs	again	and	there	was	really	nothing	of	importance	likely	to	happen	in	Stockholm	for	some	weeks.”244	Not	only	did	he	leave	on	his	own	volition,	but	also	he	neglected	to	ask	permission,	and	to	let	Mair	know	about	his	decision	until	five	days	later.	He	was,	undoubtedly,	an	asset.		 In	July	1917,	Kenney	sent	a	letter	to	E.	Fullerton	Carnegie,	who	was	in	charge	of	the	Scandinavian	Section	of	the	Foreign	Office	News	Department.	The	content	of	the	letter	centres	on	a	variety	of	persons	within	the	British	propaganda	structure.	Kenney’s	tone	is	informal.	For	example,	it	is	Kenney	who	tells	Carnegie	what	to	do	about	Roderick	Jones	and	what	they	want	from	him.	Another	character,	Mr.	Ellison,	is	painted	as	stupid,	lazy	and	tactless,	and	Kenney	insists	“he	ought	not	to	be	allowed	out	of	the	country	in	war	time.”245	The	letter	reads	almost	like	a	tirade	against	several	members	of	the	British	propaganda	system,	though	Kenney	makes	efforts	to	impress	upon	Carnegie	that	he	is	“quite	camlm	[sic],	without	heat,	anger,	or	a	shadow	of	malice.”246	The	impression	this	letter	leaves	is	one	of	camaraderie,	and	a	lateral	structure,	with	Kenney	free	to	think,	act	and	say	what	he	wants.		 In	the	Autumn	of	1917	Kenney	again	spent	a	good	deal	of	time	in	Stockholm,	covering	another	conference	there.247	At	this	time,	the	matter	of	the	Norwegian	Telegrambureau	was	also	coming	to	a	head,	and	a	few	reports	in	September	and	October	deal	with	this	and	will	be	referenced	in	Chapter	V.	With	regard	to	his	other	activities,	they	remained	much	the	same.	In	a	report	to	Mair	in	November,	Kenney	again	insisted	on	increasing	the	flow	of	articles	to	send	out	to	Norwegian	papers.	He	also	returned	to	the	idea	of	blacklisting	journalists,	using	the	actual	term	‘blacklist’.	Further	he	reported	on	the	Norwegian	political	situation,	as	before,	concentrating	on	Ihlen.248	It	appears	that	these	were	his	general	tasks:	consolidating	the	system	of	dissemination	of	British	material,	
																																																								244	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Mair.	17	July	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	245	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Carnegie.	24	July	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	2.	246	Ibid.,	p.	5.	247	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Mair.	20	Sep.,	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Mair.	25	Sep.,	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	248	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Mair.	7	Nov.,	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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keeping	watch	on	enemy	propaganda	and	enemy	journalists,	and	reporting	on	political	events	and	how	these	are	digested	by	the	media	and	the	people.		 Here	follows	a	gap	in	the	material	between	the	7th	of	November,	1917	to	the	5th	of	March,	1918.	The	only	pieces	of	information	known	from	this	time	are	found	in	Kenney’s	autobiography.	Kenney	writes:	“early	in	1918	I	was	called	to	London	and	then	sent	to	the	Western	Front	on	a	special	mission,	just	before	the	terrific	German	break-through	in	April.”249	The	vagueness	of	this	statement	(after	which	follows	no	further	explanation)	is	only	tempered	very	slightly	by	another	tiny	detail	in	the	book	when	Kenney	describes	being	in	London	in	early	1918,	“on	my	way	to	Norway	from	France.”250	What	Kenney’s	special	mission	in	France	was	is	not	currently	known.	There	is	no	mention	of	this	mission	in	the	material	prior	to	or	following	the	gap,	and	it	appears	that	if	anything	at	all	was	written	about	it	(as	it	in	all	probability	must	have	been)	Kenney	has	uncharacteristically	failed	to	keep	it.	This	could	be	intentional,	but	it	could	also	be	a	matter	of	coincidence;	perhaps	that	travel	arrangements	made	it	difficult	to	transport	or	keep	documents.	However,	the	alternative,	intentional	interpretation	is	also	alluring.	If	the	mission	was	assigned	by	the	News	Department,	and	thus	known	to	Mair	or	Carnegie,	it	would	be	odd	that	no	reference	is	found	in	the	extant	letters.	Thus	it	is	possible,	based	solely	on	the	lack	of	mention,	that	some	other	bureau,	department	or	service	had	made	use	of	the	man.	It	remains	a	tantalizing	mystery,	and	yet	again	builds	on	the	idea	that	Kenney	was—at	least	to	some	mentionable	degree—an	instrumental	figure	in	the	war.		
The	Ministry	
	 As	the	reader	might	remember	from	the	second	section	of	Chapter	III,	the	Department	of	Information	transitioned	into	the	Ministry	of	Information	in	early	1918.	Whereas	the	creation	of	the	Department	of	Information	had	apparently	had	little	effect	on	Kenney’s	work	and	position,	this	new	transition	proved	much	more	dramatic.	An	odd	inconsistency	exists	just	here.	In	Westering,	Kenney																																																									249	Kenney,	Westering.	p.	232.	250	Ibid.,	p.	286.	
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dates	the	creation	of	the	Ministry	to	the	4th	of	March,	1918,	and	writes	that	he	discovered	this	post	factum	on	his	return	to	London	from	France.251	This	would	mean	that	he	arrived	in	London	earliest	on	the	5th	of	March,	and	given	the	time	it	took	to	travel	between	London	and	Christiania	(approximately	two	days,	though	probably	longer252),	he	would	have	arrived	in	Norway	no	earlier	than	the	8th.	And	yet,	in	the	materials,	the	documents	pick	up	again	with	a	letter	from	Kenney	dated	the	5th	of	March,	with	the	location	given	in	Norway,	and	a	note	of	a	new	address.	Adding	to	this:	he	claims	Roderick	Jones	gave	him	certain	instructions	and	that	he	sent	him	a	report	the	week	prior,	which,	barring	unlikely	turns	of	phrase,	places	Kenney	back	in	Norway	considerably	earlier	than	he	lets	on	in	his	published	work.253	Whether	this	is	meaningful	or	not	would	be	a	matter	of	speculation,	the	space	for	which	is	not	afforded	here.	Again	with	reference	to	the	events	portrayed	in	Chapter	III,	the	News	Department	and	the	newly	created	Political	Intelligence	Department	(where	Kenney	would	go	to	work	after	the	war)	were	a	stumbling	block	to	the	restructuring	of	the	British	propaganda	machine.	Kenney’s	colleagues,	upset	to	be	flung	under	the	command	of	Lord	Beaverbrook,	“resigned	their	posts	in	a	body.”254	Not	one	to	stay	quiet	when	he	felt	he	had	something	to	say	Kenney	“approached	Tyrrell	and	expressed	my	intention	of	breaking	with	the	Ministry	of	Information.”255	Tyrrell,	however,	convinced	him	to	stay	on	and	continue	his	work	in	Norway,	a	testament	to	the	importance	of	the	task	and	to	Kenney’s	aptitude.	The	reshuffling,	however,	brought	in	a	change	of	management	for	Kenney,	who	from	here	on,	reported	fairly	exclusively	to	Herbert	Charles	O’Neill	and	Roderick	Jones	(the	latter	with	regard	to	matters	of	the	news	agencies—which	is	an	interesting	constellation,	as	shall	be	seen	shortly).	O’Neill	had	evidently	taken	over	the	Scandinavian	section	from	Carnegie,	whereas	Jones	was	Director	of	Propaganda.256	Especially	Kenney’s	correspondence	with	Jones																																																									251	Ibid.,	p.	232.	252	This	estimate	arises	from	a	passage	in	Westering	where	Kenney	writes	that	crossing	from	Bergen	to	Aberdeen	should	have	taken	“under	two	days”	in	1918.	Kenney.	Westering.	p.	236.	253	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	O’Neill.	5	Mar.,	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	254	Kenney,	Westering.	p.	232.	255	Ibid.	256	Kenney.	Letter	to	O’Neill.	5	Mar.	1918.	
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stands	out	as	a	fairly	good	indication	of	Kenney’s	stature	in	the	system,	reporting	not	to	middle-management,	but	straight	to	the	top.	The	general	work	Kenney	engaged	in	did	not	change	very	much,	though	his	reports	to	the	Ministry	seem	(at	least	in	the	beginning)	more	terse	and	formal	than	the	somewhat	conversational	letters	to	Mair	and	Carnegie.	One	gets	the	sense	that	bureaucracy	had	finally	swallowed	them,	leaving	little	room	for	pleasantries	and	familiarity.	In	a	sense,	the	gentlemen	amateurs	morphed	slowly	into	civil	servants.	This	is	not	to	say	that	Kenney	suddenly	began	to	seek	orders	and	not	think	for	himself.	In	his	first	letter	to	Jones—a	hefty,	sectioned	document	with	listed	headings	and	subheadings—his	general	tone	remained	much	the	same.	It	reads	as	a	report	to	an	overseer,	explaining	what	is	being	done,	what	is	being	considered,	what	steps	are	necessary,	and	so	on.257	Perhaps	one	change	is	that	Kenney	here	began	to	increase	his	demand	for	London	to	send	him	certain	books	and	other	things,	especially	O’Neill.258	Kenney’s	early	letters	to	O’Neill	were	marked	by	a	significant	confusion	regarding	who	was	in	charge:	O’Neill,	Mr.	Hambro	or	others,	prompting	Kenney	to	send	his	reports	straight	to	Jones.259	Addressing	this	question	of	authority,	there	was	a	quick	succession	of	letters	back	and	forth	between	O’Neill	and	Kenney	late	in	May	1918.	O’Neill	insisted	he	was	“in	charge	of	Scandinavia	and	Finland,”	and	that	“Mr.	Hambro	is	the	Director	of	neutral	propaganda.”260	A	little	note	from	O’Neill	to	Kenney,	dated	the	very	next	day	is	interesting:	“If	you	are	taking	up	the	general	running	of	the	propaganda	for	us,	I	will	naturally	let	you	have	a	complete	prospectus	of	all	we	are	doing.”261	It	appears	Kenney	was	in	this	way	made	responsible	for	the	propaganda	aspect	of	the	Scandinavian	Section	within	the	Ministry	of	Information.	If	this	is	not	an	indication,	clear	as	day,	of	Kenney’s	successes	and	his	value	to	the	system,	then	nothing	is.	
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Kenney’s	system	of	dissemination	was	certainly	appreciated.	In	a	June	note	from	O’Neill	to	Kenney,	O’Neill	asked	Kenney	to	help	his	Swedish	colleague	(a	man	by	the	name	of	Charleston)	gain	entry	into	the	Swedish	press.	“Your	own	success,”	wrote	O’Neill,	“is	always	so	encouraging	that	it	throws	into	higher	relief	the	complete	non-success	of	Charleston.”262	This	opinion	from	O’Neill	of	course	underlines	Kenney’s	accomplishment,	and	provides	evidence	for	its	recognition	outside	of	Kenney’s	own	writing.	There	are	instances	where	one	might	chalk	up	Kenney’s	own	statements	as	self-inflationary,	if	one	were	prone	to	such	an	interpretation,	but	this	is	more	difficult	knowing	of	O’Neill’s	admiration.	It	should	be	admitted	that	O’Neill’s	statement	is	attached	to	a	request—and	thus	can	be	regarded	as	flattery—but	when	the	request	is	that	Kenney	teach	others	his	ways,	this	concern	appears	unlikely,	if	not	unfounded.	The	Ministry	recognized	Kenney’s	skills	and	abilities,	not	least	of	which	was	his	management	of	a	very	extensive	collection	of	informants.	In	a	letter	to	Jones,	Kenney	told	of	a	special	meeting	between	the	German	Director	of	Propaganda	and	Wolff’s	Bureau	(the	main	artery	of	German	propaganda	distribution):		Herr	Vachtel	expressed	the	opinion	that	their	methods	in	Norway	had	been	disastrous.	They	had	been	too	open,	too	energetic,	and	far	too	much	had	been	done.	He	counselled	a	considerable	diminution	in	the	quantity	of	matter	telegraphed	by	Wolff’s	Bureau	and	suggested	that	the	more	moderate	method	of	England	was	infinitely	preferable	to	their	method,	which	has	swamped	the	country	with	material	and	only	succeeded	in	helping	to	turn	the	press	and	the	public	against	Germany.	After	considerable	discussion	the	meeting	was	inclined	to	agree	with	him…263		The	lines	blur	a	little	between	being	a	propagandist	and	being	a	spy.	Kenney’s	job	description	certainly	leaned	toward	being	the	former,	but	a	whole	range	of	observations	can	easily	be	classified	as	espionage.	Kenney	dutifully	used	his	network	in	order	to	gather	information	to	relay	back	to	London.	The	fact	that	the	information	gathered	(at	least	in	this	case)	seems	also	to	be	a	compliment	to	his																																																									262	O’Neill,	Herbert	Charles.	Note	to	Kenney.	5	June	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	263	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Jones.	25	May	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	
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own	work,	is	not	so	much	a	reflection	of	hubris	on	Kenney’s	behalf,	but	rather	a	reflection	of	this	author’s	own	aesthetic	leanings:	it	also	shows	that	the	British	propaganda	was	efficient,	and	that	Kenney	was	one	of	the	more	prominent	shapers	of	it.		 In	May,	1918,	the	new	structure	of	propaganda	administration	seemed	more	clear	to	Kenney,	though	not	necessarily	more	efficient.	His	letters,	as	a	result,	became	more	pointed.	The	Ministry’s	ineptitude	in	taking	care	of	expenses	wore	on	him,	with	requests	being	made	direct	to	Sir	Roderick	Jones	and	to	O’Neill.	Kenney	even	resorted	to	threats:	“Now	I	shall	spend	no	more	of	my	own	[money],	and	if	same	delay	occurs	in	forwarding	imprests	–	I	shut	up	the	shop	and	take	a	holiday!”264	Although	it	is	difficult	to	ascertain	to	what	degree	Kenney’s	correspondence	with	O’Neill	was	jocular—the	degree	to	which	the	above	statement	was	serious—the	context	of	the	letter	and	Kenney’s	clear	exasperation	with	the	payment	situation	leaves	little	room	to	doubt	that	it	was	meant	at	least	as	a	strong	statement	of	dissatisfaction.	Further,	in	the	same	letter,	Kenney	argued	against	a	proposed	propaganda	venture:	“I	consider	the	idea	of	an	English	newspaper	here	(after	begging	your	pardon!)	simply	equal	to	the	mind	of	a	‘hobbyist’.	It	won’t	do,	old	man;	it	will	not	do.”265	[emphasis	Kenney’s]	Again,	Kenney	appears	here	not	under	O’Neill’s	command.	If	this	letter	were	taken	separately,	with	no	knowledge	of	the	positions	of	its	author	and	its	recipient,	it	would	be	natural	to	assume	that	this	was	a	message	from	an	overseer	to	his	or	her	employee.	The	letter	is	full	of	judgements	and	opinions	presented	as	superior.	This	lends	credence	to	the	idea	of	Kenney	as	a	key	player	in	the	development	of	the	system.	At	the	very	least,	Kenney	shaped	slivers	of	policy;	the	Ministry	wished	to	explore	the	idea	of	sending	out	a	propaganda	newspaper,	and	Kenney	shot	it	down.		 Kenney	repeatedly,	throughout	his	stay,	mentioned	the	need	for	him	to	travel	around	Norway	to	other	cities	than	the	capital.	The	first	indication	of	such	a	trip	actually	taking	place	arrives	in	June,	with	a	handwritten	letter	from	
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Bergen.266	Bergen	is	(and	at	the	time	was)	a	major	shipping	hub	on	the	Norwegian	west	coast.	It	was	also	most	likely	the	point	of	arrival	and	departure	of	Kenney	and	other	British	agents	to	and	from	Norway.	Other	trips	may	have	taken	place	earlier,	but	there	is	no	record	of	them.	The	letter	concerns	itself	with	developments	in	the	policies	of	newspapers,	primarily	‘Morgenavisen’	and	‘Verdens	Gang’.	These	two	papers	were	of	great	concern	to	Kenney	and	the	Ministry,	especially	in	Bergen.	Running	together,	these	could	have	posed	a	troublesome	adversary	for	British	propaganda	efforts	in	a	major	region	of	the	country.	Therefore,	Kenney	had	spoken	with	his	contacts	and	come	up	with	a	sizeable	sum	of	money	“for	buying	up	Morgenavisen	and	so	turn	it	into	a	British	organ…	May	I	have	Kr.	200,000	please?!”267	There	is	no	discernible	reply	from	London	to	this	bold	proposal,	although	the	suggestion	points	to	the	level	at	which	Kenney	worked	in	Norway	and	within	the	Ministry.	Again	it	is	difficult	to	know	whether	Kenney	was	being	serious	or	was	simply	making	a	joke	at	the	expense	of	his	paymasters.	Either	interpretation	speaks	to	some	significant	degree	of	influence,	and	the	latter	interpretation	also	would	describe	his	growing	malcontent,	which	was	about	to	reach	its	peak.		 One	possible	reason	for	the	lack	of	reply	to	this	idea	is	that	Kenney,	on	the	22nd	of	June,	announced	his	resignation.	The	actual	notice	does	not	appear,	but	in	the	collection,	a	series	of	letters	have	fairly	consistent	references	to	his	retiring	from	the	post.268	A	telegram	sent	from	Roderick	Jones	to	Kenney	in	July	makes	clear	that	the	reason	for	his	resignation	was	in	large	part	his	salary.	It	definitely	speaks	to	Kenney’s	importance	when	Jones,	the	Director	of	Propaganda	for	the	MOI,	appears	to	be	bargaining	in	order	to	keep	Kenney	on	board.	His	final	paragraph	drives	the	point	home:		 Do	you	find	the	present	system	of	paying	out	of	pocket	expenses	unsatisfactory?	In	the	circumstances	I	hope	you	will	not	press	your	resignation,	especially	as	it	might	be	desirable	for	you	to	make	Stockholm	your	main	headquarters	in	connection	with	the	new	
																																																								266	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	O’Neill.	6	June	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	267	Ibid.,	p.	2.	268	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	O’Neill.	20	June	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Willson.	28	June	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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telegraph	arrangements,	directly	we	can	get	you	a	first	class	assistant	in	Christiania.269		Jones’	appeal	evidently	had	no	impact	on	Kenney.	In	his	autobiography,	references	are	made	to	his	requests	being	treated	haphazardly	and	his	constant—and	constantly	ignored—appeals	for	his	salary	and	expenses	to	be	met.270		Even	in	the	Department	of	Information,	before	the	Ministry	had	been	created,	there	were	serious	problems.	A	letter	to	Carnegie	in	November	1917	contains	an	excellent	description:	“In	Sept.	and	Oct.	[…]	to	my	amazement,	I	received	letters	from	my	Christiania	Bank	informing	me	that	the	Foreign	Office	had	paid	money	in	to	my	account!	The	Foreign	Office!	It	is,	of	course,	too	late	to	protest	when	the	cat	is	out	of	the	bag,	and	the	spy	hunters	are	dogging	your	tracks	all	over	the	place,	but	why,	oh	why,	do	your	people	do	these	things?”271	[emphasis	Kenney’s]	And	things	were	not	set	to	improve	under	the	Ministry	of	Information.	On	the	contrary,	more	and	more	acidic	remarks	permeate	many	of	his	letters	and	reporting	since	being	drafted	to	the	Ministry,	and	these	quips	increased	in	quantity	and	intensity	throughout	the	spring	and	summer	of	1918.	An	example:	“Am	I	to	take	it	that	the	simple	alteration	of	an	address	is	beyond	the	organising	abilities	of	your	department?”272	Despite	his	announcement	of	retirement,	Kenney	continued	to	work	well	into	August	1918,	preparing	for	his	successor,	and	carrying	on	with	requests	for	books	and	articles	and	so	on.	The	material	from	this	time	ends	with	a	series	of	lengthy	and	dry	memoranda	and	reports,	probably	for	the	benefit	of	whoever	took	on	the	job	after	him.		His	exact	date	of	departure	is	not	certain,	though	it	was	in	August.	He	left	with	his	family	from	Bergen,	intending	to	land	in	Aberdeen	two	days	later.	The	trip	took	instead	five	days	(possibly	due	to	bad	weather)	with	rumours	of	enemy	
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submarines	haunting	the	crew	before	they	finally	“ran	aground	on	the	Orkneys.”273		 In	his	own	words,	he	had,	by	the	end	of	his	stay	“established	in	Norway	a	centre	of	information	and	influence	which	would	run	more	or	less	on	routine	lines.”274	This	system	“was	later	adopted	all	over	the	world	and,	in	an	attenuated	form,	it	is	carried	out	by	an	‘appropriate	department’	[perhaps	another	sting	at	the	Ministry	of	Information?]	of	Government	to	this	day.”275	It	is	obvious	he	held	his	own	accomplishments	in	high	regard,	but	it	is	perhaps	justifiably	so.	He	had	been,	since	1916,	the	spearhead	of	British	propaganda	in	Norway,	had	reported	meticulously	to	the	British	departments	and	ministries,	had	established	and	utilised	an	extensive	network	of	informants	for	the	benefit	of	British	intelligence,	and	had	served	the	Norwegian	public	with	thousands	of	pro-British	articles,	steering	them	through	crises	and	troubles	into	British	arms.	The	most	complete	test	of	Kenney’s	influence	is	in	looking	at	what	he	managed	to	do,	and	as	has	been	demonstrated:	what	he	managed	to	do	is	impressive.			PERSONS	OF	INTEREST		A	different	way	of	assessing	Kenney’s	influence	is	in	looking	specifically	at	his	network.	This	section	aims	to	do	just	that.	As	was	established	in	Chapter	III,	power	was	present	in	tight-knit	communities,	and	mapping	the	network	Kenney	found	himself	in	will	award	some	sense	of	Kenney’s	position	in	the	greater	scope	of	influence	on	policy	and	history.	Not	only	does	this	section	outline	who	Kenney	was	in	contact	with,	but	also	the	nature	of	their	relationships.	Kenney’s	network	in	Britain	is	here	of	more	interest	than	the	one	in	Norway,	primarily	because	of	the	nature	of	his	connections,	though	a	few	exceptions	exist;	in	Norway,	Kenney’s	known	contacts	spanned	mainly	a	selection	of	press	owners	and	newspaper	editors,	and	these	will	rather	be	drawn	into	the	next	chapter,	since	they	are	more	relevant	with	regards	to	the	NTB	affair.																																																									273	Kenney.	Westering.	p.	236.	274	Ibid.		275	Ibid.,	p.	229.	
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	 Firstly,	Kenney’s	primary	contacts	within	the	structure	of	British	propaganda	were	George	Herbert	Mair	and	George	Fullerton-Carnegie.	Mair	was	appointed	the	head	of	the	Neutral	Press	Committee	when	it	was	formed	in	1914.	He	had	previously	been	an	assistant	editor	at	the	Daily	Chronicle.276	His	rather	fluid	post	at	the	Committee	resulted	in	him,	alongside	Charles	Montgomery,	leading	the	Department	of	Information	until	John	Buchan	was	awarded	the	position	in	1917.277	During	Kenney’s	first	year	in	Norway,	Mair	was	in	charge	of	the	press	aspect	of	the	Department’s	work.278	When	the	Ministry	of	Information	was	created,	he	became	Assistant	Secretary.279	Mair	was	obviously	a	well	connected,	talented	man—Kenney	writes	“he	seemed	to	be	personally	acquainted	with	everybody	who	had	ever	achieved	anything	in	any	sphere	of	activities	anywhere,”280—and	for	Kenney	to	have	the	kind	of	relationship	with	him	that	he	had,	means	a	lot	for	Kenney’s	own	position	within	the	structure.	After	the	war,	Mair	was	awarded	with	a	C.M.G.281	and	had	an	illustrious	career	within	the	League	of	Nations	before	he	died,	much	too	young,	in	1926.282		 Less	is	known	about	Fullerton-Carnegie,	the	head	of	the	Scandinavian	Section	of	the	News	Department.	He	was	the	cousin	of	Lord	Tyrrell,	the	then	private	secretary	of	Foreign	Secretary	Grey,	a	familial	connection	which	in	those	times	presumably	meant	a	lot.	In	his	autobiography	from	1939,	Kenney	writes	
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that	Carnegie	was	and	continued	to	be	a	close	friend.283	He	also	appears	to	have	been	the	British	Chargé	d’Affaires	in	Oslo	during	the	inter-war	period.284		 When	the	Ministry	took	over	from	the	Department	of	Information,	Kenney	began	reporting	to	Herbert	Charles	O’Neill	and	Roderick	Jones.	O’Neill,	like	Carnegie,	is	difficult	to	source,	but	he	was	a	journalist,	editor	and	author	before	the	war.	During	the	war,	and	for	a	couple	of	years	after,	he	worked	in	the	Foreign	Office	before	eventually	returning	to	journalism	and	becoming	the	editor	of	Financial	News.285		 Roderick	Jones,	on	the	other	hand,	is	a	well-known	figure.	He	features	heavily	in	the	next	chapter,	but	it	is	worth	noting	a	few	points	here.	Some	of	Jones’	background	has	already	been	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	Jones	was	very	well	connected,	running	Reuters	and	serving	as	Director	of	Propaganda	in	the	Ministry.	During	a	House	of	Commons	debate	on	state	propaganda	in	1918—where	Beaverbrook	was	in	the	crosshairs—,	it	was	Jones	who	stayed	with	Beaverbrook	at	the	Hyde	Park	Hotel	apartment.286	A	very	powerful	figure,	Jones	“was	gazetted	one	of	the	first	knights	of	the	new	Order	of	the	British	Empire”287	in	early	1918	for	his	work	with	propaganda.	On	a	1918	memorandum	detailing	the	Reuters-FO	relationship,	Lord	Robert	Cecil’s	hand	praises	“the	loyal	and	patriotic	cooperation	of	Reuters	and	particularly	of	Sir	Roderick	Jones”,	and	under	it,	signed	by	A.J.	Balfour:	“I	quite	agree.”288	An	interesting	point	to	make	here	is	how	Kenney	saw	Jones.	A	1917	letter	to	Carnegie,	probably	near	Jones’	entry	into	the	field	proper,	describes	Kenney’s	thoughts:																																																									283	Kenney.	Westering.	p.	231-32.	284	News	in	Brief.	The	Times	[London,	England].	3	Mar.	1933.	p.	13.	The	Times	Digital	Archive.	Web.	16	Mar.	2014.	http://find.galegroup.com/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TTDA&userGroupName=stand&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&docId=CS218966115&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0	285	Mr.	H.	C.	O'Neill.	The	Times	[London,	England].	2	Oct.	1953.	p.	8.	The	Times	Digital	Archive.	Web.	16	Mar.	2014.	http://find.galegroup.com/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TTDA&userGroupName=stand&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&docId=CS136532290&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0	286	Messinger,	British	propaganda.	p.	135.	287	Read,	Donald.	The	Power	of	News:	The	History	of	Reuters.	2nd	Ed.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999.	p.	137.		288	Ibid.,	p.	132.	
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	 “Now,	first,	R.J.	[Roderick	Jones].	We	will	leave	him	alone	–	almost.	I	am	now	principally	concerned	to	see	him	put	the	Norsk	[Telegrambureau]	matter	through.	After	that,	you	have	not	convinced	me	yet;	and	his	scruples	are	too	mixed	for	my	simple	mind.	He	has	scruples	about	breaking	a	contract	–	which	the	war	broke	3	years	ago!	–	because	of	the	sanctity	of	business	contracts;	and	he	exposes	the	country	to	all	sorts	of	misrepresentations	–	because	he	is	a	Business-Manager!	We	must	discuss	this	matter	later	–	in	some	quiet	smoking-room.	Only	just	one	more	shot!	What	fools	our	soldiers	and	sailors	are;	neglecting	their	business	prospects	–	and	contracts	–	for	the	sake	of	smiting	the	Germans!	What	a	world!”289		The	excerpt	is	as	humorous	as	it	is	telling.	Again	there	is	a	sort	of	tension	between	Kenney	as	Jones’	agent	and	Jones	as	Kenney’s	puppet.	It	is	certainly	the	case	that	Kenney	knew	what	he	wanted	from	the	man,	and	was	not	afraid	to	say	it,	even	to	his	boss.	Whereas	Jones	might	have	been	at	the	head	of	the	scheme,	the	quotation	again	argues	for	Kenney,	and	agents	like	him,	being	the	motor	behind	events.		 A	sort	of	intermediary	step	between	Norwegian	and	British	contacts,	is	the	then	British	Minister	in	Christiania,	Sir	Mansfeldt	de	Cardonnel	Findlay.	Findlay	had	been	the	subject	of	controversy	after	the	‘Denshawai	Outrage’	in	1906.	Suffice	to	say	the	event	was	a	tragic	and	embarrassing	one	for	the	British	in	general	and	for	Findlay	in	particular.	The	outcome	for	Findlay	was	for	him	to	spend	over	12	years	as	Minister	to	Norway	(1911-1923),	something	he	regarded	as	a	punishment,	and	given	that	this	length	of	stay	was	3-4	times	longer	than	usual,	he	was	probably	right.	He	viewed	the	post	as	an	unfair	exile.290	Nevertheless,	Findlay	was	a	powerful	and	respected	man	among	the	British	political	elite.	An	example	both	of	his	political	reach	as	well	as	his	regard	for	Kenney	is	found	in	a	couple	of	letters	written	to	Arthur	Balfour	after	Kenney’s	resignation:	“I	can	only	place	on	record	my	very	high	opinion	of	his	character	and	of	the	results	he	has	attained,”291	and:																																																										289	Kenney.	Letter	to	Carnegie.	24	July	1917.		290	Kenney,	Westering,	p.	219.	291	Findlay,	Sir	Mansfeldt	de	C.	Letter	to	Balfour.	25	Aug.	1918.	TNA:	FO	395/187.	p.	3.	
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I	would	add	that	the	Norwegian	press,	including	the	official	paper,	have	expressed	great	regret	at	Mr.	Kenney’s	impending	departure	and	appreciation	of	the	manner	in	which	he	has	discharged	his	duties	as	Reuter’s	Correspondent.	Considering	the	great	influence	which	Mr.	Kenney	has	managed	to	exercise	on	the	press	there	could	be	no	higher	tribute	to	his	tact	and	discretion.	I	would	observe	that	a	German	Correspondent	(Harthen)	who	held	a	similar	appointment	in	German	interests	had	to	leave	Norway	some	time	[a]go	to	avoid	arrest	and	trial	for	espionage.292		If	this	is	not	a	suitable	and	clear	adulation	both	of	Kenney’s	position	within	the	developing	system	of	state	propaganda,	as	well	as	of	his	undeniable	success,	then	there	is	little	more	to	say	on	the	matter.		 		THE	RISING	SYSTEM		It	seems	rather	clear,	then,	that	Kenney	took	the	shape	of	a	rather	important	component	in	the	machinery	of	state	propaganda	during	the	First	World	War.	His	accomplishments	were	not	only	practical,	but	they	also	both	shaped	and	represented	larger	shifts	taking	place	during	the	time.	These	developments	were	complicated	and	often	subtle,	but	indicated	new	ways	of	thinking	in	policy	and	practice.	Propaganda	during	the	First	World	War,	and	indeed,	Kenney’s	work	in	the	First	World	War,	have	ripple	effects	even	to	this	day.		 First	and	foremost,	the	nature	of	this	new	type	of	war	demanded	propaganda	efforts	the	likes	of	which	had	never	before	been	seen.	“Never	before	had	the	temper	of	the	civilian	population	had	such	crucial	bearing	on	the	outcome	of	the	war.”293	While	it	is	true	that	propaganda,	in	some	form	or	another,	had	been	practiced	previously,	it	was	certainly	a	new	kind	and	a	new	dimension	of	propaganda	which	was	necessary	now.	“Organized	propaganda,	using	increasingly	sophisticated	and	efficient	communications	techniques	deliberately	to	manipulate	the	opinion	of	the	mass	of	the	people,	became	an	
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indispensable	adjunct	to	twentieth–century	politics.”294	This	was	a	new	war,	and	it	demanded	new	weapons.	Kenney’s	operation	represented	the	budding	idea	that	information	is	power,	an	idea	that	had	enormous	effects	on	the	relationship	between	the	state	and	the	press.	During	the	First	World	War,	there	occurred	a	radical	shift	in	the	relationship	between	the	state	and	the	press.	Apart	from	a	small	handful	of	press	barons,	prior	to	the	First	World	War,	diplomats	generally	regarded	journalists	and	editors	with	haughty	disdain.	As	Arthur	Willert	notes:	“The	general	feeling	on	the	part	of	the	Press	was	that	the	diplomat	was	an	exclusive	and	rather	priggish	sort	of	person	who	resented	anybody	trying	to	break	into	his	laboratory	to	discover	how	he	performed	his	mysteries.	The	average	diplomat,	on	his	side,	retaliated	by	treating	the	emissaries	of	the	Press	as	nuisances,	who,	luckily,	could	usually	be	avoided.”295	On	his	arrival	in	Norway	in	1916,	Kenney	indeed	noted	the	‘resentment’	he	felt	when	he	first	met	with	Findlay.296	It	is	a	very	interesting	idea	to	compare	this	to	Findlay’s	soaring	praise	two	years	later.	This	was	no	isolated	incident,	related	to	either	Kenney’s	or	Findlay’s	particular	disposition,	but	was	rather	a	general	mood	recognized	throughout	the	field	of	propaganda	agents.	“Mrs.	Vira	B.	Whitehouse,	for	instance,	was	sent	to	Switzerland	by	the	Committee	on	Public	Information.	The	Legation	met	her	cordially,	but,	owing	to	the	vagueness	with	which	her	instructions	were	defined,	refused	to	give	her	the	recognition	and	the	facilities	which	were	indispensable	to	her	work.”297	Nevertheless,	after	change	comes	adaptation	and	governments	slowly	began	to	realize	the	value	of	information	control	and	indeed,	as	Willert	wrote	in	1938:	“Now	all	Foreign	Offices	have	[…]	organized	contacts	with	journalists.”298		 In	tune	with	this,	and	almost	as	a	notable	exception	in	the	history	of	propaganda	work,	journalism	was	central	to	propaganda	efforts.	The	most																																																									294	Haste.	Keep	the	Home	Fires	Burning.	p.	201.	295	Willert,	Arthur.	Publicity	and	Propaganda	in	International	Affairs.	
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successful	propagandists	in	the	First	World	War	were	not	the	pamphleteers	or	the	cineastes,	and	not	even	the	editorialists.	They	were	journalists	and	editors,	like	Kenney.299	This	exists	as	an	exception	because	previously,	no	centralized,	large-scale	effort	had	been	made,	and	later,	the	focus	became	even	more	state-central,	as	seen	in	the	Second	World	War	(which	will	be	discussed	in	Chapters	VI	and	VII).	The	First	World	War	was	in	essence	the	golden	age	of	the	gentlemen	amateurs,	and	organically,	journalists	took	to	their	pens,	so	to	speak.	This	idea	was	also	represented	in	reverse,	with	major	resources	being	put	into	play	in	order	to	have	foreign	neutral	journalists	interview	British	public	figures.300		 The	British	propagandists	were	also	beginning	to	recognize	the	dangers	of	carrying	out	propaganda.	Information	gathering	was	no	new	activity,	but	with	the	sensitivity	and	scope	now	necessary,	a	new	system	was	required.	This	marked	the	departure	of	information	agents	from	the	central	trunk	of	the	foreign	services.	301	New	agencies	were	created,	and	new	roles.	Kenney’s	role,	being	employed	loosely	by	the	Foreign	Office,	and	yet	not	enjoying	full	diplomatic	status,	is	an	example	of	this	slight	shift.302	Growing	out	of	this	idea	of	subtlety	was	also	this	idea	of	pervasiveness.	“The	influencing	of	attitudes	is	implicit	in	every	function,	and	[…]	it	is	incapable	of	complete	segregation	in	anything	like	the	degree	to	which,	let	us	say,	the	purchasing	of	horses	can	be	confined	to	a	particular	agency.”303	This,	again,	is	mirrored	in	Kenney’s	experience,	working	in	part	for	the	Legation,	the	Foreign	Office,	Reuters	and	both	the	Department	and	Ministry	of	Information.	Indeed,	the	messy,	lateral	structure	of	early	British	propaganda	offices—and	both	Kenney	and	Mair’s	rather	fluid	posts	within	them—testify	to	the	newly-discovered,	all-encompassing	nature	of	their	work.		 Being	a	new	and	powerful	weapon	in	the	war,	propaganda	demanded	investment.	“It	is	probable	that	all	major	powers	spent	substantial	sums	to																																																									299	Lasswell.	Propaganda	Technique	in	the	World	War.	p.	31-32.	300	Davison,	W.	Phillips.	Some	Trends	in	International	Propaganda.	Annals	of	the	
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influence	the	press	in	neutral	countries,	although	specifics	are	difficult	to	document.”304	Although	Kenney’s	own	experience	was	not	exactly	one	of	funds	being	readily	available,	he	was	certainly	responsible	for	large	sums	of	money	passing	through	the	system,	mainly	to	influence	Norwegian	editors	and	newspaper	owners.	This	very	method	of	personal	contact	in	order	to	influence	large	swathes	of	people	was	also	a	novel	idea:			 One	of	the	lessons	to	be	drawn	from	the	success	of	British	propaganda	in	the	United	States	is	the	cardinal	importance	of	persons	as	means	of	carrying	suggestion.	No	avenue	of	approach	can	safely	be	ignored,	but	the	powers	behind	the	impersonal	agencies	must	be	reached,	and	this	is	best	managed	by	personal	contact.	The	British	were	astute	enough	to	work	chiefly	through	Americans	[in	America],	and	none	of	their	agents	came	to	the	premature	disgrace	and	humiliation	that	befell	Dr.	Dernburg.305			Lasswell’s	example	of	America	is	almost	exactly	the	same	as	Kenney’s	work	and	experience	in	Norway,	even	down	to	the	failures	of	the	German	agent,	Harthing.	Kenney	worked	chiefly	through	Norwegians	in	Norway,	signifying	a	more	restrained	application	of	influence	emerging	in	the	propaganda	sector.	It	is	worth	noting	that	sensitivity,	or	restraint,	is	a	major	tenet	of	English	School	thinking;	according	to	Herbert	Butterfield,	the	balance	of	power	survives	on	states	practicing	restraint.306	It	is	a	compelling	parallel	to	view	Kenney’s	sensitivity	in	navigating	the	balance	of	power	in	Norway	with	the	restraint	necessary	to	successfully	maintain	the	balance	of	power	on	the	global	stage.		 All	of	these	developments	are	most	readily	seen	in	the	dynamic	organization	of	the	state	services	dedicated	to	propaganda.	Organization	naturally	feeds	into	practice,	and	learns	from	it.	Insofar	as	propaganda	organization	was	concerned,	there	was	a	growing	sentiment	that	propaganda	agents	were	not	simply	functions	of	policy;	they	did	not	simply	effect	policy,	but	also	affected	it.	“It	is	important	to	give	the	propagandist	a	place,	not	only	in	the																																																									304	Davison.	Some	Trends	in	International	Propaganda.	p.	3.	305	Lasswell.	Propaganda	Technique	in	the	World	War.	pp	.	217-18.	306	Sharp,	Paul.	Herbert	Butterfield,	the	English	School	and	the	Civilizing	Virtues	of	Diplomacy.	International	Affairs,	vol.	79,	no.	4.	Royal	Institute	of	International	Affairs.	Wiley,	July	2008.	pp.	855-878.	p.	859.	
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actual	execution	of	policy,	but	in	the	formation.”307	This	sentiment	acknowledges	the	rapidly	growing	importance	of	influence	over	public	and	foreign	opinion.	It	also	clearly	demonstrates	the	way	in	which	Kenney’s	work	was	of	extraordinary	relevance	to	the	development	and	implementation	of	international	systems.	The	examination	of	his	accomplishments	in	Norway	during	the	First	World	War	leaves	little	room	to	doubt	that	he	did	affect	policy.		
v v v 
 This	chapter	has	detailed	Kenney’s	general	operations	in	Norway	during	the	First	World	War.	He	was	sent	to	Norway	by	the	Foreign	Office	in	order	to	assess	the	position	of	the	Norwegian	press	and	public	to	the	belligerent	parties.	Upon	completion	of	his	report,	Kenney	was	asked	to	return	to	Norway	to	carry	out	the	tasks	he	had	called	for.	Kenney,	during	his	time	in	Norway,	disseminated	pro-British	material,	provided	information	to	the	Foreign	Office,	monitored	the	Norwegian	press,	suggested	journalists	and	editors	for	blacklisting,	and	suggested	propaganda	policies.	His	efforts	were	largely	successful	in	spite	of	the	poor	conditions	he	had	to	suffer.	The	Ministry	of	Information’s	inefficiency	led	him	to	resign	his	post	in	the	summer	of	1918.	During	his	time	as	an	agent	in	Norway,	Kenney’s	relationship	to	his	superiors	in	London	was	an	interesting	one.	He	seemed	to	be	the	driving	force	behind	many	initiatives.	The	people	he	reported	to	were	very	influential	people,	which	places	him	in	a	powerful	network	of	individuals	capable	of	effecting	change	in	British	propaganda	policy.	Their	high	opinion	of	him	also	reflects	on	his	importance	to	the	system	in	development.	Kenney’s	experience	in	Norway	is	as	much	an	example	of	as	it	is	a	cause	of	this	development.	It	was	because	of	agents	like	Kenney	that	governments	began	to	really	take	notice	of	the	subtle	art	of	influence.	The	First	World	War	would	forever	change	the	relationship	between	the	state	and	the	press	and	Kenney	had	no	small	part	in	this	evolution.		 Perhaps	Kenney’s	greatest	achievement	in	Norway	at	this	time	was	the	sale	of	the	Norwegian	Telegram	Bureau.	This	has	not	yet	been	discussed	since	doing	so	demands	a	significant	commitment	to	space	and	understanding.	Even	at																																																									307	Lasswell.	Propaganda	Technique	in	the	World	War.	pp	.	27-28.	
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the	very	beginning	of	his	stay,	Kenney	remarked	on	the	importance	of	uncoupling	the	Norwegian	news	agency	from	the	German.	This	would	go	on	to	take	years	and	demand	from	Kenney	patience	and	skills	similar	to	those	possessed	by	a	tightrope	walker.	It	would	go	on	to	involve	the	most	powerful	political	and	media	elites	in	the	country,	even	the	Prime	Minister.	It	would	take	tact,	secrecy	and	discretion.	Rowland	Kenney	had	all	three.		 	
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CHAPTER	V	
THE	NTB-REUTERS	AFFAIR:	A	CASE	STUDY	
	 There	were	present	Prime	Minister	Knudsen,	Foreign	Minister	Ihlen,	Board	of	Trade	Minister	Friis	Pettersen,	Telegraph	Director	Heftye…308		In	1918,	the	privately	owned	Norwegian	Telegram	Bureau	[NTB]	was	bought	by	a	conglomerate	of	influential	Norwegian	pressmen.	The	move	marked	a	shift	of	the	international	news	service	in	Norway	and	opened	up	the	bureau	for	contracts	with	a	wide	range	of	outside	institutions	and	agencies—perhaps	most	significantly:	British	Reuters.	Negotiations	to	seal	the	transaction	had	been	in	progress	more	or	less	covertly	for	almost	two	years,	and	took	the	previous	owners	of	NTB	and	their	international	partners	by	surprise.	What	is	as	yet	untold	in	accounts	of	this	event	is	the	manifest	involvement	of	the	British	Foreign	Office	and	Reuters	in	the	affair,	and	at	the	centre	of	this	chapter’s	argument	stands	the	man	who	bridged	those	two	institutions	and	the	Norwegian	press:	namely,	Rowland	Kenney.																																																									308	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	George	Herbert	Mair.	2	Oct.	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	
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	 The	story	in	this	chapter	is	presented	almost	like	a	case	study.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	the	event	described	offers	a	very	detailed	glimpse	into	Kenney’s	work,	his	reach,	as	well	as	his	impact	on	a	global	system	of	propaganda.	Not	only	is	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	well	furnished	with	materials	regarding	the	affair,	but	there	are	also	interesting	materials	found	in	other	archives,	such	as	the	Norwegian	National	Archive	and	the	Reuters	Archive	maintained	by	Thompson	Reuters.	The	goal	is	to	demonstrate	a	specific	and	pinpointed	case	of	Kenney’s	work	as	a	propagandist.	In	the	previous	chapter,	his	work	was	taken	in	overview,	in	order	to	get	a	full	picture	of	his	responsibilities	and	accomplishments.	In	this	case,	it	is	possible	to	go	very	deep	and	analyse	his	relationships	to	those	with	whom	he	worked,	as	well	as	to	uncover	the	intricate	dealings	behind	the	scenes.	The	NTB-Reuters	affair	is	a	perfect	demonstration	of	Kenney’s	abilities	and	impact.		 Kenney’s	self-described	mission	when	sent	to	Norway	was	covered	in	the	last	chapter.	Perhaps	one	of	the	most	significant	points	raised	in	his	proposal	was	that	a	British	agent	should	“develope	[sic]	a	bureau	that	would	fight	out	or	absorb	the	Norsk	Telegrambureau.”309	That	such	a	statement	should	come	two	years	prior	to	the	sale	of	NTB	is	not	at	all	a	coincidence.	In	examining	the	relationship	between	Reuters	and	the	Foreign	Office,	the	troubled	position	of	NTB,	as	well	as	Kenney’s	activities,	a	very	compelling	argument	can	be	made	that	Kenney,	being	a	Foreign	Office	secret	agent,	was	at	the	heart	of	the	scheme.			THE	NORWEGIAN	TELEGRAMBUREAU		The	event	takes	place	within	a	rather	convoluted	set	of	circumstances.	It	is	important	to	be	at	least	somewhat	familiar	with	the	background	elements	so	as	to	have	a	clear	understanding	of	the	significance	of	the	episode.	Having	a	good	grasp	of	the	context	also	means	that	certain	aspects	are	more	easily	explained.	For	the	scope	of	this	chapter,	there	are	two	such	background	elements:	the	
																																																								309	Kenney,	Rowland.	Report	on	the	Norwegian	Press.	6	Sept.	1916.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	pp.	11-12.	
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collaboration	between	Reuters	and	the	British	Foreign	Office	(as	was	discussed	extensively	in	Chapter	IV)	and	the	history	of	the	Norwegian	Telegram	Bureau.	Since	the	creation	of	NTB	in	1867,	it	had	(and	still	has)	maintained	a	monopoly	on	the	international	market	of	news	into	and	out	of	Norway.	This	was	also	very	much	the	case	during	WWI.	Created	as	an	offshoot	of	the	Danish	bureau	Ritzau—which	itself	was	a	satellite	of	Wolffs	Bureau	in	Berlin—,	NTB	had	well-established,	early	ties	into	the	news	bureau	ring	which	by	the	close	of	the	19th	Century	controlled	most	of	the	news-traffic	around	the	world.310	Wolffs,	together	with	Havas	of	Paris	and	Reuters	of	London,	had	agreed	to	split	the	news-world	into	territories,	each	to	be	fed	by	their	respective	organisations.	Kenney	wrote:	“the	large	international	News	Agencies,	such	as	Reuters	in	London,	Woolfs	[sic]	Bureau	in	Berlin,	and	the	Havas	Agency	in	Paris,	had	divided	the	world	into	various	spheres	of	influence…	Scandinavia	had	fallen	into	the	German	zone,	and	the	Norsk	[Norwegian]	Telegram	Bureau	was	naturally	friendly	to	the	Germans”.311	A	Norwegian	politician,	Dr.	Arnold	Ræstad,	referred	to	NTB	in	a	letter	as	“a	sub-sub-department	of	Wolff’s.”312		The	inter-bureaux	competition	for	territories	was	not	a	casual	affair.	In	the	earliest	written	agreement	between	Reuters,	Wolffs	and	Havas,	signed	in	1859,	Wolffs	expressly	laid	claim	to	Scandinavia.313	This	did	not	stop	Julius	Reuter	from	attempting	to	absorb	Ritzau	of	Copenhagen	in	1867.314	Though	he	was	unsuccessful,	Wolffs’	territorial	claim	was	reaffirmed	in	the	famous	ring	agreement	of	January	1870,	with	a	pointed	clause	demanding	Reuters	refrain	from	operating	in	territories	held	by	Wolffs.315		The	bureaux’	control	was	not	purely	a	business	agreement.	A	document	titled	‘Memorandum	on	the	Norwegian	News	Service’,	found	in	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	and	likely	written	by	the	same	Dr.	Ræstad	in	1917,	describes	Wolffs	Bureau	as	being	“opposed	to	[the	creation	of	a	new	Norwegian	bureau]																																																									310	Berge,	Kjell	Lars,	et	al.	Norsk	Presses	Historie,	vol.	1.	ed.	Martin	Eide.	Oslo:	Universitetsforlaget,	2010.	311	Kenney,	Rowland.	Westering.	London:	J.	M.	Dent	&	Sons,	1939.	312	Ræstad,	Arnold.	Confidential	Report.	26	Sept.	1917.	Norwegian	National	Archive,	PA-0949.	p.	2.	[Translation	author’s	own.]	313	Read.	The	Power	of	News.	p.	55.	314	Ibid.		315	Ibid.,	p.	57.	
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for	reasons	of	a	political	nature,	acting,	as	it	would	do,	under	the	dictates	of	the	German	Government.”316	This	political	absorption	of	the	bureaux	had	begun	long	before	the	war	and	became	most	apparent	in	inter-bureaux	dealings:	as	an	example,	it	was	Bismarck	himself	in	the	late	1860s	who	secretly	sabotaged	negotiations	through	which	Reuters	was	attempting	to	acquire	Wolffs.317	The	political	influence	on	the	bureaux	had	clear	effects	on	the	satellite	organs	such	as	NTB.	With	such	deep-seated	power	behind	the	industry,	there	was	little	room	for	the	smaller	institutions.	“It	may	be	stated	confidentially,”	the	Memorandum	on	the	Norwegian	News	Service	notes,	“that	the	relations	between	NTB	and	Ritzau	[and	on	to	Wolffs]	can	not	be	terminated	at	will,	e.g.	after	a	certain	amount	of	years,	by	the	Norwegian	Bureau,	but	run	on	indefinitely.”318	The	contract	between	the	parent	service	and	its	satellites	was	rather	draconian,	with	NTB	paying	a	fixed	annual	sum	to	Wolffs,	as	well	as	paying	all	its	own	expenses	in	the	news	transmission	between	itself	and	Ritzau	and	also	sharing	some	of	Ritzau’s	expenses	in	obtaining	news	from	Wolffs.319	It	was	laid	out	so	as	not	to	be	directly	prohibitive	for	NTB	to	communicate	with	other	agencies	(such	as	Reuters),	but	apart	from	the	cost	of	such	communication,	there	also	had	to	be	notification	from	NTB	to	Ritzau	and	Wolffs	if	this	was	done.	It	was	“evident	that	the	whole	system	works	in	such	a	way	as	to	discourage	very	much	the	receiving	or	transmitting	of	news	direct	from	or	to	centres	outside	of	Copenhagen	and	Berlin.”320	NTB	was	contractually	and	practically	within	the	sphere	of	Wolffs	of	Berlin,	which,	as	was	laid	out	in	the	previous	section,	meant	that	it	was	closely	linked	to	the	German	government.	Additionally,	NTB	had	not	been	very	well	regarded	among	the	news	professionals	and	consumers	in	Norway.	It	was	seen	by	most	as	slow	and	inefficient,	and	it	was	jokingly	said	that	NTB	was	an	abbreviation	of	‘Nogen	Tid	Bagefter’	[Dano-Norwegian	for	‘Some	Time	Later’].321	Consequently,	competitors	attempted	to	replace	the	bureau,	but	“owing	to	the	connections	of	the																																																									316	Memorandum	Concerning	the	Norwegian	News	Service.	8	Feb.	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	9.	317	Read.	The	Power	of	News.	p.	56.	318	Memorandum	Concerning	the	Norwegian	News	Service.	p.	10.	319	Ibid.,	p.	1-2.	320	Ibid.,	p.	2.	321	Berge.	Norsk	Presses	Historie.	p.	441.	
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Norwegian	bureau	through	Ritzau	and	Wolff	with	the	great	international	news	service	ring,	it	was	very	difficult,	not	to	say	impossible,	to	start	serious	competition	with	NTB.”322	With	the	start	of	the	war,	and	the	introduction	of	Rowland	Kenney,	however,	the	situation	was	about	to	change.			THE	NTB	AFFAIR		The	‘Memorandum	Concerning	the	Norwegian	News	Service’,	presumably	written	by	Arnold	Ræstad,	is	one	of	the	earliest	documents	indicating	a	plan	was	under	development	in	order	to	replace	the	current	NTB.	The	document	was,	if	the	assumption	is	correct,	written	during	Ræstad’s	second	visit	to	London	within	a	year	at	the	turn	of	1916.	According	to	NTB	itself,	Ræstad	had	taken	it	upon	himself	to	try	to	find	a	way	to	fix	the	problems	of	the	bureau	and	to	gain	a	contract	with	Reuters.323	While	in	London,	he	visited	with	officials	in	the	Foreign	Office	as	well	as	Reuters	and	was	told	that,	due	to	the	war,	Reuters	saw	an	opportunity	to	gain	the	Scandinavian	territories	from	Wolffs.324			 Ræstad’s	memorandum	made	the	case	that	it	was	in	the	Allies’	interest,	and	especially	British	interest,	to	facilitate	a	change	in	the	Norwegian	bureau	situation.	In	support	of	this	view,	it	claimed	that	the	German	government	had	used	its	influence	over	Wolffs	agency	to	support	an	anti-Allied	press	policy.325	This	was	a	thinly	veiled	accusation	that	Germany	was	pushing	propaganda	through	NTB.	The	memorandum	went	on	to	suggest	that	the	only	solution	was	to	be	found	through	a	deal	with	Reuters.326	It	seems	clear	that	the	purpose	of	the	document	was	to	persuade	some	British	authority	(most	likely	Reuters	or	the	Foreign	Office)	that	an	agreement	both	could	and	should	be	found.	Together	with	Kenney’s	1916	call	to	‘fight	out	or	absorb’	NTB,	this	document	represents	the	early	stages	of	planning.	It	is,	of	course,	unclear	whether	Kenney	and	Ræstad	had,	at	this	point	in	time,	spoken,	and	impossible	to	tell	if	Kenney	had	in	any	way																																																									322	Memorandum	Concerning	the	Norwegian	News	Service.	p.	5.	323	Olsen,	Einar.	Notat	om	NTB	og	Byråforbindelsene.	30	Dec.	2011.	E-mail.	324	Ibid.	325	Memorandum	Concerning	the	Norwegian	News	Service.	326	Ibid.	
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influenced	Ræstad	to	make	the	move.	However,	parallel	to	this,	Kenney	was	pursuing	the	NTB	matter	as	well,	writing	to	Mair	in	December	1916	and	declaring	that	NTB	was	useless	for	siphoning	news	from	Britain	into	Norway	and	that	it	would	be	necessary	to	open	a	competing	agency	or	await	the	natural	reorganisation	of	the	existing	bureau.327		 Again	according	to	NTB’s	own	historian,	Ræstad	returned	to	Norway	in	the	spring	of	1917	and	presented	the	results	of	his	foray	to	the	newly	formed	Norwegian	Press	Association,	which	proceeded	to	deliberate	on	the	matter	for	a	considerable	amount	of	time.328	A	report	written	by	Ræstad	in	September	of	that	year	gives	a	thorough	account	of	the	events.	The	report,	marked	‘Confidential’,	details	his	two	trips	to	London	and	mentions	meetings	with	officials	from	Reuters,	the	General	Post	Office	and	the	Foreign	Office.	The	link	to	the	Foreign	Office	appears	almost	cursory,	with	a	note	that	the	Foreign	Office	unofficially	“would	be	happy	to	see	these	negotiations	completed.”329	The	report	also	makes	a	mention	of	Kenney	(it	is	one	of	very	few	instances	in	which	Kenney	appears	in	the	Norwegian	archives),	tellingly	referring	to	him	as	“Reuters’	representative	here.”330	The	cause	for	Kenney’s	inclusion	in	the	document	is	also	his	first	documented	interference	with	the	process.	According	to	the	report,	Kenney	had	counselled	against	accepting	Reuters	insistence	that	the	current	NTB	leadership	be	included	in	the	negotiations.	Evidently,	he	had	also	convinced	Reuters	to	drop	the	suggestion,	securing	the	strict	confidence	of	the	negotiations	between	Reuters	and	the	Norwegian	Press	Association.331	This	is	no	minor	moment.	Kenney,	under	guise	of	working	for	Reuters,	had	directed	the	negotiations	to	avoid	a	major	hurdle.	His	and	the	Foreign	Office’s	propaganda	interests	had	trumped	Reuters’	financial	interests.	
																																																								327	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	George	Herbert	Mair.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	1	Dec.	1916.	328	Olsen.	Notat.	329	Ræstad,	Confidential	Report.	p.	3.	330	Ibid.	This	is	a	soft	indication	that	Kenney’s	cover	identity	(established	in	Chapter	IV)	was	operational.	Whether	Ræstad	was	aware	that	Kenney	was	actually	an	agent	of	the	Foreign	Office	is	impossible	to	tell,	but	even	assuming	this	was	the	case,	the	fact	that	the	cover	was	maintained	in	a	confidential	report	presumably	meant	for	the	Norwegian	press	elite,	is	notable.	331	Ibid.	
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	 Kenney	had	certainly	been	aware	of	Ræstad’s	meetings	in	London	for	some	time	before	this.	Immediately	upon	Ræstad’s	return	to	Norway,	Kenney	met	with	one	of	Ræstad’s	associates,	Mr.	Aars	Johanssen.	Kenney	acted	as	a	sort	of	facilitator,	on	his	own	initiative	placing	Johanssen—as	a	representative	of	the	Norwegian	Press	Association,	which	was	fundamentally	an	association	of	journalists—in	contact	with	the	owner	of	one	of	Norway’s	largest	newspapers,	Rolf	Thomessen	of	Tidens	Tegn.	In	his	writings	to	Mair,	Kenney	expresses	himself	in	a	way	that	makes	him	seem	to	be	directing	the	entire	affair,	suggesting	to	the	parties	which	path	to	take.332	Ultimately,	his	work	in	connecting	the	Association	with	the	newspaper	owners	was	a	bridge	connecting	the	contract	with	Reuters	to	the	possibility	of	a	new	NTB.	It	seems	plausible	from	the	constellation	of	confidences	that	Ræstad	and	Johanssen	were	at	least	partly	aware	that	Kenney	was	more	than	a	Reuters	journalist,	though	this	remains	mere	surmise.		 The	preparations	for	a	new	bureau	in	place	of	NTB	required	rather	complicated	preparations,	not	least	of	which	was	the	laying	of	a	new	communications	cable	from	Britain	to	Norway.	This,	naturally,	required	more	than	even	the	most	diligent	press	association,	newspaper	owner	or	propaganda	institution	could	muster.	Kenney’s	announcement	to	Mair	that	“we	[presumably	the	cabal	in	Norway	looking	to	overthrow	NTB]	have	now	the	Minister	for	the	Board	of	Trade	and	the	Prime	Minister	enthusiastic	for	the	proposal,”333	is	therefore	a	major	step	in	the	planning	phase.	This	particular	moment	also	demonstrates	how	closely	connected	Kenney	was	with	the	very	elite	of	not	only	the	Norwegian	media,	but	also	the	Norwegian	political	elite.	If	there	is	any	doubt	as	to	Kenney’s	importance	to	the	process,	a	letter	from	Kenney	about	a	trip	to	Sweden	in	the	summer	of	1917,	surely	gives	ample	evidence.	Kenney	was	eager	to	impress	upon	his	superiors	in	the	Department	of	Information,	that	his	trip	should	not	slow	the	process	down:	“It	will	be	a	thousand	pities	if	this	should	interfere	with	the	Telegram	Bureau	arrangements.	[…]	Mr.	Carnegie	will	tell	you	how	necessary	it	is	to	shepherd	the	Norwegians	if	you	want	them	to	enter	any																																																									332	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	George	Herbert	Mair.	2	Apr.	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	2.	333	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	George	Herbert	Mair.	24	May	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	2.	
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fold	at	a	given	time.”334	That	Kenney’s	absence	from	the	country	should	possibly	bear	such	significance	on	the	matter	indicates	the	level	of	his	involvement.		 By	autumn,	the	planning	had	entered	into	a	difficult	phase.	While	Ræstad	had	been	the	main	negotiator	on	the	side	of	the	Norwegians,	and	had	been	what	appears	to	be	a	close	associate	of	Kenney’s,	he	proved	to	ultimately	be	unnecessary	for	the	final	transaction.	The	question	of	financing	quickly	became	a	problem	with	Ræstad	at	its	unfortunate	centre.	According	to	Kenney’s	letters	to	Mair,	Ræstad	staked	a	claim	to	a	rather	large	sum	of	money	to	cover	his	expenses	and	act	as	a	fee	for	his	services.	Two	newspapermen	in	particular,	Ola	Christoffersen	(of	Aftenbladet)	and	Rolf	Thomessen	(of	Tidens	Tegn),	set	themselves	against	such	an	arrangement,	implying	that	Ræstad’s	interest	in	the	matter	was	purely	a	speculative	one.	Christoffersen	also	made	a	remark	to	Kenney	that	Ræstad	had	made	veiled	threats,	reminding	him	that	the	contract	was	in	effect	between	Ræstad	and	Reuters.	Kenney	was	emphatic	in	naming	Christoffersen	the	“most	important	man	with	whom	we	have	to	deal.”335		Particularly	interesting	in	this	problem	is	Kenney’s	positioning.	Having	worked	seemingly	closely	with	Ræstad	as	a	sort	of	middleman	between	the	Norwegian	Press	Association,	the	Foreign	Office,	the	Department	of	Information	and	the	Norwegian	pressmen,	Kenney	was	now	detached	from	Ræstad.	He	was	quite	clear	in	his	letters	that	Ræstad	had	not	approached	him	about	the	problem,	and	even	further,	Ræstad	was	not	aware	that	Kenney	knew	of	it	at	all.	This	is	significant	because	it	separates	Kenney	from	the	interests	of	the	press	association,	making	much	clearer	his	role	as	wholly	propagandistic.	Kenney’s	stake	in	the	matter	became	even	more	visible	when	he	suggested	a	solution	to	the	problem:		 Perhaps	the	best	method	would	be	for	the	Special	Committee	to	invite	me	to	a	meeting	where	the	matter	will	be	raised;	then,	whilst	expressing	no	opinion	on	the	matter	as	to	the	reasonableness	of	Dr.	Ræstad’s	claim,	I	will	remind	all	present	that	we	are	none	of	us	primarily	interested	in	personal	gain,	and																																																									334	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	George	Herbert	Mair.	16	June	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	335	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	George	Herbert	Mair.	1	Sep.	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	3.	
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suggest	to	Dr.	Ræstad	that	he	hand	over	the	whole	of	the	papers	to	me.336		The	proposal	alone	is	a	manifestly	telling	one;	that	Kenney	could	find	himself	in	such	a	position	as	to	take	complete	charge	of	the	affair	from	the	Norwegian	side,	acting,	as	he	presumably	was,	as	Reuters’	representative.	He	was	rapidly	taking	centre-stage	in	the	preparations.	Added	to	this,	Kenney	obtained	assurances	from	Christoffersen	and	Thomessen	that	they	would	come	to	him	first	if	they	were	considering	leaving	the	scheme.337		 The	matter	came	to	a	head	in	a	meeting	held	on	the	28th	of	September	1917.	Present	at	the	meeting	were	a	series	of	newspaper	editors	(including	Thomessen	and	Christoffersen),	the	Telegraph	Director	Heftye,	Dr.	Ræstad,	and	both	the	Foreign	and	Prime	Ministers.	The	affair	was	certainly	not	to	be	left	to	chance.		It	is	unclear	whether	any	of	Ræstad’s	demands	were	met,	but	he	agreed	nonetheless	to	give	up	the	final,	signed	contract	to	a	company	recognised	by	the	Norwegian	government	and	by	Reuters.338	The	preparations	for	the	establishment	of	a	new	bureau	were	thereby	complete,	not	least	due	to	Kenney’s	careful	interventions.	Kenney’s	work	with	regards	to	the	NTB	affair	was	therefore	practically	complete.	The	new	agency	was	established	and	an	offer	to	purchase	the	old	NTB	was	accepted	on	March	25th,	1918.339		What	is	interesting	to	note	is	that	Roderick	Jones,	the	Director	of	Reuters,	had	since	1917	been	engaged	in	the	Department	of	Information	(subsequently	the	Ministry	of	Information)	as	head	of	“cable	and	wireless	propaganda.”340	Jones	was	therefore	responsible	both	for	Reuters’	business	as	well	as	propaganda	policy	in	the	Department.	By	March	1918,	the	Ministry	of	Information	had	been	established,	and	Kenney	received	instructions	to	report	to	new	individuals	(as	was	discussed	in	Chapter	IV).	Regarding	his	work	with	NTB,	
																																																								336	Ibid.,	p.	4-5.	337	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	George	Herbert	Mair.	17	Sep.	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	3.	338	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	George	Herbert	Mair.	2	Oct.	1917.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.		339	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Sir	Roderick	Jones.	25	Mar.	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	340	Read.	The	Power	of	News.	p,	134.	
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Jones	asked	Kenney	“to	report	direct	to	him.”341	In	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers,	all	material	and	discussion	surrounding	NTB	after	March	1918	is	between	Kenney	and	Jones,	whereas	all	other	matters	are	parsed	through	O’Neill.	This	undeniably	is	a	conflict	of	interest.	With	the	new	NTB	in	place,	and	the	conditions	for	the	Reuters-NTB	contract	being	worked	on,	Kenney	had	little	more	to	do	with	the	matter,	except	reporting	faithfully	to	Jones.	One	particular	instance,	which	also	serves	to	cast	light	on	the	episode,	was	a	case	of	a	slip	of	the	tongue	by	a	member	of	the	American	Legation.	The	importance	of	Allied	“control	in	Norway”342	apparently	sent	a	particularly	prickly	Norwegian	newspaper	editor,	Mr.	Hambro	of	
Morgenbladet,	into	a	rant	suggesting	“that	this	effort	to	reorganise	the	telegraphic	services	was	part	of	the	Allied	scheme	for	‘controlling’	Norway.”343	An	implication,	of	course,	related	to	the	truth,	but	perhaps	put	too	bombastically.	The	deal	between	NTB	and	Reuters	remained	difficult	to	pin	down,	mainly	due	to	disagreements	over	the	fee	structure,	as	well	as	the	massive	task	of	laying	a	new	cable	to	facilitate	the	increased	flow	of	information.	This	resulted	in	the	NTB	contract	with	Wolffs	being	renegotiated	at	the	transfer	of	the	old	firm	to	the	new	one.	Kenney	assured	Jones	that	this	was	simply	because	the	original	Wolffs	contract	from	1910	had	not	yet	expired,	and	that	the	German	bureau	effectively	conceded	their	sole	control	over	NTB	in	the	renegotiation.	Kenney	had	surreptitiously	managed	to	obtain	copies	of	both	the	1910	contract	and	the	renegotiated	contract	and	sent	these	to	Jones	with	a	note	that	it	should	not	be	known	that	he	had	them.344	It	appeared	the	Ministry	was	satisfied	to	let	the	matter	be	resolved	by	the	overt	parties,	as	it	gave	Kenney	no	further	instructions.	In	due	course,	the	new	NTB	did	reach	an	agreement	with	Reuters	and	Havas.345		Kenney’s	work,	however,	seems	to	have	been	impressive	to	the	propagandists	in	Britain.	Later	in	1918,	a	similar	coup	was	performed	against																																																									341	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Herbert	Charles	O'Neill.	5	Mar.	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	342	Kenney.	Letter	to	Sir	Roderick	Jones.	25	Mar.	1918.	p.	2.	343	Ibid.	344	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Sir	Roderick	Jones.	28	May	1918.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	345	Olsen.	Notat.	
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the	Swedish	bureau.	John	Buchan,	the	Director	of	the	Ministry	of	Information,	informed	Reuters	in	August	that	a	new	bureau	had	been	established	in	Sweden,	and	that	the	contracts	between	the	Svenska	[Swedish]	Telegrambureau	and	Reuters	could	now	be	transferred	to	the	new	Nordiska	Telegrambureau.346	Furthermore,	Buchan	made	it	clear	to	Reuters	that	“in	accordance	with	the	high	interests	involved,	the	Ministry	intend	to	do	all	in	their	power	to	fulfil	their	part	of	the	obligation	to	prevent	news	from	all	parts	of	the	world	from	reaching	the	Svenska	Telegrambyrån.”347	This	not	only	shows	the	immense	scope	of	the	operation	Kenney	undertook	and	its	ripple	effects	into	new	propaganda	policy,	but	also	demonstrates	the	level	at	which	Kenney	operated.			ANALYSIS		What	the	NTB-Reuters	case	demonstrates	is	the	extent	to	which	the	Department	and	Ministry	of	Information	acted	to	ensure	access	to	and	control	of	foreign	channels	of	news	distribution	in	the	First	World	War.	The	official	history	of	NTB	does	not	account	for	the	Foreign	Office	or	the	propaganda	institutions’	involvement	to	any	realistic	degree.	So	in	terms	of	historical	value,	the	case	study	uncovers	a	previously	unknown	factor.	In	terms	of	the	thesis,	without	Kenney’s	direct	involvement,	the	affair	might	have	fallen	apart	on	numerous	occasions,	whether	by	Reuters	tipping	off	the	owners	of	the	private	NTB	or	by	Ræstad	spoiling	his	own	contract	and	his	relationship	with	the	newspaper	owners,	or	a	number	of	other	difficulties.	This	is	a	particular	instance	where	Kenney’s	work	can	demonstrably	be	shown	to	have	had	significant	effects,	not	only	on	wartime	propaganda,	but	also	on	the	shape	of	the	international	news-agency	politics.	While	it	is	impossible	to	determine	with	any	appropriate	level	of	confidence	the	extent	to	which	Kenney	initiated	the	affair,	he	was	certainly	involved	from	the	beginning.	Naturally,	there	had	been	those	in	Norway	who	had																																																									346	Buchan,	John.	Letter	to	Messrs	Reuter's	Telegram	Co..	17	August	1918.	London:	Reuters	Archive,	Thomson	Reuters.	347	Buchan,	John.	Letter	to	Messrs	Reuter's	Telegram	Co..	22	August	1918.	London:	Reuters	Archive,	Thomson	Reuters.	
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disliked	NTB	and	who	had	sought	to	replace	or	undermine	its	operations	long	before	Kenney	arrived.	Indeed,	several	attempts	were	launched,	and	promptly	failed,	because	of	NTB’s	monopoly	of	news	from	the	governing	big-three	agreement.348	It	could	of	course	be	argued	that	the	war	destabilised	enough	of	the	situation	for	a	real	threat	to	be	mounted,	and	that	Kenney’s	involvement	could	of	course	all	be	a	matter	of	fortuitous	coincidence.	Kenney,	looking	for	a	way	to	open	the	Norwegian	news-market	to	British	propaganda,	realised	he	had	a	sharp	ally	in	Ræstad	who	was	already	on	the	path	to	securing	a	contract.	However,	while	unproven,	one	other,	quite	likely	scenario	is	that	Kenney	recruited	Ræstad—who	was	already	sympathetic	to	the	cause—and	steered	him	to	London.	In	support	of	this,	one	could	present	the	facts:	a)	that	Kenney	was	intimately	aware	of	Ræstad’s	trips	to	London	while	they	were	still	on-going,	in	spite	of	Ræstad’s	very	cursory	contact	with	the	Foreign	Office,	b)	that	Ræstad’s	trips	to	London	took	place	at	the	precise	moment	when	Kenney	began	his	work	in	Norway,	c)	that	the	immediacy	of	the	issue	is	much	more	present	for	Kenney	than	for	Ræstad,	and	finally	d)	that	it	was	Kenney	who	gathered	the	newspaper	owners	and	linked	them	to	Ræstad	and	his	negotiations	with	Reuters,	thereby	materialising	the	true	window	of	opportunity.	Kenney	also	seems	to	have	maintained	an	apparent	lack	of	interest	in	the	business,	at	least	toward	those	directly	involved.	He	is	not	mentioned	in	attendance	in	any	meeting	(even	the	meeting	in	which	he	suggested	he	could	challenge	Ræstad	for	control	of	the	contract).	Instead,	his	conversation	with	the	interested	parties	appear	to	have	happened	in	confidence,	information	kept	closely	guarded.	The	assurances	extracted	from	the	concerned	newspaper	owners,	and	his	handling	of	Ræstad’s	fee-demands	are	excellent	examples	of	this	type	of	behaviour.	Kenney’s	role	seems	to	exist	behind	the	curtain,	perhaps	in	some	way	pulling	the	strings	in	secret	and	unofficially.	The	suggestion	of	taking	the	contract	from	Ræstad	is	the	most	direct	involvement	in	the	affair	throughout	the	documents,	perhaps	save	for	his	introduction	of	Ræstad’s	man	to	the	newspaper	owners.	The	remainder	of	his	action	in	the	affair	is	fairly	consultative.	This,	of	course,	points	to	the	idea	that	his	role	was	secret,	at	least	to	some	or	even	all	of	the	primary	parties.																																																									348	Memorandum	Concerning	the	Norwegian	News	Service.	
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v v v		There	is	no	doubt	that	the	news	agencies	were	under	strain	to	be	channels	for	propaganda	purposes	from	different	sides.	Kenney	was	at	the	forefront	of	a	push	not	only	to	use	NTB	as	a	channel,	but	to	recreate	it	and	redefine	the	international	press	in	Norway.	Indeed	it	was	largely	successful,	the	new	company	taking	over	the	old	NTB’s	contract	and	opening	up	the	ties	to	other	news	agencies.	Kenney	was	a	part	of	restructuring	the	news	media	of	Norway,	a	restructuring	that	would	survive	The	Second	World	War	and	the	Cold	War;	in	fact,	today’s	NTB	has	its	roots	in	the	company	created	in	1918.	
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CHAPTER	VI	
THE	INTERWAR	YEARS		 …the	hammer	fell,	however,	in	spite	of	your	generous	and	valiant	efforts,	and	here	I	am	doing	my	best…349		Rowland	Kenney’s	work	in	the	interwar	period	is	very	interesting	and	even	raises	countless	points	for	the	purpose	of	this	thesis,	but	with	the	space	afforded	here	the	events	must	be	paraphrased.	It	is	not	exaggeration	to	suggest	Kenney’s	activities	during	this	period	could	be	the	subject	of	at	least	two	more	theses,	but	it	is	in	accordance	with	this,	not	in	spite	of	it,	that	this	thesis	omits	a	very	detailed	discussion	at	this	point;	it	cannot	be	afforded	to	give	it	the	consideration	it	deserves.	While	Kenney	was	important	and	showed	great	nous	and	skill	during	this	period,	advancing	his	already	impressive	position,	the	main	focus	remains	with	his	work	in	Norway,	if	only	to	give	a	suitably	detailed	and	analytical	account.		 Another	reason	to	avoid	going	too	deeply	into	this	episode,	is	that	Kenney’s	private	collection	of	documents—an	extraordinary	resource	for	his																																																									349	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	4	Nov.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	3.	
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work	in	Norway—here	falters	considerably.	Documentation	from	1919	until	1939	is	sparse.	It	is	therefore	difficult	to	understand	with	any	sufficient	confidence	what	exactly	his	activities	were	in	this	period,	though	there	are	tantalizing	clues.	What	is	undeniably	true	is	that	the	man	did	not	disappear	in	1918	and	reappear,	fresh-faced	and	eager,	in	1939,	and	it	serves	the	reader	to	at	least	offer	a	summary	of	the	known	arc	during	these	two	decades.	Small	arguments	as	to	Kenney’s	position	and	influence	in	developing	an	international	system	are	made,	but	in	large	part,	this	section	simply	traces	the	movements	and	interests	of	the	man.	It	also	serves	to	deliver	some	context	to	Kenney’s	role	going	into	the	Second	World	War,	as	well	as	the	position	of	Great	Britain	and	Norway	leading	up	to	the	war.			HE	WAS	A	CIVIL	SERVANT		After	his	resignation	from	the	Ministry	of	Information	and	return	to	Great	Britain,	Kenney	reported	to	Carnegie	and	Tyrrell	at	the	Foreign	Office.	The	focus	at	the	Foreign	Office	was	preparations	for	the	Peace	Conference.	Kenney	was	subsequently	made	Assistant	Commissioner	on	the	Foreign	Office’s	Political	Mission	to	Poland.	The	object	for	Kenney	was	to	assess	the	Polish	position	“from	the	point	of	view	of	the	Polish	Left	Wing.”350		 In	this	Kenney	proved	characteristically	capable.	Trough	his	travels	to	and	within	Poland,	Kenney	met	with	dignitaries	and	royalty.	From	December	1918	until	February	1919,	he	travelled	and	reported.351	On	his	arrival	in	Paris	on	the	2nd	of	February,	1919,	Kenney	was	taken	the	very	same	evening	to	meet	with	A.	J.	Balfour,	then	of	course	Foreign	Secretary,	to	tell	of	his	findings.352	This	is	surely	an	extraordinary	testament	to	Kenney’s	influence	at	the	time.	A	short	time	later,	Kenney	was	again	sent	to	Poland,	with	Esme	Howard,	who	had	gone																																																									350	Kenney,	Westering,	p.	240.	351	Documents	from	this	period	are	extensive	and	exist	in	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	I	would	like	to	encourage	further	study	into	Kenney’s	work	in	Poland,	though,	as	mentioned,	doing	so	here	would	be	leaps	and	bounds	beyond	what	can	be	afforded	both	in	terms	of	scope	and	depth.	352	Kenney,	Westering.	
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on	request	from	Lloyd	George	himself.	While	obviously	flippant,	Kenney	apparently	dreamt	up	the	European	Union	at	a	party	in	Warsaw	during	this	trip.	“I	suggested	that	the	only	sensible	way	to	settle	our	international	troubles	would	be	by	the	establishment	of	a	United	States	of	Europe	[…]	I	had	no	supporters;	it	was	a	lively	party,	and	I	was	shoved	under	the	table.”353	While	Kenney	cannot	in	all	likelihood	claim	to	have	grandfathered	the	union	in	its	current	form,	his	work	in	Poland	and	in	Paris	do	tell	of	a	man	shaping	policy	and	personally	advising	some	of	the	most	influential	figures	of	the	time.		 He	returned	again	to	Paris,	noted	a	dejected	mood,	but	was	eager	to	do	more	work.354	More	than	a	decade	later,	Kenney	related	this	part	of	the	story	to	Arthur	Willert—the	same	Arthur	Willert	who	authored	the	cited	piece	titled	‘Publicity	and	Propaganda	in	International	Affairs’	in	1938—:	having	completed	his	Polish	assignment,	and	with	nothing	more	to	achieve	in	Paris,	Kenney	spoke	to	Carnegie	and	Tyrrell	at	the	Foreign	Office	who	suggested	he	would	be	given	some	leave	and	then	be	sent	on	a	Mission	to	Germany,	before	continuing	on	within	the	Political	Intelligence	Department.355	A	German	Mission	in	the	wake	of	the	First	World	War	speaks,	of	course,	to	Kenney’s	stature.	The	prognosis	for	his	career	seemed	on	the	rise.			 With	a	view	to	experience	the	thrill	of	flight,	Kenney	was	authorised	to	return	to	London	by	air	and	climbed	into	the	observation	seat	of	a	D.H.9—an	open	biplane.	The	Canadian	pilot	ferried	him	across	the	channel	safely,	landing	at	Lympne	to	refuel,	whereupon	Kenney	recalled	some	complaints	made	about	the	fuel	tank.	Upon	climbing	again,	they	encountered	heavy	fog	and	the	pilot	determined	to	land356:		 Four	times	we	dived,	without	result.	It	was	the	most	weird	experience.	Twice	we	came	down	over	woods,	so	low	that	twigs	in	the	tree-tops	scraped	our	under-carriage.	The	fog	was	so	thick	that	we	were	almost	on	the	ground	before	we	could	see	anything.	On	our	fifth	dive	we	did	hit	the	ground.	I	had	just	time	to	see	a	farm	and	the	surrounding	fields	rushing	up	to	us,	and	entertain	one	desire,	before	we	struck.																																																									353	Kenney,	Westering,	p.	279.	354	Kenney.	Westering,	p.	280.	355	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	A.	Willert.	24	July	1931.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	356	Kenney.	Westering.	
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	 I	had	no	fear,	no	sense	of	horror.	There	was	simply	this	one	desire,	absorbing	my	whole	conscious	being,	for	sudden	death.357		Instead,	both	Kenney	and	the	unnamed	pilot	survived,	miraculously,	though	Kenney	would	be	plagued	for	the	rest	of	his	life	with	medical	problems	due	to	the	crash-landing.	The	immediate	problems	were	a	broken	right	arm,	which	due	to	poor	setting	at	the	hospital	had	to	be	rebroken	without	anaesthetic;	several	episodes	of	collapse,	including	a	heart	attack;	two	broken	ribs	which	had	punctured	his	lungs;	and	finally	chronic	pneumonia	and	sciatica.	More	heart	attacks	followed,	resulting	in	the	discovery	of	a	“nine-inch	thrombus	of	the	femoral	vein”358	in	his	left	leg.	In	his	own	words:	“the	air	crash	left	me	with	a	crocked	arm,	a	crocked	leg,	a	spine	which	was	only	free	from	pain	in	one	position,	and	worst	of	all,	ruined	nerves.”359		 Relating	this	story	serves	three	purposes.	First,	and	most	obviously,	it	simply	advances	the	narrative	of	Kenney’s	life,	so	that	the	reader	is	aware	of	what	kind	of	trouble	he	had	undergone	during	this	time.	Second,	it	serves	as	a	foundation	for	an	argument	that	in	spite	of	Kenney’s	incredible	achievements,	his	health	(as	well	as,	of	course,	his	radical	politics	and	impoverished	background)	hindered	his	professional	advancement.	And,	finally,	Kenney’s	misfortune	led	to	a	significant	change	in	Treasury	policy.		 Kenney	came	to	at	a	massive	financial	loss	and	was	eventually	told	“the	Treasury	repudiated	financial	responsibility	for	any	accident	to	an	officer	travelling	by	air,	unless	he	were	under	definite	instructions	to	do	so.”360	Kenney	himself	appears	convinced	that	the	regulation	to	that	effect	was	drafted	based	on	his	own	accident	and	of	course	found	it	very	unfair.	Not	only	did	he	lose	his	salary	while	recovering,	but	he	also	lost	a	period	of	his	pension.361	It	is	therefore	no	surprise	that	the	details	of	his	complaints	feature	in	the	letter	to	Willert,	written	twelve	years	after	the	fact.	
																																																								357	Kenney.	Westering,	p.	281.	358	Kenney.	Westering,	p.	284.	359	Ibid.	360	Kenney.	Letter	to	Willert,	24	July	1931.	p.	2.	361	Kenney.	Letter	to	Willert.	24	July	1931.	
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	 As	mentioned	previously,	little	is	known	from	the	period	of	1920-1939.	A	newspaper	article	published	in	Norsk	Tidend	and	translated	either	for	or	by	Kenney,	appears	in	the	collection	with	the	following	summary:		 When	he	returned	to	the	Foreign	Office	in	1920,	he	was	appointed	to	the	Political	Intelligence	Department	as	specialist	on	the	Northern	European	countries.	This	department	was	abolished,	and	Mr.	Kenney	was	transferred	to	the	News	Department,	where	he	continued	to	work	as	head	of	the	Cultural	Section	until	the	outbreak	of	war	in	1939.	For	many	years	Mr.	Kenney	was	almost	alone	in	this	publicity	work,	which	was	responsible	for	informing	the	world	of	British	cultural	values.	Later,	when	the	importance	of	the	work	came	to	be	recognized,	a	semi-official	organisation,	the	British	Council	was	set	up,	and	Mr.	Kenney,	as	was	natural	with	his	experience	had	a	great	deal	to	do	with	the	establishment	of	this	institution,	and	with	training	and	advising	the	staff	in	their	work.	Right	up	to	the	outbreak	of	war	in	1939	he	was	the	Foreign	Office	representative	on	nearly	all	the	various	British	Council	Committees.362	[Emphasis	in	original.]		While	it	may	appear	to	be	a	poor	source,	it	is	in	fact	the	most	succinct	record	of	his	activities	during	this	time.	Kenney’s	appointment	to	the	Political	Intelligence	Department	(PID),	as	had	also	been	the	plan	before	his	fateful	crash,	is	in	itself	a	valuable	point.		The	PID	was	formed	within	the	Foreign	Office	as	part	of	the	preparations	for	the	peace	conference	after	the	First	World	War.	It	held	a	series	of	functions,	primarily	producing	reports	detailing	political	developments	and	realities	in	a	wide	range	of	countries,	which	were	subsequently	“circulated	to	the	War	Cabinet	and	the	principal	officers	of	the	state.”363	Erik	Goldstein	contends	that	the	creation	of	the	PID	“was	clearly	motivated	by	the	obvious	eclipse	of	the	Foreign	Office	in	policy	formulation”364	by	Lloyd	George’s	informal	secretariat.	The	PID	was	thus	expressly	populated	by	“the	best	available	experts”365	in	order	to	gain	authority	and	clout.	In	the	literature,	the	PID	is	nearly	invariably																																																									362	An	old	Friend	of	Norway.	Norsk	Tidend.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	363		Goldstein,	Erik.	Winning	the	Peace:	British	Diplomatic	Strategy,	Peace	
Planning,	and	the	Paris	Peace	Conference,	1916-1920.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1991.	p.	63.	364	Ibid.	p.	58.	365	Ibid.	
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described	as	“highly	effective”,	in	light	of	“the	calibre	of	the	individuals	employed,”	giving	it	the	nickname	“The	Ministry	of	All	the	Talents.”366	By	proxy,	it	can	be	argued	that	Kenney’s	deliberate	placement	within	the	PID	is	a	clear	reference	to	his	abilities	and	value.	The	PID	also	united	a	group	of	people	who	had	played	or	would	play	rather	important	roles	in	Kenney’s	professional	life.	The	Department	included	Fullerton-Carnegie,	Reginald	‘Rex’	Leeper,	Lewis	Bernstein	Namier,	and	Robert	Vansittart	among	others.367	In	a	handful	of	cases,	it	is	likely	that	Kenney	first	met	these	people	here.		 The	department	steadily	grew	in	influence,	eventually	being	regarded	as	an	important	and	highly	effective	development	in	the	Foreign	Office.	At	the	Paris	peace	conference,	the	patron	of	the	PID,	Lord	Hardinge—who	at	the	time	also	was	the	Permanent	Under-Secretary	at	the	Foreign	Office—was	“the	superintending	ambassador	of	the	British	delegation.”368	Having	been	created	for	the	purpose	of	aiding	the	British	peace	aims,	this	would	be	the	height	of	the	department’s	influence.	In	the	following	several	months,	in	spite	of	great	support	for	its	work	within	the	Foreign	Office,	the	department	was	wound	down	due	to	Treasury	cuts.	It	would	remain	obvious	that	the	PID	had	played	a	very	important	role	in	the	revitalisation	of	the	Foreign	Office,	and	in	fostering	a	group	of	highly	successful	diplomatists	and	civil	servants	who	would	colour	the	Foreign	Office	for	the	decades	to	come.369	Not	least	among	them	was	Kenney.	In	addition	to	his	work	in	the	PID,	Kenney’s	purportedly	instrumental	role	in	the	establishment	and	running	of	the	British	Council	is	an	important	point	to	make	with	regards	to	the	thesis.	Kenney	recalled	his	work	with	the	British	Council	in	a	1945	memorandum	to	Laurence	Collier	who	at	the	time	was	the	British	Ambassador	to	Norway	and	had	worked	with	Kenney	through	the	Second	World	War	(see	Chapter	VII).	Kenney	saw	the	foundations	for	the	British	Council	arising	from	the	ashes	of	the	First	World	War.	With	the	war	over,	and	plenty	of	propagandists	to	spare,	the	government	began	to	consider	how	it																																																									366	Goldstein,	Erik.	The	Foreign	Office	and	Political	Intelligence	1918-1920.	
Review	of	International	Studies,	vol.	14,	no.	4.	Cambridge	University	Press,	Oct.	1988.	pp.	275-288.	p.	285	367	Goldstein.	Winning	the	Peace.	368	Ibid.,	p.	85-86.	369	Ibid.;	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	Political	Intelligence	Department,	see	Chapter	2	of	Erik	Goldstein’s	book,	Winning	the	Peace.	
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might	increase	British	cultural	value	abroad.	This	coincided	with	a	particularly	nasty	backlash	against	the	concept	of	propaganda—one	might	recall	the	point	made	in	Chapter	II,	that	propaganda	often	demonises	itself—which	in	turn	shut	down	large	swathes	of	the	official	machinery	and	certainly	left	little	room	for	the	remains	to	grow.370		 	One	of	the	granules	left	was	precisely	Kenney,	who	had	settled	once	again	in	the	News	Department	of	the	Foreign	Office.	Together	with	one	other	colleague,	Kenney	populated	a	section	“concerned	with	certain	publicity	which	had	been,	apparently	by	accident,	left	over	from	the	war,	[…and]	dealt	with	the	many	requests	for	publicity	material	which	were	constantly	being	made	by	H.M.	Embassies,	Legations	and	Consulates.”371	In	a	battle	for	public	money	for	the	section—and,	recognising	the	shadow	cast	upon	the	term—Kenney	began	substituting	the	phrase	‘propaganda	work’	for	‘cultural	work’	and	lobbied	the	Treasury	for	a	ruling	that	funds	may	be	spent	in	this	regard.	After	what	he	claimed	was	“many	years	of	effort”372	he	succeeded,	and	landed	a	small	sum	of	£1,000	per	year.		 Even	with	this	relative	pittance,	Kenney	recalled	making	headway.	“The	results	of	even	the	small	amount	of	cultural	publicity	we	could	get	for	our	£1000	a	year	were	such	that	it	soon	became	obvious	to	everyone	who	considered	the	matter	that	more	money	must	come	from	somewhere.”373	He	managed	to	raise	the	Treasury	funds	allotted	to	£2,500	per	annum,	but	lost	ground	again	when	the	economy	ground	to	a	halt	at	the	start	of	the	1930s.	Around	this	same	time,	Rex	Leeper	(who	will	be	properly	introduced	in	Chapter	VII)	made	his	way	into	the	News	Department,	and	in	spite	of	initial	misgivings,	took	an	interest	in	Kenney’s	section.	He	“became	enthusiastic	about	it	and	determined	that	it	should	be	strengthened	and	its	work	considerably	expanded.”374	Through	Leeper’s	enthusiasm	the	small	section	in	the	News	Department	went	through	a	series	of	renditions	in	1934,	including	as	a	part	of	the	short-lived	Cultural																																																									370	Kenney,	Rowland.	Memorandum	to	Laurence	Collier.	18	Sep.	1945.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.		371	Ibid.,	p.	1.	372	Ibid.	373	Ibid.	374	Ibid.,	p.	2.	
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Relations	Committee	in	which	it	was	joined	by	the	Travel	Association	and	the	Empire	Marketing	Board	among	others,	and	the	Advisory	Committee	for	the	Promotion	of	International	Relations.375	Finally,	“on	14	November	Leeper	informed	the	Foreign	Secretary	of	the	formation	of	an	as	yet	unnamed	committee	under	the	chairmanship	of	Lord	Tyrrell,	and	on	5	December	there	took	place	its	first	meeting	at	which	it	was	agreed	that	it	should	be	called	‘The	British	Committee	for	Relations	with	Other	Countries’.”376	This	was	the	organisation	which	would	soon	be	known	as	the	British	Council.	In	the	academic	literature,	such	as	Frances	Donaldson’s	The	British	
Council:	The	First	Fifty	Years377	and	Edward	Corse’s	A	Battle	for	Neutral	
Europe,378	Leeper	is	of	course	the	man	credited	with	the	founding	of	the	British	Council.	However,	as	Kenney’s	account	emerges,	this	might	be	kindly	called	a	simplistic	understanding.	Kenney	himself	states	that	“Mr.	(now	Sir)	Rex	Leeper	and	I	were	responsible	for	the	founding	of	the	British	Council.”379	Nevertheless,	interestingly—and	perhaps	disappointingly—Kenney	does	not	appear	at	all	in	either	Donaldson’s	or	Corse’s	books.	This	may	problematize	Kenney’s	own	assertion	that	he	was	essential	to	the	British	Council’s	formation.	However,	Kenney’s	continued	elusiveness	with	regards	to	nearly	all	aspects	of	his	work	in	nearly	all	alternative	sources	other	than	his	own	Rowland	Kenney	Papers,	suggests	that	this	is	not	a	specific	problem,	but	a	general	one.	For	whatever	reason	(some	explored	in	this	chapter),	Kenney	has	been	forgotten	in	so	many	respects	that	it	is	difficult	to	believe	he	has	in	this	instance	inflated	his	own	import.	Additionally,	in	Kenney’s	defence,	the	memorandum	about	the	British	Council	outlining	Kenney’s	recollections	was	addressed	to	Collier,	a	close	colleague	of	Leeper’s,	who	would	doubtless	have	recognised	and	challenged	any	falsity.380	The	most	inviting	conclusion,	then,	becomes	the	idea	that	Kenney	is	truthful	in	his	statements	about	founding	the	British	Council,	but	that	in	the																																																									375	Corse,	Edward.	A	Battle	for	Neutral	Europe:	British	Cultural	Propaganda	
during	the	Second	World	War.	London:	Bloomsbury,	2013.	376	Donaldson,	Frances.	The	British	Council:	The	First	Fifty	Years.	London:	Jonathan	Cape,	1984.	p.	28.	377	Donaldson.	The	British	Council.	378	Corse.	A	Battle	for	Neutral	Europe.	379	Kenney.	Memorandum	to	Laurence	Collier.	18	Sep.	1945.	p.	1.	380	Ibid.	
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literature,	because	of	the	paucity	of	sources	available	to	the	public	concerning	Kenney	(outside	of	the	recently	discovered	Rowland	Kenney	Papers)	he	has	been	overshadowed	by	more	immediately	prominent	figures,	like	Leeper	and	Vansittart,	for	example.	This	again	highlights	the	importance	of	the	thesis	which,	in	admittedly	grandiose	terms,	sets	the	record	straight	on	a	man	left	behind	in	the	history	books	and	the	archives.	A	final	note	on	the	British	Council	in	this	context	arises	from	the	fact	that	at	its	bedrock	lay	the	British	propaganda	expertise	from	the	First	World	War,	particularly	manifest	in	Kenney	himself.	The	British	Council	practiced—indeed,	practices—what	Jacques	Ellul	(discussed	in	Chapter	II)	would	call	‘sociological	propaganda’,	which	is	the	use	of	propaganda	in	order	to	consolidate	or	project	the	sense	of	belonging	to	a	group:	what	is	often	referred	to	as	cultural	propaganda.381	A	full	discussion	of	the	theories	behind	such	cultural	propaganda	is	helpfully	laid	out	in	chapter	two	of	Corse’s	A	Battle	for	Neutral	Europe.382	Historically,	however,	the	difficulty	in	distinguishing	political	from	cultural	propaganda—with	the	British	Council	and	the	Ministry	of	Information	as	proxies	for	this	duel—materialised	in	the	final	months	of	peace	before	the	Second	World	War.	In	February	1939,	it	was	agreed	that	in	case	of	war,	the	Ministry	of	Information	would	absorb	the	British	Council	entirely,	assuming	responsibility	for	its	staff	and	output	until	it	could	be	restored	in	peacetime.383	What	followed	was	a	drawn-out	debate	between	several	interests	within	the	sphere	of	British	propaganda.	The	original	proposal	was	put	down,	replaced	instead	by	a	solution	of	combination.	The	Ministry	of	Information	agreed	that	insofar	as	the	British	Council	engaged	in	cultural	and	educational	work,	it	was	outside	of	the	expertise	of	the	Ministry	and	should	continue	these	tasks	undisturbed.	However,	any	activity	concerning	true	propaganda,	including	all	work	concerning	film,	would	have	to	be	previously	approved	by	the	Ministry,	
																																																								381	Ellul.	Propaganda.	382	Corse.	A	Battle	for	Neutral	Europe.	383	Donaldson.	The	British	Council.	p.	69.	
	 131	
and	a	liaison	position	was	created	for	this	to	work.384	It	is	remarkable,	then,	to	read	Kenney’s	own	thoughts	on	this	careful	division	of	labours:		We	still	held	to	the	word	‘cultural’,	and	worked	it	into	the	title,	because	after	careful	enquiry	we	found	that	both	in	the	Foreign	Office	and	in	the	Treasury,	as	well	as	among	outside	bodies	whose	support	we	were	canvassing,	we	should	have	met	with	resistance	had	we	suggested	that	the	activities	should	be	extended	in	any	directions	which	could	be	called	political.	Thus	the	British	Council,	which	has	since	grown	to	such	dimensions	and	absorbed	such	an	enormous	amount	of	public	money,	was	limited	in	its	scope	purely	for	opportunist	reasons,	and	in	my	opinion	there	is	no	reason	whatever	why	the	work	subsequently	undertaken	by	the	Foreign	Division	of	the	Ministry	of	Information	and	that	done	by	The	British	Council	should	not	be	carried	out	by	one	organisation.385		The	entire	memorandum	to	Collier	is	virtually	built	up	toward	this	conclusion,	Kenney	only	coasting	through	his	role	in	the	Council’s	founding	so	as	to	establish	that	it	was	and	is	simply	a	tool	for	propaganda,	though	propaganda	by	another	name.			 What	is	perhaps	the	most	remarkable	thing	about	this	period	is	his	own	cryptic	message	on	the	subject.	His	autobiography,	Westering,	was	written	during	this	time	and	published	in	1939.	In	the	book,	Kenney	goes	to	great	length	to	describe	all	of	the	episodes	of	his	life,	from	early	childhood	to	the	then-present	day.	Part	one	of	the	book,	dealing	with	his	childhood	up	until	he	became	a	young	professional	in	his	twenties	is	exactly	one	hundred	pages	long.	Part	two,	about	his	work	with	the	unions	and	the	socialist	press	before	the	outbreak	of	the	First	World	War	spans	one	hundred	and	fourteen	pages.	And	his	life	during	and	immediately	after	the	war	is	described	in	part	three,	over	ninety	pages.	The	following	part,	titled	‘Bondage’	and	ostensibly	covering	the	period	between	1920	and	1939,	is	a	simple	single	page	with	two	ominous	paragraphs,	worth	repeating	here	in	full:																																																										384	A	full	account	of	the	debate	and	surrounding	the	British	Council	and	the	Ministry	of	Information	can	be	found	in	Donaldson’s	book,	chapter	5.	Donaldson.	
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	 Chapter	I	In	the	spring	of	1920	I	accepted	an	offer	of	a	post	in	the	Political	Intelligence	Department	of	the	Foreign	Office,	where	I	have	continued	to	serve	in	various	capacities	ever	since;	and	the	day	of	deliverance	is	not	yet.		 I	hope	I	shall	live	long	enough	for	much	to	be	forgotten,	lest	some	unkind	friend	defile	my	grave	with	the	epitaph:	
He	was	a	civil	servant.386		This,	remarkably,	is	it.	Kenney,	who	was	not	a	man	to	let	one	word	do	the	job	when	ten	could	do	the	same,	was	surprisingly	taciturn	about	his	activities	during	this	period.	The	obvious	question	is	why,	which	can	only	be	answered	by	speculation.	Perhaps	the	most	exciting	theory	would	be	that	Kenney	was	engaged	in	work	so	secret	in	nature	that	he	would	not	speak	of	it.	Perhaps	his	role	in	the	British	Council	would	betray	its	purportedly	benign	intentions.	This	would	also	explain	the	glaring	lack	of	material	that	he	kept	from	this	time.	While	he	did	make	references	to	some	of	his	activities	in	Norway	in	the	First	World	War,	it	is	obvious	that	he	left	a	great	deal	of	sensitive	information	out	in	his	autobiography.	While	enticing,	a	more	likely	theory	would	be	that	Kenney,	defeated	from	his	trouble	with	the	air-crash	and	generally	dejected	by	his	work,	had	little	eagerness	to	talk	about	it.		 The	truth,	as	usual,	must	lie	somewhere	in	between.	It	is	likely	that	his	condition	after	1919	was	poor,	and	he	fought	for	years	to	be	given	what	he	felt	was	owed	to	him.	This	must	have	dampened	his	spirits	considerably.	In	addition,	he	was	by	all	accounts	still	engaged	in	propaganda	and	intelligence	work,	by	its	very	nature	a	sensitive	field,	where	secrecy	was,	and	is,	a	virtue.	By	1939,	when	the	book	was	published,	he	may	have	had	a	sense	of	what	was	coming,	and	may	have	found	it	irresponsible	to	lay	bare	the	inner	workings	of	his	profession,	especially	while	still	engaged	in	it.	Kenney	would	return	to	Oslo	as	Press	Attaché	at	the	start	of	the	Second	World	War,	the	same	position	he	had	left	more	than	twenty	years	earlier.387																																																												386	Kenney.	Westering,	p.	301.	387	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Kit	Kenney.	6	Sept.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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The	Glass	Ceiling		Were	the	world	a	simpler	place,	one’s	stature	and	professional	rank	within	a	system	might	adequately	provide	a	measure	of	one’s	particular	success	and	influence	therein.	In	such	a	world,	the	reader	might	expect	Kenney’s	name,	given	his	described	accomplishments	thus	far,	to	be	one	rising	in	the	ranks	of	the	Foreign	Office,	for	example.	One	might,	at	this	juncture,	expect	to	see	him	at	least	courted	for	higher	office;	perhaps	heading	a	department,	perhaps	rising	to	join	ever	tighter	circles	of	power,	or	beginning	to	fill	the	contours	of	an	éminence	
grise.	Were	the	world	a	simpler	place.		 	Kenney	had,	after	all,	arrived—from	striking,	if	not	abject,	poverty	on	the	outskirts	of	industry,	through	a	string	of	more	or	less	backbreaking	jobs	reserved	for	the	lowest	orders,	through	unions	and	radical	journalism	both	mocked	and	feared	by	the	powers	that	be,	through	war	and	diplomacy	and	tact	and	secrecy—at	the	door	of	the	elite.388	If	the	reader	can	forgive	the	out-of-place	imagery,	it	is	certainly	tantalising	to	imagine	the	open	biplane	soaring	over	the	Channel,	and	in	the	observer’s	seat:	a	man	at	the	prime	of	his	life,	climbing	to	increasing	heights,	ever	upward	against	the	odds.	And	then	a	faulty	fuel	tank.	And	then	the	fog.	And	then	oblivion.	As	if	to	say:	here,	but	no	further.		 The	drama	is	not	far	from	the	truth.	Kenney’s	career	at	the	conclusion	of	his	affairs	at	Versailles,	indeed,	at	the	moment	between	flight	and	impact,	seems	if	not	at	its	peak,	then	at	least	at	the	immediate	point	of	levelling	off.	Professionally,	Kenney	became	dead	in	the	water,	and	his	accelerating	ascension	was	suddenly,	though	perhaps	not	unexpectedly,	curtailed.	The	crash	and	subsequent	illness	is	of	course	a	part	of	the	reason	for	this,	but	there	were	more	deliberate	causes	as	well.	His	political	background	and	convictions—coupled	with	the	stifled	atmosphere	of	career	mobility	within	the	civil	service	sector,	and	indeed	in	the	general	British	society	of	the	time—suspended	him.			 The	argument	is	made	here	to	counter	one	particularly	naïve	criticism,	as	well	as	to	strike	a	point	against	what	can	be	described	as	a	myopic	view	of	historical	understanding:	the	idea	that	it	is	of	ultimate	importance	to	take	into																																																									388	Kenney,	Westering.	
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account	the	persons	and	indeed	personalities	only	at	the	top	of	a	structure.	It	is	of	course	natural	that	academics	examine	those	with	obvious	influence.	However,	the	result	can	perhaps	be	described	as	a	sort	of	hierarchical	Darwinism,	where	history	favours	the	tip	of	the	iceberg,	and	where	historiography	provides	a	feedback	loop,	isolating	a	select	few.	Of	course,	not	all	historical	writing	suffers	this	fault,	and	this	author	does	not	wish	to	suggest	it	is	inherently	wrong	to	focus	on	leaders	and	pioneers.	The	point	is	simply	that	there	are	uncountable	opportunities	to	reach	an	even	greater	understanding	of	not	only	history,	but	also	of	the	functioning	of	systems,	if	there	is	an	effort	to	include	those	less-than-titular	characters.	In	this	spirit,	the	thesis	provides	ample	support	for	a	crusade	for	the	forgotten.	One	of	the	main	problems	with	this	time-period	is	that	it	is	entirely	unclear	what	Kenney’s	position	was	within	the	system.	His	return	as	Press	Attaché	in	1939	of	course	bookends	the	period	at	a	level	grade,	but	the	reference	in	Westering	to	his	service	“in	various	capacities”389	is	tantalizingly	vague.	The	cited	newspaper	article	of	course	references	to	him	as	the	head	of	the	Cultural	Section	in	the	News	Department	of	the	Foreign	Office,	though	no	confirmation	of	this	exists,	and	other	clues	seem	to	counteract	the	statement.	Letters	from	early	in	the	Second	World	War	place	Kenney	in	connection	with	film	propaganda,	an	exciting	new	venture,	to	be	sure.	390	In	letters	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart,	the	renowned	diplomat	who	was	also	involved	in	film,	Kenney	discusses	film	propaganda	policy	with	authority.	“Pity	our	BRITISH	FILM	COUNCIL	was	not	formed	and	financed	when	first	proposed!	We	should	have	been	in	a	position	for	active	operations	when	the	war	started.”391	The	use	of	the	possessive	‘our’	here	is	interesting,	of	course.	Before	the	outbreak	of	war,	Kenney	was	a	bridge	between	the	film	industry	and	the	Foreign	Office,	and	it	seems	he	was	well	liked.392	In	a	memorandum	allegedly	(according	to	Kenney’s	scribble)	dictated	by	E.H.	Carr	and	signed	by	Colonel	Bridge,	Kenney’s	superiors	at	the	Ministry	of																																																									389	Kenney,	Westering.	p.	301.	390	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	4	Nov.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	391	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	24	Nov.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	392	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	29	Jan.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	
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Information	during	the	Second	World	War,	Kenney	is	referred	to	as	“a	senior	Officer”	with	a	salary	of	“£1,000	a	year.”393	He	had	certainly	received	some	recognition,	but	was	doubtless	still	very	low	on	the	ladder.	Another	clue	lies	within	the	previously	cited	letter	from	1931,	wherein	Kenney	hints	that	he	is	regarded	as	a	‘temporary’	within	the	civil	service.394		 While	Kenney	may	now	have	slipped	from	the	historical	records	unfairly,	his	employers	most	certainly	had	not	forgotten	about	his	past.	Before	joining	the	Foreign	Office	in	1916,	Kenney	had	been	an	active	and	vocal	opponent	to	the	establishment.	He	was	a	radical.	To	sum	up	in	a	grossly	inadequate	manner:	Kenney’s	work	as	a	young	man,	on	the	railway	or	as	a	navvy	or	in	the	mines	meant	that	he	was	useful	to	the	Labour	press	since	he	“could	write	of	labour	from	actual	experience.”395	With	an	apparent	talent	for	journalism,	Kenney	rose	quickly	from	writing	a	few	articles	for	the	English	Review	about	the	railroad	strikes	to	becoming	the	editor	of	the	newly	cast	radical	labour	publication	the	
Daily	Herald.396	Throughout,	he	was	neither	shy	nor	careful:	“my	policy	on	the	paper	was	one	of	no	compromise	with	the	enemy—the	‘capitalist.’”397		 In	his	vitriol	against	the	establishment,	through	the	megaphone	that	the	
Daily	Herald	became,	there	was	in	his	own	words	“a	case	quite	strong	enough	to	get	me	gaoled	for	a	considerable	period.”398	Even	the	Labour	Party	grew	angry	at	these	radicals:			 The	‘big	guns’	in	the	Labour	Party	detested	us.	We	represented	only	a	small	dissident	minority	which,	they	believed,	was	never	happy	except	when	sniping	at	the	solid,	sensible	majority	of	the	Party—and	themselves	[.	.	.]	I	scarcely	blame	them.399			With	this	history,	and	with	an	obvious	predisposition	to	a	radical	political	viewpoint	and	a	flair	in	its	exposition,	it	is	no	surprise	that	his	relationship	with																																																									393	Letter	to	Waterfield.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	2.	394	Kenney.	‘Letter	to	Willert.’	24	July	1931.	p.	2.	395	Kenney,	Westering.	p.	163.	396	Kenney,	Westering;	Steed,	William.	Letter	to	Mr.	Kenney.	7	June	1912.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.		397	Kenney,	Westering.	p.	183.	398	Ibid.,	p.	184.	399	Ibid.,	p.	188.	
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the	government,	even	as	an	employee,	was	strained.	His	irreverent	disdain	was	not	well	hidden,	and	his	letters	and	memoranda	throughout	his	service,	though	mostly	pleasant	and	professional,	often	carried	in	their	sarcasm	a	hint	of	acrimony.		 It	is	also	evident	in	his	letters	and	reports	that	dealing	with	various	officials	within	civil	service	was	at	times	difficult.	Especially	striking	is	his	careful	and	almost	methodological	gratitude	expressed	at	every	instance	whereupon	a	more	or	less	unlikely	person	could	bear	to	hear	him	out.	Findlay,	the	Ambassador	to	Norway	during	the	First	World	War,	was	described	as	a	stiff	and	isolated	aristocrat.	However,	Kenney	writes:	“I	feel	that	it	was	greatly	to	his	credit	that	he	not	only	had	the	patience	to	try	to	understand	my	point	of	view	on	politics	and	social	questions—which	must	have	been	for	a	time	almost	insufferable	to	him—but	to	come	to	tolerate	me	and	them,	and	ultimately	give	me	his	whole	confidence.”400	Throughout	both	the	autobiography	as	well	as	his	letters,	he	makes	special	mention	of	those	figures	who	tolerated	him,	surely	an	indication	that	these	were	special	events	for	the	man.	Regardless	of	whether	or	not	Kenney	was	eager	and	itching	to	move	forward,	it	is	clear	that	it	would	be	difficult	for	those	in	charge	to	elevate	someone	with	such	outspoken	and	controversial	political	ideals.		 On	the	other	hand,	while	in	a	very	real	sense	a	detriment	to	further	advancement,	there	is	merit	to	the	idea	that	this	had	also	helped	his	career	thus	far.	In	particular,	his	mission	in	Poland	was	largely	informed	and	buttressed	by	his	leftist	leanings,	and	this	was	in	all	likelihood	also	a	factor	for	his	placement	in	Norway	(as	the	reader	might	recall,	it	was	the	dockers’	union	leader	Ben	Tillett	who	ostensibly	offered	up	Kenney	to	the	Foreign	Office	for	the	mission).	Kenney	was	likely	looked	upon	as	useful	within	a	certain	set	of	bounds.	To	put	an	overly	dramatic	spin	on	it,	Kenney	could	infiltrate	more	leftist	societies	and	social	circles	effectively.	There	is	obviously	also	a	rich	history	of	the	British	establishment	making	use	of	leftists,	such	as,	perhaps	most	infamously,	Kim	Philby	(who	may	have	crossed	paths	with	Kenney	through	his	work	with	the	
																																																								400	Kenney,	Westering.	p.	228.	
	 137	
Special	Operations	Executive	in	1940).401	His	political	leanings	were	a	proverbial	double-edged	sword.			 It	is	also	manifestly	true	that	the	upper	echelons	of	the	Foreign	Office	were	difficult	to	reach	for	anyone.	The	general	rule	was	that	the	higher	the	position,	the	more	locked	down	that	position	would	be.	Recognizing	the	stiffness	of	the	system,	as	well	as	a	need	to	incorporate	the	Diplomatic	Service	with	the	Foreign	Office,	efforts	were	made	to	open	up	mobility	both	internally	and	externally.	A	series	of	articles	in	1919	and	1920	in	the	influential	journal	New	
Europe,	railed	against	“the	closed	society	of	the	Foreign	Office	based	on	an	unsound	classification	of	function	and	a	survival	of	class	favour.”402	And	while	reforms	were	pursued	and	to	some	degree	accomplished,	tradition	remained	tenacious.	Between	1919	and	1939,	only	sixteen	men	held	positions	at	the	levels	of	Permanent,	Deputy	and	Assistant	Under-Secretaries,	and	Chief	Clerks.403	This	is	a	remarkably	small	number,	indicating	a	clear	rigidity	in	the	system.	Additionally,	ten	of	those	sixteen	men	spent	the	entirety	of	the	20-year,	interwar	period	in	the	Foreign	Office.404	While	there	were	some	improvements	in	mobility	in	the	lower	levels	of	the	chain,	“it	is	not	even	true	that	continuity	was	lost	at	lower	levels.”405	The	interwar	years	thus	became	more	of	the	same	for	the	Foreign	Office,	with	mild	improvements	in	lower-level	mobility,	but	without	any	real	opening	up	higher	up	on	the	ladder.		 Kenney	describes	his	own	employment	during	the	period:		 For	over	twenty	years	I	have	been	engaged	in	the	News	Department	of	the	Foreign	Office	on	such	work	as	is	now	regarded	as	necessary	for	propaganda	purposes.		 Now	that	positions	in	the	New	Foreign	Publicity	Department	have	been	allocated,	I	am	placed	in	a	subordinate																																																									401	Seale,	Patrick,	and	Maureen	McConnville.	Philby:	The	Long	Road	to	Moscow.	New	York:	Simon	&	Schuster,	1973.		402	Steiner,	Zara,	and	M.	L.	Dockrill.	The	Foreign	Office	Reforms,	1919-21.	The	
Historical	Journal,	vol.	17,	no.	1.	Cambridge	University	Press,	Mar	1974.	pp.	131-156.	p.	132.	403	Larner,	Christina.	The	Amalgamation	of	the	Diplomatic	Service	with	the	Foreign	Office.	Journal	of	Contemporary	History.	vol	7,	no.	1/2.	Sage	Publications,	Jan	1972.	pp.	107-126.	p.	114.	404	Ibid.	405	Ibid.	
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position.	Men	who	have	only	recently	become	British	subjects	and	who	have	really	no	experience	of	this	work	are	made	heads	of	sections;	I	am	not.406		Kenney	was	undoubtedly	disappointed	at	his	own	progress	within	the	system,	and	was	not	afraid	to	let	his	superiors	know.	By	the	time	the	Second	World	War	had	begun,	it	was	clear	that	Kenney	was	aware	of	the	limits	to	his	rise.	In	another	letter	to	Vansittart,	he	writes	of	Foreign	Office	gossip	he	has	heard:	“’That	man	Rowland	Kenney	would	have	been	put	in	charge	of	Foreign	Publicity	if	he’d	had	any	natural	sense	for	intrigue,	and	hidden	his	dislike	and	contempt	for	the	crowd	he	had	to	work	with,	and	under.’	I	don’t	believe	it.”407	While	it	might	be	a	mistake	to	rely	too	heavily	on	compliments	about	himself	cited	from	gossip,	it	certainly	shows	his	own	feelings	on	the	subject,	and	given	the	context,	it	is	hard	to	disqualify	the	central	idea.	A	combination	of	the	inherently	choking	structure	of	the	workplace,	his	own	ineligibility	due	to	his	political	fervour,	and	his	debilitating	physical	condition	following	his	crash	left	him	at	a	standstill.	It	would	therefore	be	a	mistake	to	attempt	to	glean	any	particular	qualitative	conclusions	about	his	influence	based	solely	on	his	position.	Kenney	was	likely	undervalued,	even	though	he	still	had	a	significant	part	to	play	in	the	coming	war.				BRITAIN	AND	THE	SECOND	WORLD	WAR		It	is,	as	with	Chapter	III	and	the	First	World	War,	important	to	set	the	stage	for	the	Second	World	War,	so	as	to	place	Kenney’s	activities	in	a	clear	context.	Again	similarly	to	Chapter	III,	the	purpose	is	not	here	to	give	an	exhaustive	history	of	Britain	and	Norway	and	their	roles	in	the	war,	since	it	is	assumed	that	the	reader	has	an	understanding	of	this	picture.	Rather,	the	object	here	is	to	establish	some	sort	of	framework	understanding	of	the	relevant	developments	pertaining	to	Kenney’s	immediate	sphere	of	influence.	Britain’s	position	and	aims	should																																																									406	Kenney,	Rowland.	‘Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart’.	6	Oct.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	2.	407	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	24	Nov.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	
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highlight	why	Kenney’s	area	of	expertise	was	again	called	into	action.	The	section	is	tied	off	with	an	examination	of	how	and	under	what	circumstances	the	British	propaganda	machinery	was	revived,	giving	a	neat	run-up	into	Kenney’s	wartime	activity.		
The	British	Position,	part	two		Britain’s	position	and	aims	with	regard	to	the	Second	World	War	is	a	topic	that	has	been—and	indeed	continues	to	be—covered	so	extensively	as	to	nearly	make	its	inclusion	here	redundant.	Nearly,	because	with	such	a	vast	library	of	literature	on	the	subject,	it	is	entirely	helpful	to	offer	some	sort	of	focus	and	keep	close	a	more	detailed	and	to-the-point	context	of	the	issues	at	hand.	The	objective	of	the	thesis	is	to	bring	to	light	the	development	of	modern	systems	of	information	control	and	propaganda,	as	well	as	establish	Kenney’s	markedly	important	role	in	this	regard.	Therefore,	this	section	will	examine	the	British	position	and	aims	through	such	a	lens.		 While	appeasement	remains	a	contentious	issue	in	British	diplomatic	history	as	regards	the	Second	World	War,	it	is	not	directly	relevant	here,	save	for	a	short	demonstration	of	the	likely	motives	for	the	policy,	and	extending	these	motives	to	cover	a	further	understanding	of	British	national	identity	at	the	dawn	of	the	war.	Such	an	understanding	assists	in	the	idea	of	the	kinds	of	commitments	Britain	was	prepared	to	make	and	can	be	tied	to	its	goals	with	the	use	of	propaganda.	A	useful	contemplation	of	the	main	arguments	of	the	issue	is	found	in	Stephen	G.	Walker’s	article	‘Solving	the	Appeasement	Puzzle’	published	in	the	British	Journal	of	International	Studies	in	1980.	His	analysis	of	several	competing	theories	virtually	leads	him	to	conclude	that	Britain	was	constrained	by	imperial	overreach,	as	well	as	the	negative	effects	of	the	Depression,	which	led	to	a	lack	of	interest	and	resources	(both	physical	and	symbolic)	in	dealing	with	foreign	affairs.408	Commitments	had	to	be	prioritised.	To	pull	and	prod	somewhat	at	this	idea	leads	to	a	supposition	that	Britain	perhaps	was	stretched																																																									408	Walker,	Stephen	G.	Solving	the	Appeasement	Puzzle:	Contending	Historical	Interpretation	of	Diplomacy	during	the	1930s.	British	Journal	of	International	
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thin	in	its	international	relations,	and	was	struggling	to	retain	a	position	of	power.	This,	obviously,	has	interesting	effects	on	primary	tools	of	power	projection,	among	which	propaganda	and	information	control	are	prominent.		 The	early	days	of	the	war	are	often	characterised	from	the	British	side	as	the	‘Phoney	War’,	considering	the	lack	of	any	outright	commitment	of	forces	on	the	continent.409	This	was	a	result	of	a	lack	of	Allied	preparation,	both	practically	and	diplomatically,	for	war.	Primarily,	then,	the	early	stages	of	the	war	were	spent	trying	to	rally	together	and	coordinate	allies.	Neutral	Europe	was	a	prime	target	from	which	to	draw	support.410	The	result	was	therefore	an	increased	interest,	as	was	seen	in	the	First	World	War,	in	obtaining	and	consolidating	a	strong	leadership	position	for	Britain	in	the	Allied	constellation.	Naturally,	the	most	effective	method	of	reaching	such	a	position	would	be	through	swaying	these	nations	to	the	British	and	allied	side:	“to	overcome	inadequate	pre-war	preparation,	and	the	effect	of	Britain’s	appeasement	policy	on	neutral	opinion,	which	entertained	serious	doubts	regarding	its	capacity	and	will	to	fight.”411	Propaganda,	again,	was	at	the	forefront	of	British	strategic	aims	from	the	beginning.		 Thus,	the	British	position	and	aims,	at	least	at	the	outset	of	the	Second	World	War,	were	fairly	similar	to	those	of	the	First.	Propaganda	was	rather	quickly	deemed	an	effective	method	of	achieving	certain	strategic	aims	and	solidifying	the	British	position	as	a	spearhead	of	the	Allied	forces.	Gathering	the	support	of	neutral	countries	was	seen	as	an	important	objective.	With	this	in	mind,	it	is	clear	that	British	wartime	relations	with	foreign	powers	were	of	great	importance	to	policy.	As	already	mentioned,	the	position	of	Britain	relative	to	the	neutral	countries	was	a	very	important	factor.	Norway,	being	one	such	neutral	country,	with	a	history	of	at	the	very	least	a	casual	alignment	with	Britain,	was	of	course	a	valuable	target.	Nevertheless,	Norway	was	particularly	problematic.	There	were	“specific	questions	in	Norway	regarding	the	'honesty	of	official	British	attitudes	toward																																																									409	Cole,	Robert.	‘The	Other	‘Phoney	War’:	British	Propaganda	in	Neutral	Europe,	September-December	1939.	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	vol.	22,	no.	3.	Sage	Publications,	July	1987.	pp.	455-479.	410	Ibid.	411	Ibid.,	p.	456.	
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war'.	Norwegian	opinion	clearly	favoured	the	Allies;	but	'it	was	by	no	means	certain	that	any	serious	breach	of	neutrality	or	act	of	coercion	by	the	Allies	would	not	stampede	the	country	into	a	support	of	Germany.’”412	Thus,	Norway	was	a	particular	case,	requiring	deft	skill	and	careful	handling.	For	years,	there	had	been	a	small	but	lively	academic	debate	on	to	what	extent	Norway	would	depend	on	Great	Britain	in	its	further	economic	and	national	development.	An	example	of	one	such	debate	is	found	in	a	lecture	given	in	1937	at	Chatham	House,	delivered	by	George	Soloveytchik	and	published	in	International	
Affairs.413	The	fact	that	Kenney	was	asked	to	return	to	Norway	at	the	start	of	the	war,	replacing	the	already-present	agent	(who	was	in	fact	Kenney’s	own	son414),	speaks	to	Kenney’s	undeniable	quality.	
	
The	Remaking	of	the	Machine		The	propaganda	machinery	that	had	finally	been	consolidated	by	the	end	of	the	First	World	War	had	been	superfluous	in	peacetime	and	was	subsequently	dismantled	in	1918.415	All	that	meaningfully	remained	was	the	skeleton	crew	of	the	Foreign	Office	News	Department	as	well	as	the	British	Council	which	was	established	somewhat	later.	In	deliberation	as	to	what	kind	of	system	should	be	in	place	for	propaganda	and	publicity	services	were	war	to	break	out,	a	debate	was	begun	in	a	sub-committee	of	the	Committee	of	Imperial	Defence	(CID)	in	1935.	The	debate	concerned	itself	mainly	with	which	pre-existing	sections	of	government	should	be	in	charge	of	the	propaganda	effort—if	indeed,	any.	The	resulting	opinion	was	that	“a	return	to	the	1918	system	[of	a	Ministry	of	Information	separate	from	the	Foreign	Office	News	Department]	was	infinitely	preferable	to	a	return	to	the	arrangements	which	had	existed	before	the	Ministry	of	
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Information	had	taken	charge	of	propaganda	from	the	Foreign	Office.”416	This	was	in	part	because	it	was	felt	that	there	was	an	opportunity	now	to	solidify	a	streamlined	and	centralised	machine,	maintaining	accountability,	efficiency	and	oversight.	However,	it	also	resulted	from	a	somewhat	lacklustre	planning-phase,	due	to	the	heavy	load	of	work	already	placed	on	those	serving	in	the	committee,	the	secrecy	of	their	objective,	and	the	political	risk	in	making	plans	for	political	information	control	in	peacetime.417	The	debate	and	considerations	back	and	forth	as	to	what	this	new	Ministry	eventually	would	become,	would	continue	at	a	slow	and	confused	pace	up	until	the	final	year	of	peace.		Even	the	appeasement	policy	played	a	major	role	in	the	conflicts	surrounding	the	planning	stage	of	the	Ministry.	“MOI	planners	were	hampered	at	the	start	by	departmental	and	personal	feuding,	which	was	permitted	because	no	war	emergency	existed,	and,	after	1937,	by	the	adherents	of	appeasement	policy	who	dominated	Whitehall.”418	A	government	desperately	avoiding	the	idea	of	war	naturally	becomes	a	government	uneasy	and	uncommitted	in	its	war	preparations.	The	building	of	the	propaganda	machinery,	being	a	vital	part	of	the	British	war	effort,	suffered	under	the	idea	that	war	should	not	come,	as	well	as	under	the	overstretched	control	of	the	Treasury.	“Every	department	had	to	scramble	for	funds	in	the	context	of	expanding	demands	created	by	war	preparations.”419	Appeasement	would	only,	however,	last	so	long.	By	1939,	it	was	becoming	evident	that	the	preparations	had	to	be	set	into	high	gear,	if	not	directly	into	motion.	A	Ministry	of	Information	had	been	settled	on,	in	the	spirit	of	its	1918-edition,	but	it	was	important	now	to	organise	effectively	the	transfer	of	certain	tasks	from	the	Foreign	Office	to	the	Ministry.	This	resulted	in	the	first	public	indication	that	a	Ministry	of	Information	was	forthcoming,	primarily	because	of	the	appointment	by	Chamberlain	of	Lord	Perth	to	direct	the	newly	formed	Foreign	Publicity	Department	in	the	Foreign																																																									416	Taylor,	Philip	M.	‘If	War	Should	Come’:	Preparing	the	Fifth	Arm	for	Total	War	1935-1939.	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	vol.	16,	no.	1.	Sage	Publications,	Jan.	1981.	pp.	27-51.	p.	36.	417	Taylor,	If	War	Should	Come.	418	Cole,	C.	Robert.	The	Conflict	within:	Sir	Stephen	Tallents	and	Planning	Propaganda	Overseas	before	the	Second	World	War.	Albion:	A	Quarterly	Journal	
Concerned	with	British	Studies,	vol.	14,	no.	1.	1982.	pp.	50-71.	p.	50.	419	Ibid.	
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Office.	This	is	the	same	Foreign	Publicity	Department	that	Kenney	was	absorbed	into,	as	referenced	in	his	letter	to	Carr,	cited	previously.	The	Foreign	Publicity	Department	came	about	through	a	reorganisation	of	the	Foreign	Office	News	Department,	where	the	new	section	would	handle	any	and	all	purely	propaganda	work,	leaving	the	News	Department	to	deal	with	press.420	That	Kenney	was	involved	at	this	point	should	come	as	no	surprise	(neither	should	his	noted	criticism	of	the	organisation	in	the	letter)	but	it	certainly	again	displays	Kenney’s	position	as	rather	central	to	the	reanimation	of	the	propaganda	services.	Indeed,	if	we	can	make	the	assumption	that	Kenney	was	a	pioneer	and	a	definitive	force	in	the	shaping	of	British	propaganda	policy	during	the	First	World	War,	then	the	return	of	a	relatively	similar	system	in	anticipation	of	the	Second	World	War	speaks	to	his	importance.	It	deserves	mention,	of	course—if	only	to	mollify	the	reader	that	all	considerations	have	been	made—that	the	Ministry	of	Information	was	characterised,	especially	for	its	work	in	the	early	years	of	the	war,	as	a	grossly	incompetent	institution.	The	faults	of	the	Ministry	have	almost	been	elevated	into	historiographical	cliché,	famously	solidified	by	Evelyn	Waugh,	Norman	Riley	and	other	social	commentators	of	the	time	as	well	as	a	whole	host	of	historians.421	While	certainly	the	Ministry	as	a	whole	cannot	be	described	as	a	massive	success,	this	has	little	bearing	on	the	relevance	and	importance	of	Kenney’s	work.	It	should	also	not	dissuade	historians	and	policy-makers	from	seeking	the	lessons	learned.	Rather	than	throwing	the	baby	out	with	the	bathwater,	the	Ministry	“is	best	seen	not	as	a	dead	end	but	as	part	of	a	transition.”422	In	spite	of	its	glaring	shortcomings,	it	displayed	a	stunning,	if	misguided,	dedication	to	information	control,	and	the	work	of	its	many	components—of	which	Kenney	was	a	sizeable	one—carries	with	it	a	myriad	of	valuable	insights	and	smaller	victories.																																																										420	Taylor,	If	War	Should	Come.	421	Grant,	Mariel.	Towards	a	Central	Office	of	Information:	Continuity	and	Change	in	British	Government	Information	Policy,	1939-51.	Journal	of	
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	NORWAY	AND	THE	SECOND	WORLD	WAR		Similarly	to	the	analysis	of	Britain’s	position	and	preparations	leading	into	the	war,	it	is	also	necessary	to	evaluate	and	contextualise	the	Norwegian	side.	Here	it	is	important	to	establish	not	only	Norway’s	own	position	before	and	during	the	war,	but	also	the	perception	of	Norway	of	the	warring	parties.	This	will	assist	in	evaluating	Kenney’s	work	as	a	function	of	British	objectives	relating	to	Norway.	No	conclusion	about	Kenney’s	influence	and	impact	can	be	made	without	understanding	the	framework	surrounding	his	mission.	This	final	part	of	the	chapter	will	therefore	examine	Norway’s	position	and	aims,	as	well	as	what	Norway	represented	for	the	warring	parties,	primarily	Britain	and	Germany.		
The	Norwegian	Position,	part	two		In	the	First	World	War,	Norway	was	constantly	cast	as	a	sympathetic	but	reserved	state	with	reference	to	Great	Britain.	From	the	Norwegian	side,	the	relationship	could	still	largely	be	described	as	such	through	the	interwar	period	and	into	the	Second	World	War.	Norway’s	disproportionally	powerful	and	state-of-the-art	merchant	fleet	was	a	key	component	of	the	relationship,	establishing	a	clear	economic	interest	for	both	parties	in	maintaining	a	tenuous	bond	between	the	nations.423	By	the	early-to-mid-1930s,	at	a	point	in	time	when	Germany	was	at	its	most	introspective	and	internationally	disinterested,	Britain	secured	its	economic	ties	with	the	Scandinavian	region	and	Finland.	“The	depreciation	of	sterling,	together	with	the	bilateral	trade	agreements	concluded	in	1933	with	Denmark,	Norway,	Sweden	and	Finland,	helped	to	make	Scandinavia	one	of	Britain’s	most	important	export	markets.”424	This	economic	bond	would	continue	to	be	relevant	well	into	the	war	and	serves	as	the	backbone	of	the	Anglo-Norwegian	relationship,	even	as	priorities	shifted.																																																										423	Salmon,	Patrick.	British	strategy	and	Norway	1939-40.	Britain	&	Norway	in	
the	Second	World	War.	Ed.	Patrick	Salmon.	London:	HMSO,	1995.	pp.	3-14.	p.	4.	424	Salmon,	Patrick.	Scandinavia	and	the	Great	Powers,	1890-1940.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press:	1997.	p.	235.	
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	 There	is	something	to	be	said	for	a	mismatched	perception	between	Norway	and	Britain	of	their	own	constellation.	Norway	prided	itself	in	maintaining	strong	independence	(as	a	relatively	young	state)	and	displaying	somewhat	isolationist	policies.	On	the	eve	of	war,	“Norwegians	were	beginning	to	question	the	degree	to	which	Britain	would	be	able	to	maintain	in	wartime	the	naval	supremacy	on	which	Norway’s	security	depended.“425	On	the	other	hand,	in	what	can	perhaps	be	described	as	a	classic	greater-power	misunderstanding,	Britain	presumed	Norway	was	more	invested	in	the	relationship	than	ostensibly	was	the	case.	“British	policy	makers	neglected	Norway	on	the	assumption	that	the	Norwegians	were	so	sympathetic	towards,	and	so	dependent	upon	Great	Britain	that	little	attention	needed	to	be	paid	to	them.“426	These	respective	attitudes	of	course	fed	off	of	each	other,	creating	a	noticeable	distance	between	the	two	states	on	the	eve	of	war.	It	was	the	Northern	Department	in	the	Foreign	Office	that	eventually	began	problematizing	this	misunderstanding	and	argued	that	Norway	had	to	be	shown	good	faith	in	order	to	achieve	a	good	relationship	in	the	war	to	come.	427		 Eventually,	the	Northern	Department,	together	with	Sir	Robert	Vansittart—a	prominent	friend	of	Kenney’s	(who	will	be	given	due	consideration	in	Chapter	VII)—convinced	the	Foreign	Secretary	that	Norway	was	a	question	worth	considering.	If	Germany	were	to	attack,	could	Britain	formally	guarantee	it	would	come	to	Norway’s	aid?		 The	matter	was	debated	at	such	length	in	the	Foreign	Office	that	a	request	was	not	sent	to	the	Chiefs	of	Staff	until	24	August,	and	their	report	was	presented	only	on	4	September,	a	day	after	the	outbreak	of	war.	The	Chiefs	of	Staff	endorsed	the	Foreign	Office’s	proposal	with	the	proviso	that	‘no	assistance	as	regards	direct	air	attack	can	be	given’.	Dormer	duly	gave	this	assurance	to	[the	Norwegian	Foreign	Minister]	on	16	September.428			The	Norwegian	position	was	thus	an	uneasy	one.	Norway	sought	to	remain	as	neutral	as	possible	to	protect	its	vital	trade-ties,	though	it	was	still	markedly,																																																									425	Salmon,	Patrick.	British	strategy	and	Norway	1939-40.	p.	5.	426	Ibid.	427	Ibid.	428	Ibid.,	p.	6.	
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though	not	unreservedly,	aligned	with	Britain.	As	mentioned	earlier,	the	backbone	of	trade	and	economics	would	serve	to	both	test	and	cement	further	relationships	throughout	the	war.	A	convincing	case	can	be	made	to	suggest	that	it	was	this	sphere	that	eventually	sucked	Norway	into	the	war	and	made	it	a	prominent	geopolitical	target	both	for	Germany	and	Britain.			 	
Trade	and	Territory		In	general,	the	trade	between	Norway	and	both	Germany	and	Britain	was	an	important	aspect	of	Norway	as	a	wartime	objective.	There	were	four	general	factors	at	play:	strategic	resources,	the	efficacy	of	the	Norwegian	merchant	fleet,	trade-based	neutrality	and	the	strategic	geographical	advantage	of	the	Norwegian	coastline	and	territorial	waters.	The	first	three	factors	can	be	coalesced	to	form	a	rather	sizeable	economic	asset—or,	indeed,	weapon—for	each	warring	parties	and	the	final	factor	presents	itself	as	a	significant	geostrategic	asset.		An	additional	factor	to	be	tacked	on	to	the	list	is	the	political	one,	which	represents	an	ideological	concern.			 The	political	factor	may	ostensibly	bear	the	most	obvious	significance	to	British	propaganda	as	it	describes	not	only	a	British	objective	(as	the	economic	and	geostrategic	factors	do)	but	also	provides	insight	into	the	content	and	indeed	method	of	propaganda.	Propaganda	is	of	course	a	political	instrument	more	than	a	military	one,	though	it	can	be	militarily	strategic	nonetheless.	This	political	strategic	significance	of	Norway	closely	follows	the	mismatched	perception	of	the	Anglo-Norwegian	relationship.	On	the	one	side,	British	officials	were	convinced	that	Norway,	being	“a	small,	democratic,	peace-loving	country	with	close	links	to	the	United	Kingdom	[…]	should,	many	felt,	align	itself	openly	with	the	Allied	cause	in	combating	Hitlerism,	which	threatened	the	whole	of	Europe.”429	The	Norwegians	were	certainly	mainly	anti-Nazi	but	on	the	other	hand	a	curious,	if	not	widely	evidenced,	Norwegian	idiosyncrasy	was	an	innate	suspicion	of	international	power-politics.	The	Norwegian	national	spirit	“tended	to	brand	all	great	powers	as	equally	culpable”430	and	thereby	shy	away	from																																																									429	Ibid.,	p.	4.	430	Ibid.	
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direct	involvement	or	alignment	one	way	or	another.	This	position	was	further	shifted	by	a	presumption	that	British	naval	supremacy	would	shield	Norway	from	danger	and	that	as	such	Norway	had	little	skin	in	the	game.	And	finally,	Norwegians	were	more	concerned	with	the	British	violations	of	Norwegian	neutrality	“—which	tended	to	be	few	but	conspicuous—than	[…]	those	of	Germany,	which	were	more	frequent	but	less	visible.”431	In	effect	Norway	did	not	appear	to	fall	in	line	as	easily	as	the	British	expected	it	would.	This	was	problematic	for	many	reasons.		 First	and	foremost,	Norway	“was	the	source	of	a	number	of	strategic	raw	materials	such	as	nitrates,	ferro-alloys	and	non-ferrous	metals,	as	well	as	fish	products	and	whale	oil.”432	These	were	important	resources	in	any	war	economy	and	were	useful	both	to	strengthen	oneself	by	obtaining	them	and	weaken	the	enemy	by	denying	them.	The	Norwegian	merchant	fleet	can	be	considered	in	the	same	way,	as	its	sheer	tonnage	was	stupendous	for	a	relatively	small	country	like	Norway.	Whether	chartering	Norwegian	ships	for	own	use	or	denying	the	enemy	those	ships,	it	was	a	useful	resource	to	consider.433		 Specifically,	however,	it	was	Swedish	iron	ore	that	held	strategists’	attention.	Of	primary	importance	to	the	strategic	war-aims	of	Germany	was	the	supply	and	supply-chain	of	iron	ore,	which	was	entirely	necessary	for	the	German	war	economy.	“When	the	[British	experts]	from	the	[Industrial	Intelligence	Centre—under	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Warfare]	examined	which	route	the	iron	ore	convoys	used,	they	discovered	that	even	though	the	ore	was	usually	sent	to	Germany	through	the	Swedish	ports	Luleå	and	Oxelösund	by	the	Baltic	Sea,	it	was	sent	to	Narvik	[in	Norway]	by	train	in	the	winter,	from	November	until	April,	since	the	Bottenvik	in	the	Baltic	Sea	was	frozen	over.	From	Narvik	the	ore	was	transported	by	sea	to	Germany.”434	For	six	months	out	of	the	year,	that	is,	Norway	was	the	main	transport	route	of	what	the	British	War	
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Cabinet	described	in	the	spring	of	1940	as	“the	Achilles’	heel	of	the	German	war	economy.”435		Added	to	this,	tensions	in	the	Baltic	were	high,	and	it	was	not	entirely	out	of	the	realm	of	possibility	that	German	imports	through	that	sea	might	become	restricted,	leaving	Narvik	as	the	only	reliable	export	point	for	the	resource	come	winter	or	summer.436	In	fact,	the	worry	that	the	British	might	seal	off	the	Baltic	was	not	at	all	unfounded.	Operation	Catherine,	a	daring	plan	suggested	by	Churchill,	described	a	scenario	of	establishing	an	entire	fleet	in	the	Baltic	to	make	this	the	primary	setting	of	the	naval	battlefield.	The	plan	was	never	set	into	motion,	but	certainly	shows	that	Narvik	could	become	a	serious	hotspot.	On	the	German	side,	Great	Admiral	Erich	Raeder	advised	Hitler	to	invade	Norway	specifically	with	reference	to	Narvik	and	the	iron	ore.437	Conversely,	on	the	British	side,	Churchill	was	also	concerned	with	the	issue	and	“wanted	to	halt	the	supply	of	Swedish	ore	transported	to	Germany	from	the	port	of	Narvik,	but	Chamberlain	and	the	War	Cabinet	were	firmly	against	the	violation	of	Norwegian	neutrality.”438	The	iron	ore	and	the	port	of	Narvik	was	to	remain	a	sort	of	fulcrum	for	the	war.	An	imagined	possibility	on	the	German	side	was	that	Allied	assistance	for	the	Finns	early	in	the	war	might	take	the	shape	of	British	and	French	units	landing	in	the	north	of	Norway,	jostling	Norway	into	the	war	by	violating	neutrality	as	well	as	extending	a	force	across	northern	Scandinavia.	439	This	could	be	a	major	blow	to	the	iron	ore	supplies,	with	Allied	forces	potentially	taking	control	of	the	Kiruna-Gällivare	iron	ore	deposits	in	Sweden.440	While	also	halting	the	ore	exports	to	Germany,	this	would	force	closed	the	neutral	coastline	which	provided	a	serious	problem	for	the	British	naval	blockade	of	Germany.	Britain	could	not	inviolably	force	the	blockade	into	Norwegian	waters,	and	thus	there	existed	an	open	corridor	along	the	Norwegian	coast.			
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	 	And	the	importance	of	the	Norwegian	coastal	corridor	cannot	truly	be	overstated.	It	was	a	massive	hole	in	the	blockade,	provided	a	route	for	German	shipping,	submarines	and	other	military	units	into	the	North	Atlantic	and	essentially,	it	presented	a	large	open	flank	from	which	Germany	could	“operate	against	British	shipping.”	441	Control	of	these	waters	was	a	formidable	geostrategic	asset	if	it	could	be	acquired	reasonably.	Both	parties	were	worried	that	the	other	might	seek	to	control	southern	Norway,	Britain	could	launch	devastating	naval	forces	from	there—sealing	the	blockade	and	the	Baltic	very	effectively—442,	and	Germany	could	potentially	“establish	bases	for	air	and	sea	attacks	on	the	United	Kingdom.”443	It	was	clear	to	all	that	Norway	possessed	a	nexus	of	economic,	geostrategic	assets	that	caught	the	attention	of	both	sides	of	the	war	and	painted	it	as	a	valuable	objective	over	which	to	gain	control.	It	was	entirely	unclear	whether	either	warring	party	would	respect	Norwegian	neutrality	and	territory.	While	perhaps	not	entirely	accurate	historically,	Max	Hastings	provides	a	somewhat	humorous	picture	of	the	position	the	Norwegians	subsequently	found	themselves	in:	“At	0130	on	9	April,	an	aide	awoke	King	Haakon	of	Norway	to	report:	‘Majesty,	we	are	at	war!’	The	monarch	promptly	demanded:	‘Against	whom?’”444			
v v v		While	Kenney	is	unmistakably	difficult	to	place	in	the	interwar	years	it	is	certain	he	was	still	instrumental	in	propaganda	and	intelligence	affairs	for	Britain.	His	missions	to	Poland	and	his	subsequent	reporting	to	Balfour,	as	well	as	his	planned	mission	to	Germany	all	tell	of	a	man	highly	valued	in	his	field.	It	is	impossible	to	tell	what	would	have	happened	had	he	not	suffered	the	airplane	crash	in	1919,	but	he	was	certainly	doing	important	work	both	before	and	after	that	fateful	incident.	His	continued	service	within	the	revered	Political	Intelligence	Department	as	well	as	in	the	News	Department	until	1939	shows	his																																																									441	Beevor,	Antony.	The	Second	World	War.	p.	71.	442	Ibid.	443	Salmon,	Patrick.	British	strategy	and	Norway	1939-40.	p.	4.	444	Hastings,	Max.	All	Hell	Let	Loose:	The	World	at	War	1939-1945.	London:	HarperPress,	2011.	p.	43.	
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loyalty	and	exceptional	quality	within	propaganda	work.	The	role	he	played	in	the	establishment	and	running	of	the	British	Council	does	likewise.		 It	is	clear,	however,	that	Kenney	at	this	time	faced	considerable	difficulties	with	regards	to	professional	advancement.	His	past,	as	a	labourer	and	radical	labour	journalist,	propelled	him	onto	a	stage	from	which	he	could	expound	his	radical	views.	These	political	leanings	stayed	with	him	throughout	his	career	and	his	life,	and	while	they	certainly	helped	him	progress	up	to	a	point	they	doubtless	made	it	at	times	difficult	to	gain	the	favour	of	his	superiors.	Civil	servitude	by	itself	was	a	difficult	ladder	to	climb,	and	with	his	background,	his	problematic	health	and	his	political	fervour,	he	remained	at	this	time	on	the	lower	rungs	until	1939.		 In	the	run-up	to	the	Second	World	War,	Britain	was	faced	with	economic	problems	as	well	as	imperial	overreach.	This	spilled	out	into	the	policy	of	appeasement,	which	markedly	delayed	appropriate	war-preparations,	including	preparations	pertinent	to	propaganda.	Unprepared	Britain	therefore	spent	the	first	months	of	the	war	in	a	surprisingly	non-committal	position,	rather	focusing	on	rallying	allies	for	their	cause.	Norway,	an	officially	neutral	European	state,	was	a	prominent	target	for	this	push.	Propaganda	was	seen	as	a	useful	tool	in	establishing	these	relationships,	though	the	creation	of	a	Ministry	of	Information	was	to	take	a	long	time	and	careful	debate.		 The	relationship	between	Norway	and	Britain	was	similar	in	this	period	to	what	it	had	been	in	the	First	World	War,	one	of	reserved	connection.	Especially	naval	and	economic	interests	were	largely	aligned.	Britain,	however,	misunderstood	the	extent	to	which	Norway	looked	to	Britain,	which	resulted	in	a	last-minute	scrambling	to	gain	Norwegian	confidence.	The	problem	was	that	Norway	displayed	isolationist	tendencies,	and	while	politically	aligned	with	Britain,	was	suspicious	of	great-power	politics.	In	addition,	Norway’s	merchant	fleet,	trade	connections,	neutral	coastline	and	geostrategic	importance	painted	Norway	as	a	target	for	control	both	for	Britain	and	Germany.	Especially	significant	was	the	port	of	Narvik,	through	which	iron	ore—necessary	for	the	German	war	economy—flowed.	Norway	thus	hung	on	in	uneasy	neutrality,	suspicious	both	of	British	and	German	machinations	before	the	alarm	finally	sounded	in	the	early	morning	of	April	9th,	1940.	
	 151	
What	is	abundantly	clear	is	that	though	Kenney	suffered	unimaginable	setbacks	during	this	period	he	was	still	heavily	involved	in	propaganda	and	information	control.	Though	little	information	remains,	he	would	return	to	Norway	in	the	fall	of	1939	in	exactly	the	same	position	he	had	left	21	years	prior.	While	a	pleasing	historiographical	symmetry,	it	should	not	be	overlooked	that	Kenney	had	achieved	great	things	in	this	period,	and	had	suffered	tremendously.	And	for	Kenney	the	Second	World	War	would	in	no	way	resemble	the	First.	
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CHAPTER	VII	
THE	SECOND	WORLD	WAR:	ROWLAND	KENNEY	IN	NORWAY		 …Congratulations	good	wishes	England	expects	and	is	never	disappointed	Stop	Black	cats	and	Horseshoes.445		The	Second	World	War	would	prove	to	contain	its	own	immense	challenges	for	Rowland	Kenney.	He	had,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	V,	remained	active	during	the	interwar	period	in	propaganda	work,	both	as	a	practical	agent,	as	well	as	in	developing	certain	systems	within	the	field.	The	Second	World	War	would	test	many	of	these	developments	and	also	inform	its	own	evolution	of	the	practice.	This	chapter	focuses	on	Kenney’s	widely	varied	work	during	the	period	of	the	Second	World	War,	primarily	to	establish	Kenney’s	position	as	a	forgotten	key	figure	in	the	development	of	propaganda	as	a	system.			 In	order	to	achieve	this	aim,	the	chapter	first	outlines	the	work	of	the	man	in	detail,	seeking	to	describe	his	professional	accomplishments	and	place	him	in	the	appropriate	context.	Kenney’s	context	within	the	network	of	people																																																									445	Telegram	1830.	12	Apr.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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responsible	for	the	development	of	propaganda	is	further	described	by	a	short	description	of	a	few	of	the	personalities	he	worked	with.	Finally,	a	section	is	reserved	for	the	examination	of	how	propaganda	principles	and	techniques	developed	during	this	time,	linking	Kenney’s	own	work	to	these	developments.			KENNEY	RETURNS	TO	NORWAY		By	the	time	the	Second	World	War	sparked	in	September	1939,	Rowland	Kenney	was	a	veteran	of	propaganda.	For	nearly	a	quarter	of	a	century,	Kenney	had	been	an	agent	for	a	number	of	official	institutions	in	the	practice	of	propaganda.	He	had	witnessed	the	evolution	of	the	machinery	from	the	sport	of	amateurs	to	the	sophisticated	bureaucratic	behemoth	that	would	now	run	the	show.	The	Second	World	War	would	see	Kenney	return	to	the	Ministry	of	Information,	eventually	heading	his	own	section.	It	would	also	see	him	escaping	a	German	invasion,	embedding	with	MI6,	and	being	recognised	for	his	work	by	the	King	of	Norway.		 The	Second	World	War	is	perhaps,	alongside	the	Cold	War	era,	the	most	studied	period	when	it	comes	to	the	use	of	state	propaganda.	Nonetheless,	following	Kenney	gives	the	reader	an	unmatched	inside	view	not	only	of	the	inner	workings	of	the	propaganda	institutions	that	would	define	the	practice	in	the	modern	era,	but	also	of	the	extent	to	which	a	single	agent	participated	in	its	shaping.	At	the	start	of	the	war,	Kenney	was	around	57	years	old.	It	would	be	his	final	trial	and	his	final	opportunity	to	make	his	mark.	This	chapter	outlines	this	meandering	period	and	seeks	to	show	the	beginning	of	Kenney’s	legacy,	a	legacy	that	may	well	have	been	forgotten,	but	one	which	still	has	impact	both	on	information	control	and	Anglo-Norwegian	relations	to	this	day.		
Return	to	Oslo		It	was	not	at	all	foreseeable	that	Kenney	would	return	to	Norway	at	the	start	of	the	war.	In	fact,	Kenney’s	return	to	Oslo	as	Press	Attaché	and	point	man	for	British	propaganda	in	Norway	could	very	well	have	not	happened	at	all.	In	early	October,	a	series	of	letters	were	sent	between	Kenney	and	his	superiors	
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revealing	the	level	of	intrigue	that	led	to	the	appointment.	Kenney	saved	them	all,	and	multiple	copies	of	some,	perhaps	hinting	at	his	strong	feelings	on	the	matter.	After	all,	why	would	he	accept	taking	a	job	he	had	held	twenty	years	earlier,	surely	he	had	progressed	since	then?		 It	began	in	early	September,	a	few	days	after	the	war	officially	started	for	Britain.	Kenney	was	employed	in	the	Foreign	Publicity	Department	of	the	Ministry	of	Information,	which	was	gearing	up	to	shuffle	the	deployment	of	Press	Attachés	for	the	overseas	propaganda	work.446	The	Press	Attaché	in	Oslo	at	the	start	of	the	war	was,	funnily	enough,	Rowland	Kenney’s	son	Kit.	A	letter	from	father	to	son	(affectionately	addressed	“Kjaere	Kit-Ko”447),	on	the	6th	of	September	1939,	brings	up	what	must	have	been	a	sensitive	subject:	it	seemed	on	the	cards	that	Rowland	was	to	replace	Kit.	In	the	letter,	Rowland	interestingly	appears	to	have	some	sort	of	sway	with	regards	to	the	placement,	writing:	“I	am	told	that	it	had	already	been	decided	that,	as	you	had	expressed	a	preference	for	Oslo,	Tennant	was	to	be	sent	to	Stockholm;	but	Oslo	will	no	longer	be	open	if	I	am	to	fill	the	post.	I	have	been	asked	whether	you	would	care	to	take	over	Helsingfors	[Helsinki],	if	they	get	rid	of	Hewins.”448	Kenney	at	the	very	least	seems	intimately	knowledgeable	about	the	placements,	which	places	him	relatively	close	to	the	centre	of	power	in	the	department.		 Heading	the	Foreign	Publicity	Department	was	Colonel	Charles	Bridge,	and	as	Kenney	put	it	“between	Col.	Bridge	and	myself	are	three	or	four	more	or	less	incompetent	people.”449	One	of	these	people	that	he	refers	to	was	probably	E.	H.	Carr,	who	would	play	a	role	in	the	debacle	soon	to	unfold.	A	letter	with	no	date,	but	with	a	note	to	suggest	it	was	dictated	by	Carr	and	signed	by	Col.	Bridge,	references	to	Rowland	Kenney	as	a	senior	officer	who	is	proposed	to	be	sent	to	Oslo	and	paid	£1,000	a	year,	nearly	double	the	pay	of	the	officers	sent	to	the	other	three	northern	countries	(£600).450	On	the	16th	of	September,	the	decision	appears	to	have	been	made.	“We	desire	to	make	the	following	appointments	as	soon	as	possible:	[…]	Mr.	Rowland	Kenney	to	be	Press	Attaché	to	the	Legation	in																																																									446	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Kit	Kenney.	6	Sept.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	447	‘Kjære’	being	Norwegian	for	‘Dear’.	Ibid.	p.	1.	448	Ibid.	449	Ibid.	450	‘Letter	to	Waterfield’.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	2.	
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Oslo	(salary	£1,000,	local	allowance	£200).”451	The	letter	continues	further	on:	“We	should	like	all	these	appointments	to	take	effect	not	later	than	Wednesday,	September	20th,	on	which	date	Mr.	Tennant	leaves	for	Stockholm.	Mr.	Rowland	Kenney	will	leave	a	few	days	later.”452	This	was	not	to	be	so.		 The	story	is	not	easy	to	piece	together,	but	it	begins	with	a	letter	from	Col.	Bridge	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart,	the	Diplomatic	Advisor	to	the	Government.	Almost	diffidently,	Bridge	writes	that	he	has	just	been	notified	of	some	negative	comments	being	made	about	him	or	one	of	his	subordinates,	presumably	Carr.			 I	want	to	assure	you,	without	any	shadow	of	a	doubt	whatever,	that	Mr.	Kenney	applied	in	writing	to	be	appointed	as	Press	Attaché	to	Oslo.	The	memorandum	or	letter	containing	his	request	was	addressed	in	manuscript	by	Mr.	Kenney	personally	to	Mr.	E.	H.	Carr.	I	was	shown	it	and,	as	a	result,	instructed	Mr.	Carr	to	take	the	necessary	steps	to	send	Mr.	Kenney	to	Oslo.453			Bridge	goes	on	to	say	that	the	letter	from	Kenney	to	Carr	can	no	longer	be	found	at	the	Ministry,	but	highlights	again	that	Kenney	did	indeed	apply.	It	appears	that	someone	has	made	a	problem	out	of	Kenney’s	application,	and	that	it	might	have	been	suggested	that	Kenney	had	been	pushed	into	the	job	unwillingly.	The	letter	was	copied	both	to	Kenney	and	Carr.		 The	very	next	day,	Kenney	wrote	to	Vansittart	to	tell	his	side	of	the	story.	He	referenced	Rex	Leeper,	the	Head	of	the	News	Department	of	the	Foreign	Office	who	Kenney	had	worked	with	for	a	long	time.	Kenney	had	been	told	by	Leeper,	when	the	Ministry	of	Information	was	being	re-established,	that	he	“should	be	put	in	charge	either	of	a	section	in	the	Film	Department	or	the	Foreign	Publicity	Department.”454	Some	time	later,	this	suggestion	was	watered	down	to	heading	a	dedicated	Fenno-Scandinavian	section	in	the	Foreign	Publicity	Department.	Kenney	appears	to	be	disappointed	at	finding	himself	on	a	much	lower	rung	than	what	had	been	suggested.	“I	had	applied	for	the	post	of																																																									451	Letter	to	Woodburn.	16	Sept.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	452	Ibid.	453	Bridge,	Charles.	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	5	Oct.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.		454	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	6	Oct.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	
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Press	Attaché	to	Oslo,”	writes	Kenney,	“only	because	I	felt	my	position	in	the	Foreign	Publicity	Department	of	the	Ministry	of	Information	to	be	an	impossible	one.”455	He	then	informs	Vansittart	that	he	has	attached	a	copy	of	the	letter	he	sent	to	Carr,	the	letter	Bridge	has	declared	lost.		 The	letter	to	Carr	is	not	dated,	but	it	is	fair	to	imagine	it	must	have	been	written	and	sent	some	time	before	Kenney	informed	his	son	he	would	be	filling	the	position.	It	is	a	letter	written	rather	confrontationally,	and	seems	to	come	on	the	heels	of	what	might	have	been	a	heated	discussion	between	Carr	and	Kenney.	Kenney	writes	about	his	experience	and	his	value	to	the	Ministry,	making	no	effort	to	conceal	his	disappointment	at	being	placed	subordinate	to	‘experts’	who	he	claims	“have	only	recently	become	British	subjects	and	who	have	really	no	experience	of	the	work.”456	If	the	reader	can	forgive	a	brief	interjection	to	muse	on	Kenney’s	primary	motivation:	Kenney	makes	the	point	first	that	these	experts	have	only	recently	become	‘British	subjects’,	as	if	national	piety	should	elevate	him.	Considering	Kenney’s	rather	radical	political	views,	a	compelling	question	throughout	the	research	is	what	motivated	him	to	engage	so	vitally	with	the	establishment	and	the	government	that	he	ostensibly	fought	against.	This	instance	offers	up	what	can	be	regarded	as	a	plausible	explanation:	nationalism.	Perhaps	he	felt	very	deeply	that	his	service	was	founded	in	nationalism,	that	he	fought	for	his	country,	and	this	would	explain	his	suspicion	towards	foreign	experts	brought	in	and	rewarded	with	higher	positions	than	his	own.	Alternatively,	Kenney	may	simply	have	been	annoyed	at	his	own	lack	of	promotion.		 In	any	case,	Kenney	continued	and	formally	requested	a	raise	in	position	and	salary.	And	then	the	fateful	alternative:	“Otherwise:	Sir	C.	Dormer	has	asked	for	a	Press	Attaché,	at	a	suggested	salary	of	£1,000	a	year,	my	present	normal	salary;	I	apply	for	the	post	–	which	will	only	put	me	in	the	position	I	occupied	twenty-three	years	ago!”457	In	the	context	of	the	letter,	the	suggestion	seems	to	land	somewhere	between	dejection	and	sarcasm.	Vansittart,	sensing	the	same,	agreed,	and	sent	a	reply	to	Col.	Bridge	the	same	day	he	received	Kenney’s	letters.																																																									455	Kenney.	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	456	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	E.	H.	Carr.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	457	Ibid.	
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“I	have	received	your	letter	of	October	5th.	I	am	afraid	however	that	I	must	tell	you	frankly	that	I	do	not	think	it	gives	a	complete	account	of	what	has	passed.”458	Kenney	had	friends	in	high	places.		 But	what	had	prompted	Col.	Bridge	to	contact	Vansittart	in	the	first	place?	The	answer	lies	in	a	scrawled,	handwritten	letter	from	Carr	to	Kenney,	posted	ten	days	later.	According	to	the	letter,	Laurence	Collier,	the	Head	of	the	Northern	Section	in	the	Foreign	Office	and	soon	to	be	Ambassador	to	Norway,	had	stated	that	sending	Kenney	to	Oslo	was	“a	put-up	job”459	between	Carr	and	Bridge,	which	had	angered	Carr.	Vansittart	had	apparently	also	made	some	negative	comments	about	Carr	in	relation	to	Kenney’s	case.	Knowing	that	Kenney	had	been	to	the	Foreign	Office	and	had	seen	both	Vansittart	and	Collier,	Carr	made	the	assumption	that	Kenney	had	encouraged	this	and	had	lashed	out	at	him.	“I’m	sorry,”	wrote	Carr,	and	sympathised	with	Kenney	that	he	“ought	to	have	had	some	other	job,”460	but	that	it	was	not	within	his	power.	“As	you	know,	it	wasn’t	my	wish	that	you	shouldn’t	stay	in	my	section.”461	It	is,	of	course,	impossible	to	know	to	what	extent	Kenney	was	responsible	for	Collier	and	Vansittart’s	opinions	on	the	matter.			 When	the	dust	had	settled	and	apologies	had	been	made,	Kenney	found	himself	once	again	in	Norway	and	began	fulfilling	his	duty	as	Press	Attaché	and	propaganda	officer	in	the	country.	As	with	the	First	World	War,	the	work	would	begin	slowly	and	arduously	before	gaining	any	touch	of	momentum.	In	the	First	World	War,	for	a	time,	the	propaganda	machinery	had	been	allowed	to	grow	somewhat	organically.	The	gentlemen	amateurs	had	been	given	considerably	free	reins	in	their	work.	By	the	end	of	that	war,	with	the	establishment	of	the	Ministry	of	Information,	the	bureaucracy	had	begun	to	catch	up,	and	with	the	premeditated	launch	of	the	Ministry	for	the	Second	World	War,	the	bureaucracy	was	already	in	place,	stifling	and	limiting	as	it	was.	
																																																								458	Vansittart,	Sir	Robert.	Letter	to	Colonel	C.	Bridge.	6	Oct.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	459	Carr,	E.	H.	Letter	to	Rowland	Kenney.	9	Oct.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	460	Ibid.,	p.	2.	461	Ibid.,	p.	1-2.	
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	 It	can	be	imagined	that	October	was	spent	setting	up	and	getting	to	grips	with	the	system,	making	useful	connections	and	establishing	proper	channels	for	communication.	By	late	November,	reports	begin	trickling	in	from	Kenney	in	Norway.	The	task	was	monumental.	Not	only	was	the	Press	Department	supposed	to	carry	out	propaganda	work	for	the	Ministry	of	Information,	but	it	was	also	supposed	to	handle	work	for	the	British	Council,	leaving	the	Press	Attachés	swamped	and	unable	to	accomplish	much	at	all.462	Having	experience	with	the	work,	Kenney	returned	to	his	old	self,	not	so	much	airing	opinions	as	dictating	propaganda	policy.	He	rejected	Ministry	proposals	as	“foolish	and	unworthy	pretence,”463	and	requested	permission		“to	spend	certain	sums	on	translation	and	printing	at	[his]	discretion.”464	Kenney	even	took	steps	without	authorisation	and	sought	authorisation	for	this	post	factum.	“I	should	be	glad	if	I	could	have	general	authorisation	to	incur	expenditure	on	small	items	of	this	kind	without	having	to	refer	to	the	Ministry	on	each	occasion.”465	Kenney,	it	seems,	longed	back	to	the	state	of	affairs	two	decades	prior,	and	was	certainly	in	the	driver’s	seat	of	propaganda	policy	in	Norway.		 A	memorandum	written	during	this	time	gives	the	same	impression.	Kenney	mourned	British	propaganda	inefficiency,	which,	even	in	the	face	of	German	failures	of	public	perception,	was	damaging.	Recognizing	the	increasing	dimension	and	scope	of	the	British	propaganda	machine,	he	warned	against	using	German	methods	of	“false	accusations”	and	“baser	types	of	publicity.”466	These	were	of	course	policy	questions.	But	Kenney	did	not	only	criticise,	he	proposed	the	creation	of	a	bulletin	to	be	printed	and	selectively	distributed	both	to	individuals	and	the	press,	with	the	express	instruction	that	it	could	be	filed	for	reference.	The	bulletin	would	only	contain	true	and	factual	assertions	and	repudiations	and	would,	in	his	mind,	“become	an	authority	on	the	rights	and	wrongs	of	the	various	questions	raised.”467	He	wrote	enthusiastically	of	the	proposal	also	to	Collier,	describing	the	bulletin	as	something	that	“could	be																																																									462	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	J.	Henderson.	27	Nov.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.		463	Ibid.,	p.	4.	464	Ibid.	465	Ibid.	466	Kenney,	Rowland.	Memorandum.	27	Nov.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	2.	467	Ibid.,	p.	3.	
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made	a	very	powerful	weapon	for	use	in	almost	every	country	in	the	world,”468	and	suggesting	he	would	be	the	editor	of	the	bulletin	himself.	Whether	the	idea	ever	came	to	fruition	in	some	iteration	is	difficult	to	say,	though	no	further	mention	is	offered	in	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.		 Another	example	of	Kenney’s	complete	control	of	the	propaganda	in	Norway	comes	in	the	shape	of	instructions	sent	to	the	Ministry.	Bureaucratic	overreach	appears	to	have	stymied	and	swamped	Kenney	with	too	much	material.			 Actual	news	should	come	through	Reuters	and	the	private	correspondents;	financial	and	commercial	information	we	can	work	in	through	Anker	Olsen;	what	we	want	for	our	own	distribution	are	short,	light	articles,	or	paragraphs	of	between	250	and	700	words,	they	must	not	be	openly	propagandist,	but	informative	in	an	attractive	manner	about	Great	Britain	and	the	Commonwealth	generally.469				 		It	does	seem	rather	backwards	that	a	Press	Attaché	should	be	explaining	to	Ministry	officials	in	London	what	they	should	send	and	what	they	should	not	send.	In	effect,	this	displays	the	decentralised	structure	from	Kenney’s	point	of	view	and	places	Kenney	at	the	weighted	end	of	the	position.	In	the	same	letter	as	cited	above,	written	in	February,	Kenney	appears	to	have	finally	begun	to	get	the	machine	running	properly,	writing	that	he	“had	just	got	the	whole	of	the	Oslo	press	thundering	against	Germany.”470	Momentum	appeared	to	be	gathering	for	Kenney,	who	just	a	few	days	prior	had	been	given	the	local	rank	of	First	Secretary	in	the	Diplomatic	Service.471	This	was	doubtless	a	testament	to	the	importance	and	impact	of	his	work.		 The	significance	of	the	task	was	not	lost	on	the	man	either,	in	spite	of	his	initial	reluctance	to	take	up	the	position.	While	there	were	deep-set	challenges	both	in	Norway	and	in	London,	Kenney	felt	it	was	vital	that	Norway	be	handled																																																									468	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Laurence	Collier.	27	Nov.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	469	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Roger	Stevens.	29	Feb.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	470	Ibid.,	p.	2.	471	Butler,	F.	G.	M.	Letter	to	R.	Kenney.	23	Feb.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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carefully	and	well.	“The	situation	up	here	is	difficult,	and	I	fear	that	we	may	make	the	mistake	of	swiping	the	Norwegians	with	an	iron	hand	without	keeping	in	evidence,	all	the	time,	the	velvet	glove!	If	Norway	is	to	be	involved	in	war,	she	must	be	in	on	our	side,	and	glad	that	she	is.”472	The	difficult	work	was	not	made	easier	by	the	conditions	surrounding	the	staff.	In	contrast	to	the	papers	from	the	First	World	War,	the	papers	from	this	period	are	overwhelmingly	concerning	requests	for	salary	increases,	the	covering	of	expenditures,	the	intolerable	amount	of	work	being	expected	from	a	much	too	small	staff	and	the	micromanaging	imposed	by	the	Ministry	on	the	officers.473	Kenney’s	irritation	is	tangible	in	his	letters	to	the	Ministry.			 We	go	toddling	on	here,	but	I	must	confess	that	I	find	the	line	of	thought	of	the	Foreign	Publicity	Directorate	difficult	to	follow:	I	make	a	suggestion	which	I	think	would	lead	to	wide	publicity	in	the	Norwegian	provincial	press;	the	response	is	three	letters,	signed	by	three	different	people,	asking	for	reports	with	cuttings	(why	not	diagrams?)	of	space	devoted	to	agency	telegrams!	I	suppose	the	simple	fact	is	that	30	years’	experience	of	publicity	and	propaganda	work	has	totally	unfitted	me	for	–	publicity	and	propaganda	work.	So	all	I	can	do	is	follow	my	own	stupid	nose,	watch	and	pray,	and	trust	in	time,	which	cures	all	things.474				The	‘suggestion’	referenced	to	is	in	all	likelihood	the	bulletin,	and	Kenney	may	have	begun	gathering	what	the	Ministry	had	demanded	from	him	in	evidence	to	get	it	started.	However,	unbeknownst	to	Kenney,	and	indeed	to	everyone	involved:	time	was	running	out.																																																										472	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Robert	Vansittart.	29	Jan.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	2.	473	See	Kenney,	Letter	to	J.	Henderson,	and	attachments	for	a	comprehensive	example.	See	also:	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Roger	Stevens.	20	Nov.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	Kenney,	Rowland.	Memorandum.	20	Nov.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	E.	H.	Carr.	26	Jan.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Quarmby.	26	Jan.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	A.	W.	G.	Randall.	7	Mar.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.		474	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Roger	Stevens.	10	Dec.	1939.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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April	1940		Early	in	the	morning	on	the	9th	of	April	1940	the	alarm	sounded.	German	ships	had	snuck	into	the	Oslo-fjord	under	the	cover	of	night	and	the	invasion	of	Norway	was	underway.475	Kenney	made	his	way	from	Oslo	to	Høsbjør—about	140	km	to	the	north	of	Oslo—in	a	party	of	eight	people	from	the	Legation	staff	and	the	Press	Department.	He	had	left	Oslo	only	one	hour	before	the	Germans	had	entered	the	city.476	At	Høsbjør	Kenney’s	party	met	renowned	SIS-officer	Captain	Frank	Foley’s	party	and	together	they	made	their	way	further	north,	eventually	arriving	at	Åndalsnes	in	the	evening	of	the	10th	of	April.477	Margaret	Reid,	Frank	Foley’s	assistant,	refers	to	Kenney	as	one	of	the	two	in	charge	of	their	party	while	fleeing	Oslo	for	Åndalsnes;	the	other,	of	course,	being	Foley	himself.478	It	is	remarkable	that	material	from	this	period	and	indeed	the	preceding	period	survives	in	Kenney’s	collection.	He	must	have	spent	time	gathering	his	papers	and	have	carried	them	with	him	through	the	escape	and	through	the	harrowing	weeks	to	come.		 The	papers	from	this	period	are	a	thrilling	read.	In	the	early	days	of	the	stay	at	Åndalsnes,	the	documents	mainly	consist	of	telegrams	sent	to	and	from	Kenney	concerned	with	military	and	naval	movements	as	well	as	reports	on	rumours,	bombing	raids	and	which	call-signals	to	use.	While	very	tempting,	it	is	not	within	the	scope	of	this	thesis	to	delve	into	this	material,	as	it	does	little	to	elucidate	on	the	creation	of	systems	of	information	dissemination	and	control.	Any	researcher	keen	to	get	a	sense	of	the	British	perspective	on	the	ground	in	the	very	early	days	of	the	invasion	of	Norway	would	do	well	to	study	these	
																																																								475	Reid,	Margaret.	April	1940:	En	krigsdagbok:	Margaret	Reids	dagbok.	Oslo:	Gyldendal,	1980.	[translation	mine].	476	Kenney,	Rowland.	Memorandum.	22	Apr.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	477	Kenney,	Rowland.	Memorandum.	8	May	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	478	Reid,	Margaret.	April	1940.	
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documents.	The	focus	of	this	thesis,	however,	is	on	Kenney’s	position	and	his	work	in	greater	effect.479		 The	work	of	a	Press	Attaché	must	of	course	suffer	under	invasion	and	occupation.	In	light	of	the	new	situation,	and	of	being	attached	to	Foley,	Kenney	adapted	and	began	working	as	an	impromptu	intelligence	officer.	Cross-referencing	a	memorandum	by	Kenney	on	the	19th	of	April	and	a	telegram	received	on	the	20th,	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	Foley’s	code-name	was	‘93,000’,	which	confusingly	was	also	the	secret	country-code	for	Finland.480	The	received	telegram	confirms	that	Kenney	should	act	in	a	dual	capacity,	“cooperating	with	93,000	and	affording	assistance	wherever	possible	to	naval	and	military	authorities.”481	A	later	report	typed	up	by	Kenney	in	London	in	early	May	confirms	this	version	of	events	once	more	by	explaining	that	upon	arrival	in	Åndalsnes	on	April	10th	he	“immediately	commenced	activities	as	Intelligence	Officer,	in	co-operation	with	Captain	Frank	Foley.”482	Whether	this	was	Kenney’s	first	introduction	to	the	bona	fide	intelligence	services	is	unknown—his	work	for	decades	would	have	made	him	a	valuable	asset—but	it	certainly	speaks	to	his	capabilities	and	his	stature.		 To	give	an	example	of	Foley’s,	and	by	extension	Kenney’s	position	in	this	capacity:	one	message	that	was	passed	through	Foley	at	this	time	was	the	assurance	that	British	help	was	on	the	way,	made	by	the	British	Prime	Minister	to	the	Norwegian	Government:			 “We	are	coming	as	fast	as	possible	and	in	great	strength.	Further	details	later.	Meanwhile	use	every	effort	at	all	costs	to	cut	railway	communications	so	that	neither	Bergen	nor	Trondhjem	can	be	reinforced	by	land.	We	are	preventing	enemy	reinforcements	arriving	by	sea.	We	are	inspired	by	your	message	and	feel	sure	that	you	have	
																																																								479	Documents	and	memoranda	from	Kenney’s	point	of	view	can	be	found	both	in	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	as	well	as	in	TNA:	FO	371/24834,	N	5150.	480	Kenney,	Rowland.	Memo.	19	Apr.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	Telegram	
incoming	No	1.	20	Apr.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	481	Telegram	incoming	No	1.	This	exchange	between	Kenney	and	the	Foreign	Office	concerning	his	cooperation	with	Foley	also	exists	in	TNA:	FO	371/24834,	N	4433.	482	Kenney,	Rowland.	Report.	7	May	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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only	to	hold	on	until	we	arrive	for	both	our	countries	to	emerge	victorious.”483	
	That	a	message	of	such	gravity	may	very	well	have	passed	through	Kenney	is	remarkable,	and	it	is	noted	here	to	show	Kenney’s	place	in	the	company	of	high	politics.	Nevertheless,	even	in	the	midst	of	incessant	bombing	and	fear	of	being	overrun,	Kenney	continued	to	pursue	publicity	and	propaganda	efforts	as	well.	Kenney	had	spoken	with	Dr.	Arnold	Ræstad,	a	Norwegian	acquaintance	of	his	from	the	First	World	War	who	had	since	held	a	short	term	as	foreign	minister	and	would	soon	head	the	Norwegian	national	bank	in	London	for	the	duration	of	the	war.	Ræstad	had	also	made	it	to	Åndalsnes,	and	they	had	evidently	discussed	the	necessity	to	establish	a	media-	and	information	service	to	counteract	the	occupation.	On	the	18th	of	April,	a	mere	nine	days	after	the	invasion	and	fraught	escape	from	Oslo,	Ræstad	wrote	to	Kenney	that	an	organization	had	been	established,	under	the	supervision	of	Kåre	Fostervoll	who	would	later	become	the	director	of	the	Norwegian	national	broadcasting	service.	On	behalf	of	the	Norwegian	government,	Ræstad	asked	Kenney	officially	to	connect	the	service	to	the	British	and	allowing	an	exchange	of	information.484	Kenney	transmitted	the	proposal	back	to	the	Foreign	Office	together	with	his	own	blessing,	and	the	proposal	was	approved	shortly	thereafter.485		In	addition	to	Ræstad’s	interim	department	of	information,	Kenney	spearheaded	a	proposal	to	release	issues	of	the	local	newspaper	in	Åndalsnes,	including	items	in	English	in	order	to	raise	the	morale	of	the	local	population.486	He	also	served	as	an	intermediary	between	the	British	press	and	the	Norwegian	
																																																								483	Special	Distribution	and	War	Cabinet.	Message	to	Norway.	13	Apr.	1940.	TNA:	FO	371/24834.		484	Ræstad,	Arnold.	Letter	to	Rowland	Kenney.	18	Apr.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.		485	Kenney,	Rowland.	Telegram	1200.	18	Apr.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers;	
Telegram	From	Unexpected	London.	20	Apr.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	486	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Captain	Knight.	19	Apr.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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news	agency	NTB—which	had	narrowly	escaped	Oslo	and	had	set	up	temporarily	in	Åndalsnes	as	well.487	One	particular	letter	in	this	period	of	the	collection	is	innocently	astounding.	Colonel	Ernst	David	Thue	had	two	grave	errors	in	his	letter	to	Kenney:	the	letter	is	addressed	to	‘Kennedy’	and	is	dated	the	16th	of	March,	1940.	Context,	such	as	the	mention	of	the	military	command	established	strictly	after	the	invasion	in	April,	means	that	a	date	of	April	16th	is	much	more	likely,	and	with	Kenney’s	name	continually	misspelled	throughout	the	collection,	it	can	safely	be	assumed	he	was	the	recipient.	Errors	notwithstanding,	the	letter	concerns	itself	with	the	assignment	of	a	particular	Norwegian	officer	to	assist	Kenney.488	The	officer	in	question	was	Lieutenant	Martin	Linge,	who	is	still	today	revered	as	one	of	Norway’s	greatest	war	heroes	alongside	Max	Manus.	Linge	was	one	of	the	godfathers	of	the	organized	Norwegian	resistance	movement	and	his	assignment	to	Kenney	may	have	been	his	first	contact	with	the	British	who	would	train	and	supply	him	and	his	team.		 While	somewhat	speculative,	Kenney’s	connection	with	Linge	and	the	resistance	movement	may	run	deeper	than	a	fortuitous	meeting	in	a	bombed-out	town	in	the	Norwegian	fjords.	Once	Kenney	had	made	his	way	back	to	London,	he	penned	a	letter	to	his	old	friend	Vansittart:		 There	were	one	or	two	Norwegian	officers	who	had	been	extremely	useful	to	us,	and	who	were	prepared	to	re-enter	occupied	Norway	for	the	purpose	of	carrying	out	any	scheme	which	we	could	usefully	develop.	One	of	these	men,	who	was	wounded,	is	at	present	in	London	and	I	wonder	whether	it	would	not	be	possible	even	now	for	us	to	develop	an	underground	organization	in	Norway	which	would	be	ready	to	create	havoc	among	the	Germans	on	the	longed-for	day	when	the	tide	turns	against	them.489		
																																																								487	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Foreign	Division.	23	Apr.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	488	Thue,	Ernst	David.	Letter	to	Kennedy.	16	Mar.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	489	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	1	July	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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The	letter	was	written	on	the	1st	of	July,	exactly	two	months	after	Linge	was	wounded	in	battle	and	transported	to	Britain.490	The	only	reasonable	conclusion,	then,	is	that	Kenney	was	at	least	involved	in	establishing	the	Norwegian	resistance	movement,	if	not	instrumental	in	placing	Linge	at	its	forefront.	This	discovery,	if	accurate,	is	of	great	significance	to	Norwegian	war	history.	With	inadequate	defences	and	a	rapidly	deteriorating	situation	surrounding	the	British	personnel	in	Åndalsnes,	Kenney	and	his	assistants	were	first	ordered	to	evacuate	the	country	on	the	26th	of	April,	a	plan	that	subsequently	was	refused	by	the	Lieutenant	Commander	in	charge.	A	new	plan,	to	shelter	Kenney’s	party	further	inland	was	suggested,	but	Kenney	succeeded	in	obtaining	passage	on	a	ship	bound	for	Scotland,	departing	from	Ålesund	in	the	evening	of	the	28th	of	April.	The	ship	‘Lochnagar’	was	not	equipped	at	all	for	war	and	had	to	anchor	off	the	Scottish	Isles	for	repairs	two	days	later.	Eventually,	Kenney	arrived	in	Kirkwall	and	was	flown	to	Aberdeen	and	took	a	train	from	there	to	London.	Kenney	reported	back	at	the	Foreign	Office	and	the	Ministry	of	Information	on	the	3rd	of	May.491	The	German	invasion	of	Norway	had	thus	uprooted	Kenney	from	his	usual	position,	though	he	had	still	fought,	under	what	can	be	regarded	as	near	impossible	circumstances,	to	maintain	a	hold	on	the	information-	and	press-services	he	could	render	in	favour	of	Britain.	In	addition	to	being	of	great	importance	to	the	intransigent	occupied	publicity	service,	he	also	began	working	as	an	intelligence	officer	with	one	of	the	greatest	known	agents	of	the	time.	And	finally,	he	may	have	been	instrumental,	and	was	certainly	significant,	in	the	creation	of	a	Norwegian	resistance	force	based	out	of	Britain.	A	force	regarded	by	many	as	a	great	help	to	the	Allied	cause.	In	short,	Kenney	here	displayed	his	remarkable	versatility	and	his	undeniable	influence	in	these	world	events.																																																														490	Haavardsholm,	Espen.	Martin	Linge	–	min	morfar:	Familieroman	med	
fotografier.	Oslo:	Oktober	forlag,	2007.	491	Kenney,	Rowland.	Memorandum.	4	May	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.		
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Director	of	the	Northern	Section		The	occupation	of	Norway	rendered	Kenney’s	primary	position	as	Press	Attaché	and	propaganda	officer	for	Oslo	virtually	irrelevant.	There	was	now	no	possibility	of	engaging	in	broad-scale	propaganda	in	the	major	Norwegian	media.	His	experience	prior	to	the	invasion	made	him	reluctant	to	continue	working	for	the	Ministry	of	Information	at	all.	Seeking	other	options,	Kenney	appealed	on	his	return	to	Vansittart,	in	quite	stark	words,	to	be	given	a	job	worth	doing	in	the	Northern	Department	of	the	Foreign	Office.	“Immodestly	but	quite	sincerely,	I	believe	that	I	know	more	about	national	propaganda	abroad	than	the	whole	staff	of	the	Foreign	Division	of	the	Ministry	put	together,	and	if	I	am	to	work	there	I	ought	to	be	directing	it	instead	of	being	a	mere	cog	in	the	wheel	–	which	is	being	turned	by	men	who	have	no	sense	whatever	for	the	job.”492	Vansittart	responded	that	Kenney	would	more	likely	than	not	have	to	stay	at	the	Ministry	since	there	was	no	work	at	all	to	be	done	in	the	Northern	Department,	but	that	he	would	appeal	to	the	higher-ups	in	the	Ministry	to	see	if	something	advantageous	could	be	secured.493		 At	the	start	of	the	war,	Kenney	had	of	course	been	passed	to	the	Ministry	from	the	Foreign	Office	on	assignment,	but	he	was	now	in	a	strange	position	of	being	let	down	by	his	principal	employer.	Kenney	made	several	different	appeals	during	the	late	spring	and	early	summer	of	1940.	Rebuffed	from	the	Northern	Department,	it	appears	Kenney	desired	to	be	returned	to	the	north	of	Norway	to	do	work	in	the	field	there.	In	late	May,	his	superior	in	Norway,	Sir	Cecil	Dormer,	telegraphed	to	the	Foreign	Office	that	an	eventual	return	to	Norway	would	be	advisable	on	Kenney’s	part,	but	that	he	should	wait	“until	the	position	has	been	rather	more	stabilised	and	until	it	is	a	little	more	certain	that	the	Legation	will	not	have	to	move	again.”494	This	was	not	good	news	for	Kenney,	who	was	
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advised	to	remain	at	his	cottage	in	Haslemere	until	it	could	be	decided	what	to	do	with	him.495		 Precisely	two	weeks	after	this	dispiriting	message,	another	message	arrived	from	the	Ministry	of	Information.		 As	I	regret	there	is	no	way	in	which	we	can	avail	ourselves	any	longer	of	your	service	in	this	Ministry	I	have	written	to	Quarmby	to	ask	that	the	Foreign	Office	should	take	the	responsibility	for	any	future	post	to	which	you	may	be	appointed.	I	should	however	like	to	express	our	thanks	to	you	for	the	work	which	you	have	done,	and	at	the	same	time	extend	the	hope	that	a	new	appointment	may	not	be	long	delayed.496	
	Kenney	was	suddenly	free	from	the	Ministry	of	Information,	as	he	had	requested,	but	without	any	further	instructions	from	the	Foreign	Office	which	had	indicated	it	had	no	spot	for	him	either.	It	can	only	be	imagined	the	frustration	which	Kenney	must	have	felt,	being	a	veteran	of	the	business,	an	expert	in	his	trade,	and	having	a	burning	wish	to	be	of	use	continually	thwarted.	A	small	hope	might	have	been	kindled	by	a	note	from	the	Foreign	Office	asking	if	Kenney	might	be	interested	in	working	in	the	Liaison	Department	on	items	concerning	Scandinavia,	though	if	there	would	be	enough	work	for	a	full	position	remains	unclear.497	Kenney,	understandably,	jumped	at	the	idea.498	He	would	work	there	for	a	fortnight,499	but	the	true	saving	grace	arrived	in	the	form	of	a	change	of	heart	in	the	Ministry	of	Information.	Quite	out	of	the	blue,	Kenney	received	a	letter	from	Leigh	Ashton	of	the	Ministry,	informing	him	that	after	considering	a	number	of	candidates,	the	Ministry	would	like	Kenney	“to	come	to	us	and	look	after	our	Scandinavian	interests.”500	At	first,	Kenney	reportedly																																																									495	Ibid.	496	Woodburn.	Letter	to	Rowland	Kenney.	14	June	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	497	Randall,	A.	W.	G.	Note	to	Rowland	Kenney.	19	June	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	498	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	A.	W.	G.	Randall.		20	June	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	499	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	P.	F.	D.	Tennant.	10	July	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	500	Ashton,	Leigh.	Letter	to	Rowland	Kenney.	4	July	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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refused.	It	was	his	good	friend	Laurence	Collier,	at	the	time	the	head	of	the	Northern	Section	of	the	Foreign	Office	and	soon	to	be	the	British	Ambassador	to	Norway501,	who	persuaded	him	to	take	the	job,	so	that	“propaganda	work	in	the	North	should	be	competently	done.”502	In	a	quick	reversal,	Kenney	was	let	go	from	the	Ministry	and	then	asked	back	with	a	title	of	Director	of	the	Northern	Section	of	the	Foreign	Division.		 The	raise	in	position,	to	now	head	a	section	for	the	Ministry,	gave	Kenney	much	more	room	in	which	to	discuss	policy,	and	he	did	not	shy	away	from	so	doing.	A	memorandum	dated	the	19th	of	July,	1940,	gives	his	preliminary	and	broad-strokes	view	of	propaganda.	It	is	an	interesting	exposition	of	the	foundation	of	Kenney’s	view	on	the	nature	of	his	own	work.	His	discussion	begins	with	the	posing	of	three	fundamental	questions:	“Why	are	we	fighting?	What	do	we	hope	to	gain	by	it?	What	kind	of	a	world	do	we	wish	to	see	when	we	have	broken	German	domination	in	Europe,	and	prepared	the	way	for	reconstruction?”503	In	light	of	what	Kenney	characterised	as	an	unclear	and	unformulated	response	within	British	policy,	he	lamented	the	dangers	of	the	war	and	the	difficulty	of	conducting	effective	propaganda	in	such	a	system.		 A	later	memorandum,	titled	‘The	Psychological	Weapon’	goes	into	greater	detail.	It	is	in	essence	a	blueprint	or	a	draft	of	one	proposed	propaganda	offensive	to	weaken	the	will	of	the	German	soldiers.	Kenney	suggests	“one	of	the	most	effective	methods	of	weakening	the	will	of	an	individual	is	to	confuse	him	in	regard	to	his	aims.”504	While	it	is	strange	to	see	Kenney	involved	in	offensive	propaganda,	it	does	offer	some	understanding	about	what	his	ideas	were	on	propaganda	and	its	uses.	In	the	document,	he	proposes	that	they	attack	the	sexual	sensibilities	of	German	soldiers	and	especially	their	wives,	drawing	for	them	the	picture	of	their	men	frequenting	prostitutes	in	other	European	nations	and	informing	them	they	“must	expect	to	run	the	risk	of	venereal	disease	on	the																																																									501	Goldstein,	Erik.	Collier,	Sir	Laurence	(1890-1976).	Oxford	Dictionary	of	
National	Biography.	Oxford	University	Press,	2004:	online	edn.	Oct.	2006.	http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/64924.	2	Aug.	2015.	502	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	27	May	1941.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	503	Kenney,	Rowland.	Memorandum.	19	July	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	504	Kenney,	Rowland.	The	Psychological	Weapon.	1	June	1941.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	
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men’s	return.”505	Conversely,	the	German	soldiers	could	be	made	to	contemplate	the	effect	of	foreign	migrants	being	brought	into	their	homeland	to	fill	the	labour	gap	created	by	the	war,	and	that	these	foreigners	might	insinuate	themselves	with	their	wives	and	daughters.506	It	is	a	strikingly	sinister	example;	Kenney	himself	suggests	“they	deal	with	an	aspect	of	psychology	which,	in	this	country,	is	not	generally	accepted	as	‘quite	nice’!”507			 Apart	from	policy,	there	were	also	a	series	of	very	large	reports	made,	outlining	press-	and	media-conditions	in	his	region.	These	are	impressively	detailed.	One	such	report	lists	what	can	only	imagined	to	be	virtually	every	national	and	regional	newspaper	and	news	agency	in	Norway,	Sweden,	Denmark	and	Finland	and	includes	its	address,	its	rate	of	issue,	the	name	of	the	director,	editor	and	proprietor,	its	general	policy,	general	audience,	circulation	numbers,	as	well	as	any	special	remarks.	Where	applicable,	the	list	also	includes	the	names	of	foreign	correspondents	connected	to	the	publication	as	well	as	its	stance	within	advertising.508	Kenney	was	in	charge	of	British	propaganda	in	Finland	and	Scandinavia,	and	Iceland,	the	Faroe	Islands,	the	Netherlands,	Belgium	and	Switzerland	were	added	to	his	list	by	October	1940.509	The	work	was	very	comprehensive.	A	report	on	Sweden	details	the	scope	of	the	work.	Material	sent	from	the	Northern	Section	to	the	Press	Department	for	use	by	the	Press	Attaché	in	Sweden	consisted	of	input	to	newspaper	articles	for	print,	photographs	and	pictures,	daily	reviews	of	the	British	press,	the	Press	Attaché’s	weekly	bulletin,	the	publishing	of	pamphlets	and	books	as	well	as	window	displays.	Further	discussion	in	the	report	revolved	around	the	subheadings:	Articles	and	News;	Photographs;	Stereos;	Pamphlets,	Booklets,	Posters,	etc.;	Newspapers	and	Periodicals;	Films;	Incoming	material;	London	Correspondents	of	Swedish	Press;	Broadcasting;	and	the	Joint	Broadcasting	Committee.510	Each	of	these	
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subheadings	were	given	due	consideration	for	what	work	the	Northern	Section	pursued.	With	regard	to	Norway,	which,	after	all,	is	a	central	part	of	the	thesis,	Kenney	noted	that	it	was	impossible	to	send	material	directly.	This	did	not	stop	Kenney’s	Northern	Section.	Kenney	“devote[d]	a	considerable	amount	of	time	to	Norwegian	affairs,	mainly	in	connexion	with	the	B.B.C.	Norwegian	broadcasts,	and	the	Norwegian	paper	now	printed	in	London.”511	The	BBC	broadcast	to	Norway	consisted	of	65	minutes	of	programming	daily,	specifically	tailored	to	occupied	Norway.512	When	the	Norwegian	government	had	fled	to	London,	some	of	the	broadcasting	professionals	from	Norway	had	come	with	them,	which	was	of	great	use.	The	Norwegian	authorities,	according	to	Kenney,	regarded	these	daily	messages	as	being	“of	the	greatest	importance.”513	Kenney,	for	his	part,	took	part	in	“a	weekly	BBC	Scandinavia	meeting	at	which	questions	of	policy	are	discussed,	and	I	am	constantly	in	touch	with	the	Scandinavian	Department	of	the	BBC,	and	with	the	Norwegians,	and	give	advice,	suggestions,	and	help	in	many	ways.”514	Kenney	was	thus	also	heavily	involved	in	this	very	significant	wartime	action.	The	broadcasts	were	effective	all	over	Scandinavia.	Kenney	attended	a	meeting	in	December	1940	to	discuss	these	policies	and	activities.	The	meeting	considered	Swedish,	Danish	and	Icelandic	broadcasts	by	turn,	and	Kenney	was	central	to	the	discussion.	For	example,	he	actively	suggested	Swedish	candidates	for	the	position	of	announcer	in	the	broadcast	as	well	as	candidates	who	could	offer	constructive	criticism	regularly.515	Another	meeting	Kenney	attended	was	the	meeting	of	the	Overseas	Planning	Committee.	In	a	confidential	transcript,	Kenney	is	said	to	have	raised	the	issue	of	securing	the	transportation	of	materials	to	Sweden,	bolstering	propaganda	efforts	in	Finland,	and	cooperating	
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with	British	Council	officials	in	Iceland.	All	of	these	proposals	were	agreed.516	The	work	in	connection	with	the	broadcasts,	however,	was	taxing.	In	Kenney’s	own	words:		 I	am	at	present	responsible,	as	representative	of	the	Ministry	for	policy	and	advice	in	regard	to	all	the	Scandinavian	broadcasts:	Finnish,	Swedish,	Norwegian,	Danish,	and	Icelandic.	I	have	a	weekly	meeting	at	the	BBC	to	discuss	these	matters,	when	I	am	supposed	to	know	all	that	has	been	taking	place,	in	all	of	them,	during	the	previous	week.517		Kenney	was	involved	in	the	broadcasts	to	the	point	of	making	decisions	and	liaising	between	the	BBC	and	the	Foreign	Office	and	Ministry	of	Information	on	what	topics	should	be	covered	in	them.518	And	this	was	only	one	portion	of	the	total	workload.	Apart	from	policy-creation,	report-compilation	and	attendance	in	a	variety	of	meetings,	Kenney	also	took	part	in	propaganda	in	the	field.	He	did	not	retreat	into	the	labyrinth	of	bureaucracy,	but	rather	used	the	position	to	bolster	his	own	work	and	his	standing.	One	large	affair	in	the	field	was	his	leading	of	a	tour	of	foreign	correspondents	to	assess	the	damage	caused	in	Kent	and	Sussex	by	German	bombers.	In	a	newspaper	article	cut	out	by	Kenney	from	an	unknown	newspaper	he	is	cited	as	saying	“We	are	looking	for	the	enormous	damage	done	by	the	Germans	but	we	cannot	find	it!”519	Kenney’s	report	following	the	tour	provides	Kenney’s	views	that	the	tour	was	a	success,	thought	that	it	could	have	been	better	organised	and	carried	out.	He	also	outlines	a	series	of	suggestions	on	how	future	tours	might	be	improved.520	Kenney	not	only	showed	an	active	role	in	fieldwork	for	propaganda	purposes,	but	also	sought	to	systematise	the	efforts.	In	all	of	Kenney’s	efforts	in	this	period	rests	a	reflective	instinct	to	uncover																																																									516	Overseas	Planning	Committee.	10	Dec.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	517	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	D.	B.	Woodburn.	9	July	1941.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	518	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Laurence	Collier.	22	Aug.	1940.	TNA:	FO	371/24838,	N	6364.	519	Vain	Search	for	Nazi’s	“Enormous	Damage”:	Foreign	Newsmen	in	Sussex.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	520	Kenney,	Rowland.	Memorandum:	Conducted	Tour	of	a	Party	of	Foreign	
Journalists	to	Kent	and	Sussex.	22	Aug.	1940.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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weaknesses	and	avoid	them	in	future	work.	This	shows	a	distinct	wish	to	codify	and	embed	particular	practices	into	a	system	of	propaganda	and	information	control.		 The	usual	bureaucratic	hurdles,	however,	marred	Kenney’s	time	as	the	Director	of	the	Northern	Section.	The	chief	problem	was	found	in	the	inordinate	amount	of	work	expected	by	Kenney	and	his	small	staff.	As	early	as	in	October	of	1940,	a	few	months	into	the	job,	Kenney	admitted	to	being	“perturbed	about	the	present	condition	of	affairs	in	the	Northern	Section	of	the	Foreign	Division,	owing	to	lack	of	staff.	For	some	time	it	has	been	difficult	to	keep	abreast	of	the	work,	in	the	near	future	it	will	be	quite	impossible.”521	Quite	a	few	of	the	letters	and	reports	from	this	period	are	studded	with	remarks	which	echo	the	desperation.	Almost	a	year	later,	when	it	appears	the	Ministry	had	given	Kenney	authority	to	add	one	position	to	the	Section,	Kenney	cited	the	several	months	that	had	passed	with	the	Section	understaffed	and	work	piling	up.522			 Kenney’s	secretary,	Miss	Elizabeth	Kitson,	had	been	by	his	side	since	the	start	of	the	war	and	had	assisted	him	in	Oslo	as	well	as	during	the	invasion	and	retreat	to	Åndalsnes.	Kitson	was	regarded	as	completely	indispensible	by	Kenney,	who	repeatedly	lauded	her	to	his	superiors	in	order	to	have	her	promoted.523	A	series	of	letters	and	notes	from	August	to	October	in	1940	chronicle	the	fight	to	have	Elizabeth	Kitson	be	promoted	from	Kenney’s	secretary	to	a	research	assistant,	which	was	eventually	granted.524	Even	this	was	grossly	inadequate	for	the	amount	and	type	of	work	she	was	doing,	as	nine	months	later,	Kenney	again	claimed	that	she	must	at	all	costs	be	further	promoted.525	His	crusade	for	his	own	subordinates	was	certainly	exemplary.																																																									521	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Leigh	Ashton,	Oliver	Harvey	and	Sir	Maurice	
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	 The	job,	by	1941,	was	in	Kenney’s	estimation	nearly	unbearable.	In	a	letter	to	a	Norwegian	friend,	he	wrote	that	conditions	were	“idiotic”	and	cited	“permanent	irritation	and	a	sense	of	frustration.”526	Elaborating	in	a	letter	to	Peter	Tennant,	the	Press	Attaché	in	Stockholm,	he	went	as	far	as	to	suggest	that	the	work	in	the	ministry	left	him	feeling	more	helpless	and	“hopeless	of	doing	a	decent	job”527	than	he	had	ever	experienced	in	his	life,	which,	of	course,	is	saying	something.	A	later	letter	to	Tennant,	headed	with	the	uproarious	phrase	“Burn	When	Read!”	shines	light	once	more	on	Kenney’s	dark	humour:	“The	German	bombs	continue	to	destroy	buildings	round	about,	but	continue	to	miss	us!	If	the	Nazis	only	knew	the	Lord	is	on	their	side	in	misdirecting	their	bombs	and	leaving	this	place	to	carry	on!”528	By	the	summer	of	1941,	he	was	looking	for	a	way	out.	The	first	true	indication	of	an	escape	plan	is	in	the	form	of	a	letter	which	is	undated,	but	in	tune	with	the	related	correspondence,	it	was	presumably	written	in	the	late	spring	or	early	summer	of	1941.	The	letter	is	unsigned,	and	no	definitive	indication	is	given	concerning	its	author.	However,	it	is	possible	to	risk	one	educated	guess.	Firstly,	the	author	is	from	within	the	Foreign	Office,	based	on	his	usage	of	“us”,	“our”	and	“we.”	He	is	intimately	knowledgeable	about	the	internal	affairs	of	the	Norwegian	government	in	exile.	And	he	is	very	complimentary	and	warm	towards	Kenney.	Excluding	Vansittart—to	whom	the	letter	is	addressed,	notably	with	the	friendly:	“My	dear	Van,”—the	odds	seem	to	stack	overwhelmingly	in	favour	of	presuming	the	author	to	be	Laurence	Collier.	Collier	had,	of	course,	been	a	long	and	dear	friend	to	both	Vansittart	and	Kenney,	and	had	fought	in	Kenney’s	corner	previously,	so	to	speak.	Collier	was	also	close	with	the	Norwegian	establishment	as	Counsellor	and	then	Ambassador.		 In	essence	the	author	of	the	letter	seeks	to	pull	Kenney	out	of	the	Ministry	of	Information,	back	to	the	Foreign	Office,	in	order	to	send	him	to	the	United	States	of	America	together	with	a	delegation	of	Danes	and	later	to	assist																																																									526	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	C.	L.	Paus.	10	May	1941.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	527	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Peter	Tennant.	22	Feb.	1941.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	528	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Peter	Tennant.	18	Apr.	1941.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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with	shoring	up	the	morale	of	the	Norwegian	Americans.	The	language	surrounding	Kenney’s	capabilities	is	astoundingly	glowing.	Kenney	is	described	as	“the	only	man	we	know	with	the	necessary	knowledge	and	experience	and	the	qualities	requisite	for	undertaking	such	an	investigation	for	us,”529	and	they	“know	of	no	one	else	who	would	be	so	capable	of	undertaking	this	task	as	Rowland	Kenney.”530	Furthermore,	the	letter	highlights	Kenney’s	close	connection	to	the	Norwegian	elite,	worth	citing	in	full:		 There	is	no	Norwegian	of	any	standing	with	whom	he	has	come	in	contact,	and	that	includes	a	very	large	number	of	them,	who	has	not	complete	confidence	in	him.	They	will,	as	the	saying	is,	‘do	anything	for	him’.	I	know	that	M.	Trygve	Lie,	the	Norwegian	Foreign	Minister,	has	not	only	complete	confidence	and	trust	in	Kenney,	but	holds	him	in	the	highest	esteem	and	regard.	We	should	certainly	get	Kenney	out	to	the	U.S.A.	immediately.531		Kenney	also	appealed	himself	to	Vansittart	to	be	released.532	Feeling	placed	under	the	thumb	of	superiors	without	sufficient	knowledge	about	propaganda,	he	was	desperate	to	be	of	use	somewhere	else.	His	escape	was	not	an	easy	one.	Kenney	rounded	up	a	small	group	of	allies,	including	Vansittart,	Collier,	Warner	and	Charles	Hambro	to	argue	his	case	to	the	Foreign	Office.533	The	Ministry,	however,	did	not	want	to	let	him	go.	“It	is	really	a	ridiculous	position:	I	am	absolutely	indispensable;	and	yet	regarded,	apparently,	and	treated,	with	contempt	by	a	drove	of	incompetents.”534		 His	reports	and	memoranda	to	his	superiors	during	this	period	begin	to	show	more	and	more	contempt.	In	what	might	have	been	a	calculated	effort	to	have	himself	ejected	from	the	Ministry,	Kenney	lamented	the	fact	that	his	salary	had	effectively	dropped	since	his	secondment	to	the	job.	He	still	received	a	base																																																									529	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	p.	1.	530	Ibid.	531	Ibid.,	p.	1-2.	532	Kenney.	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	27	May	1941.	533	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Charles	Hambro.	7	June	1941.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	534	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Sir	Robert	Vansittart.	14	June	1941.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	
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salary	of	£1,000	per	annum,	but	was	now	without	the	additional	income	he	had	enjoyed	previously	from	other	work	for	the	Foreign	Office	and	from	the	Empire	Parliamentary	Association.	He	therefore	requested	of	his	superiors	an	increase	in	salary	to	reflect	his	losses.535	His	request	was	vehemently	denied.	One	unattributed	phrase	gave	him	the	ammunition	he	may	have	been	seeking	for:	“Mr.	Kenney	is	not,	of	course,	even	graded	as	a	Head	of	Section…”536	In	a	particularly	bitter	reply	Kenney	suggested	“the	most	satisfactory	solution	of	our	problems	would	be	to	return	me	to	the	Foreign	Office.”537	And	in	the	context	of	the	Second	World	War,	Kenney’s	Rowland	Kenney	Papers	finishes	there,	with	no	indication	of	what	happened	further.		 The	British	National	Archives,	however,	sheds	valuable	light	on	the	situation.	It	does	appear	that	Kenney	made	every	effort	to	leave	the	Ministry,	and	it	was	his	old	friend	Collier	who	assisted	him.	Kenney	was	seconded	to	the	Norwegian	Government	in	the	position	of	Honorary	Adviser.538	The	arrangement	was	made	between	Collier	and	the	Norwegian	Government	and	included	the	provision	that	Kenney’s	salary	was	covered	by	the	Foreign	Office.539	Letters	surrounding	this	arrangement	point	to	the	Norwegian	Government	making	the	suggestion	and	asking	for	Kenney’s	services.540	As	referenced	above,	in	the	unsigned	letter,	the	Norwegian	elite	held	Kenney	in	high	regard.	The	Ministry,	somewhat	unwillingly,	let	Kenney	return	to	the	Foreign	Office,	citing	that	they	would	“be	sorry	to	see	him	go	because	he	has	done	good	work	here.”541	If	genuine,	it	is	highly	doubtful	that	the	feeling	was	mutual.	Kenney	left	the	Ministry	of	Information	on	the	20th	of	September	1941	and	began	working	for	
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the	Norwegian	Government	on	the	6th	of	October,	following	a	spell	of	influenza.542		 With	regard	to	what	Kenney	did	for	the	rest	of	the	war,	there	is	little	definite	indication.	There	are	only	two	mentions	in	the	archives	of	Kenney	between	the	autumn	of	1941	and	the	end	of	the	war.	The	first	is	in	a	letter	from	Collier	to	Anthony	Eden	in	1942.	Kenney	had	suggested	that	the	King	of	Norway	should	take	a	tour	of	military	and	industrial	locations	in	Britain.	The	plan	was	approved	and	a	tour	was	given,	with	Kenney	being	the	originator	of	the	idea.	Collier’s	letter	interestingly	points	out	that	this	was	“the	first	tour	of	its	kind	and	may	now	be	followed	by	similar	tours	undertaken	by	the	Heads	of	other	Allied	States.”543	The	tour	itinerary,	however,	shows	that	Kenney	was	not	present	and	did	not	take	part	in	the	tour.544	Nevertheless,	that	he	spawned	this	idea	of	foreign	heads	of	state	touring	Britain	to	boost	morale	is	yet	more	evidence	of	his	nous.	The	second	mention	arrives	in	1943,	in	connection	with	a	photograph	in	the	booklet	‘War	Pictures	by	British	Artists’	which	was	later	produced	as	a	postcard	with	the	title	changed.	In	a	letter	to	Christopher	Warner	of	the	Foreign	Office,	Kenney	criticised	the	postcard	title	as	being	offensive	to	the	Norwegians	and	advised	it	to	be	changed	from	‘Norwegian	Neutrality’	to	‘The	Norwegian	Coast’.545	Sir	Kenneth	Clark,	the	Director	of	the	National	Gallery,	subsequently	withdrew	the	postcards	from	sale.546	This,	of	course,	demonstrates	Kenney’s	attention	to	detail	and	his	ability	to	achieve	propaganda	objectives.	One	other	incident	from	this	period	is	known.	In	1942,	Kenney	was	awarded	the	rank	of	Knight,	First	Class,	of	the	Order	of	St.	Olav.547	The	Norwegian	Royal	House	is	unable	to	give	any	details	as	to	the	reasoning	for	awarding	the	distinction,																																																									542	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Christopher	Warner.	15	Oct.	1941.	TNA:	FO	371/29452,	N	6020.	543	Collier,	Laurence.	Letter	to	Sir	Anthony	Eden.	16	Apr.	1942.	TNA:	FO	371/32844,	N	2013.	p.	1.	544	Tour	Itinerary.	TNA:	FO	371/32844,	N	2013.	545	Kenney,	Rowland.	Letter	to	Christopher	Warner.	4	Jan.	1943.	TNA:	FO	371/36886	N	98.	546	Rabagliati.	Letter	to	Christopher	Warner.	11	Jan.	1943.	TNA:	FO	371/36886	N	98.	547	Tverli,	Mette.	Britisk	hemmelig	agent	og	St	Olavs	Orden.	Message	to	Paul	M	H	Buvarp.	20	Feb.	2014.	E-Mail.		
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though	from	the	vantage	point	of	the	considered	story	it	seems	a	reasonable	award	nonetheless.		 To	explain	the	apparent	silence	from	Kenney	for	the	rest	of	the	war	one	must	forfeit	to	speculation,	though	obviously	not	without	fairly	reliable	indications.	That	the	appointment	to	the	Norwegian	Government	occurred	in	the	immediate	wake	of	the	suggestions	that	Kenney	accompany	Scandinavian	delegations	to	the	United	States	of	America	may	bear	significance.	The	theory	that	Kenney	spent	some	time	overseas	is	also	strengthened	by	an	index	listing	in	the	British	National	Archives	of	a	‘1942	Proposed	lecture	tour	of	Canada	&	US:	N5312/5312/30’.	The	document	referenced	is	unfortunately	lost,	but	it	does	seemingly	supplement	the	idea	of	Kenney	departing	for	the	United	States.	Together	with	the	departure	of	the	delegations	and	the	fact	that	Kenney	would	turn	sixty	years	old	in	1942,	this	seems	to	be	the	most	sure	bet.			PERSONS	OF	INTEREST		As	with	Chapter	IV,	it	is	useful	to	take	a	quick	look	at	the	people	close	to	Kenney	in	this	period.	Kenney	did	not	act	alone,	and	cataloguing	a	few	of	those	around	him	serves	to	not	only	contextualise	his	work	but	also	his	influence	and	stature.	While	there	are,	obviously,	a	large	number	of	persons	who	could	be	included	here,	only	a	few	have	been	selected	as	examples.	These	give	a	clear	indication	of	the	elevation	of	Kenney’s	professional	circles.	Colonel	Charles	Bridge	was	Kenney’s	superior	at	the	very	start	of	the	war.	He	was	appointed	first	Secretary-General	of	the	British	Council	in	1934	and	it	is	highly	likely	that	Kenney	knew	him	from	this	period.548	With	the	creation	of	the	Ministry	of	Information	at	the	breakout	of	war,	Colonel	Bridge	was	taken	in	from	
																																																								548	Fisher,	Ali.	A	story	of	engagement:	the	British	Council	1934-2009.	The	British	Council.	https://britishcouncilschool.es/sites/default/files/u11/a_short_history_of_the_british_council_2009.pdf.	Accessed	23	Aug.	2015.	p.	19;	Swann,	Paul.	The	British	
Documentary	Film	Movement,	1926-1946.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1989.	p.	131.	
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the	British	Council	to	be	Deputy	Director	of	the	Foreign	Publicity	Department.549	It	also	appears	like	he	shortly	thereafter	departed	the	propaganda	field,	returned	to	military	duties,	and	became	the	Military	Attaché	to	Rome.550	Little	information	remains	about	this	elusive	figure,	who	was	undeniably	a	centrepiece	of	British	cultural	and	political	propaganda	for	a	considerable	period	of	time.	Much	more	is	known	about	the	man	who	replaced	him:	Edward	Hallett	Carr.	Carr	was	drafted	to	the	Foreign	Office	as	a	Clerk	in	the	summer	of	1916.	He	was	soon	transferred	to	the	Northern	department	until	he,	in	1936,	left	the	Foreign	Office	entirely.	Tensions	surrounding	the	issue	of	appeasement	had	put	him	at	odds	with	Vansittart,	which	may	have	had	some	impact	on	the	appointment	of	Kenney	to	Oslo	in	1939.551	Though	Carr	resigned	from	the	Foreign	Office,	he	still	held	a	firm	position	as	a	great	thinker	of	International	Politics,	“regarded	as	one	of	the	brightest	of	his	generation.”552	Carr	re-joined	the	Foreign	Office	in	1939,	and	was	quickly	taken	up	by	the	Ministry	of	Information,	serving	under	Col.	Bridge	in	the	Foreign	Publicity	Department.	Once	Col.	Bridge	left	the	job	in	October	of	1939,	Carr	became	the	Department’s	Director,	being	Kenney’s	direct	superior	throughout	most	of	his	stay	in	Norway.	It	was	to	be	a	short	tenure,	however,	and	Carr	left	the	Ministry	of	Information	on	the	29th	of	March	1940.553	During	his	time	as	head	of	the	Foreign	Publicity	Department,	Carr	faced	a	highly	restrictive	budget	and	appointment	policy,	so	he	reportedly	“sacked	those	he	did	not	want	in	order	to	recruit	those	he	did.”554	Carr’s	letter	of	apology	to	Kenney	denotes	a	definitive	respect	and	admiration	for	the	man.	Carr,	being	arguably	a	giant	of	International	Relations	theory,	valued	Kenney	highly.	A	constant	figure	in	the	later	documents	of	the	Rowland	Kenney	Papers,	Sir	Robert	Vansittart,	of	course,	needs	no	introduction.	Like	Carr,	he	is	a	giant	in	diplomatic	history,	and	even	had	an	entire	special	issue	of	the	journal	Diplomacy																																																									549	Cole,	Robert.	‘The	Other	‘Phoney	War’:	British	Propaganda	in	Neutral	Europe,	September-December	1939.	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	vol.	22,	no.	3.	Sage	Publications,	1987.	pp.	455-479.	p.	458.	550	Donaldson.	The	British	Council.	p.	82.	551	Haslam,	Johnathan.	The	Vices	of	Integrity:	E.H.	Carr,	1892-1982.	London:	Verso,	1999.	p.	17.	552	Ibid.,	p.	58.	553	Ibid.	554	Ibid.,	p.	82.	
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&	Statecraft	devoted	to	him.555	Between	1930	and	1938,	Vansittart	was	the	Permanent	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	Foreign	Affairs.	He	was	a	staunch	and	vocal	opponent	of	appeasement,	gaining	a	reputation	as	a	hard	and	nearly	prescient	diplomat.	In	1938,	he	became	Chief	Diplomatic	Advisor	to	the	Foreign	Secretary,	a	largely	honorific	post	he	departed	from	in	1941.556	Vansittart	was	evidently	a	close	ally	to	Kenney	and	took	Kenney’s	side	in	internal	matters	without	fail.		Closely	related	to	Vansittart	politically	were	two	more	of	Kenney’s	confidantes:	Reginald	‘Rex’	Leeper557	and	Laurence	Collier.	Leeper	had	been	in	the	Foreign	Office	since	1918,	with	a	short	stint	in	the	Political	Intelligence	Department,	where	he	may	have	run	into	Kenney.	He	remained	in	the	Foreign	Office	in	various	capacities	for	the	duration	of	his	professional	life,	and	was,	together	with	Kenney,	responsible	for	the	foundation	of	the	British	Council	(see	Chapter	VI).558	Leeper	also	revived	the	Political	Intelligence	Department	in	1938,	headed	the	propaganda	division	of	the	Special	Operations	Executive	in	1940	and	was	director	at	the	Political	Warfare	Executive	between	1941	and	1943.	Leeper	was	a	talented	and	entrepreneurial	propagandist.559	Laurence	Collier	was	a	veteran	of	the	Foreign	Office,	having	served	in	the	Northern	Department	between	1926	and	1941.	For	the	final	eight	years	of	this	period,	Collier	was	head	of	the	Northern	Section.	During	the	Second	World	War,	he	was	appointed	first	as	envoy	(May	1941)	and	then	ambassador	(May	1942)	to	Norway,	an	office	he	held	until	he	retired	in	1951.	Collier	had	been	a	divisive	figure	in	the	Foreign	Office,	“his	assignment	reflected	not	only	his	ability	but	the	fact	that	some	of	his	colleagues	preferred	him	to	be	in	a	section	away	from	the	mainstream	of																																																									555	Special	Issue:	Robert	Vansittart	and	an	Unbrave	World,	1930-37.	Diplomacy	&	
Statecraft.	Vol.	6,	No.	1.	Routledge,	1995.		556	Rose,	Norman.	‘Vansittart,	Robert	Gilbert,	Baron	Vansittart	(1881-1957)’.	
Oxford	Dictionary	of	National	Biography.	Oxford	University	Press,	2004:	online	ed.	Jan.	2011.	http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36630.	2	Aug.	2015;	Lundy,	Darrel.	‘Person	Page	–	13177’.	The	Peerage.	30	July	2015.	http://thepeerage.com/p13177.htm#i131768.	31	July	2015.	557	Donaldson.	The	British	Council.	p.	17.	558	Kenney,	Rowland.	Memorandum	to	Laurence	Collier.	18	Sep.	1945.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers.	559	Drinkwater,	Derek.	‘Leeper,	Sir	Reginald	Wildig	Allen	(1888-1968)’.	Oxford	
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affairs.”560	Vansittart,	Leeper	and	Collier	represented	a	small	but	vocal	faction	of	the	Foreign	Office	cautioning	against	appeasement.	The	fact	that	all	three	feature	heavily	in	both	the	official	and	personal	correspondence	with	Kenney,	indicates	that	Kenney	may	have	been	part	of	this	clique.	Finally,	Francis	‘Frank’	Foley	was	one	of	the	period’s	most	successful	intelligence	agents.	He	had	been	an	agent	for	the	Secret	Intelligence	Service	since	the	end	of	the	First	World	War	and	was	the	head	of	station	in	Berlin	for	the	entire	duration	of	the	interwar	period.	When	the	Second	World	War	broke	out,	he	left	to	Oslo	in	order	to	keep	a	hold	on	his	German	agents.	Upon	the	invasion	of	Norway,	Foley	is	said	to	have	been	the	only	link	between	London	and	the	Norwegian	command,	a	link	Kenney	may	be	said	to	have	been	an	integral	part	of	as	well.	Kenney’s	close	cooperation	with	this	legend	of	British	intelligence	is	remarkable	in	and	of	itself.561						DEVELOPING	PRACTICES	OF	PROPAGANDA		The	Second	World	War	represents	a	period	of	remarkable	development	in	the	field	of	propaganda.	Kenney’s	multitude	of	positions	and	posts,	especially	his	post	as	director	of	the	Northern	Section,	gave	him	a	perfect	vantage	point	from	which	not	only	to	observe	these	developments,	but	also	take	part	in	their	creation.	New	communication	technologies,	new	geopolitical	realities	and	ways	of	thinking	about	public	information	both	abetted	and	necessitated	the	evolution	of	propaganda	into	the	modern,	atomic	era.	Particularly,	propaganda	had	become	more	centralised	and	bureaucratised,	becoming	more	in	tune	with	central	wartime	policy.	This	carried	with	it	a	new	respect	for	the	practice	of	propaganda	as	well	as	the	experts	who	worked	in	the	field.	Another	particular																																																									560	Goldstein.	‘Collier,	Sir	Laurence‘.	561	Smith,	Michael.	Foley,	Francis	Edward	(1884-1958).	Oxford	Dictionary	of	
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development	was	the	creeping	of	propaganda	into	various	other	wartime	practices;	it	began	to	become	a	less	distinct	weapon,	absorbed	into	the	work	of	other	departments	and	institutions.	And	finally,	the	Second	World	War,	with	its	stunning	technological	innovations,	provided	the	field	of	propaganda	with	new	and	highly	effective	communication	and	dissemination	methods.		 The	creation	of	the	Ministry	of	Information	at	the	start	of	the	war	(explained	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	V)	illustrates	the	extent	to	which	the	importance	of	propaganda	had	been	recognised.	As	discussed,	the	Ministry	had	been	conceived	of	before	the	war	and	represented	a	return	to	the	busy	machinery	of	the	last	years	of	the	First	World	War.562	The	effect	was	a	centralised	institution	(at	least	in	theory),	which	established	a	clear-cut	and	bureaucratic	system	of	propaganda.	This	is	perhaps	the	most	practical	way	of	describing	the	development	of	an	institutionalised	system.		 The	British	Council	is	a	case	in	point.	In	a	broad	definition	of	propaganda	work	(see	Chapter	II),	the	British	Council	can	be	said	to	be	a	propaganda	organisation.	It	was	engaged,	before	the	war,	in	a	series	of	tasks	ranging	from	pure	cultural	propaganda	to	education	and	cultural	exchange.563	In	anticipation	of	war,	with	the	premeditative	organisation	of	the	Ministry	of	Information,	there	were	lengthy	discussions	about	absorbing	the	British	Council	into	the	Ministry	in	war.	The	first	agreement	reached,	in	February	1939,	was	that	the	British	Council	should	indeed	be	totally	swallowed	up	by	the	Ministry	in	the	event	of	war,	with	the	Ministry	assuming	“all	its	functions	and	responsibility	for	the	salaries	of	such	staff	as	had	contractual	rights	until	these	expired”.564	This	was	problematic	for	some	senior	officials	of	the	Council,	since	it	created	the	impression	that	the	Council	was	de	facto	a	propaganda	institution,	an	impression	that	had	to	be	fought	at	least	in	theory,	if	not	in	practice.	The	argument	was	raised	that	the	British	Council	would	do	much	better	work	if	it	remained	under	the	auspices	of	the	Foreign	Office.	What	followed	was	a	drawn-out	debate																																																									562	Taylor.	If	War	Should	Come;	McLaine,	Ian.	Ministry	of	Morale:	Home	Front	
Morale	and	the	Ministry	of	Information	in	World	War	II.	London:	George	Allen	&	Unwin,	1979.	563	Donaldson,	Frances.	The	British	Council:	The	First	Fifty	Years.	London:	Jonathan	Cape,	1984.	564	Ibid.,	p.	69.		
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between	several	interests	within	the	sphere	of	British	propaganda.	The	original	proposal	was	put	down,	replaced	instead	by	a	solution	of	combination.	The	Ministry	of	Information	agreed	that	insofar	as	the	British	Council	engaged	in	cultural	and	educational	work,	it	was	outside	of	the	expertise	of	the	Ministry	and	should	continue	these	tasks	undisturbed.	However,	any	activity	concerning	true	propaganda,	including	all	work	concerning	film,	would	have	to	be	previously	approved	by	the	Ministry,	and	a	liaison	position	was	created	for	this	to	work.565	This	clearly	demonstrates	the	careful	consideration	given	to	centralising	propaganda	efforts	and	the	consolidation	of	a	true	system	of	propaganda.	However,	it	also	points	out	the	new	concept	of	propaganda	seeping	into	other	state	practices.	The	spread	of	propaganda	practices	into	other	institutions	is	an	interesting	point	to	investigate.	If	the	reader	recalls	the	decentralised	structure	of	propaganda	practiced	in	the	First	World	War,	by	such	wide	and	varied	bodies	as	Wellington	House,	the	Foreign	Office	and	the	Ministry	of	Information,	as	well	as	bodies	of	censorship	for	example,	then	this	argument	may	sound	like	a	regression	into	a	similar	system	and	not	a	development	at	all.	But	this	is	not	so.	The	First	World	War	had	considered	propaganda	a	valuable	weapon,	but	had	different	departments	working	on	the	same	task,	often	without	much	coordination.	The	system	arising	now	did	have	centralised	structures	for	management,	structures	well	guarded	and	considered.	But	also	in	recognising	the	importance	of	propaganda,	it	acknowledged	its	utility	in	nearly	any	public	relations	respect.	The	fact	then,	that	many	different	institutions	began	taking	part	in	the	broad	practice,	meant	that	there	existed	a	view	that	propaganda	did	not	need	to	solely	be	used	as	a	distinct	weapon,	but	also	as	an	enhancement	for	other	weapons	and	functions	of	the	state.	At	the	very	beginning	of	the	war,	for	example,	the	Special	Operations	Executive	also	began	propaganda	work	as	a	corollary	to	their	sabotage	and	military	activities.	Many	overlapping	departments	did	the	same,	such	as	the	British	Council	and	its	soft	propaganda	
																																																								565	A	full	account	of	the	debate	and	surrounding	the	British	Council	and	the	Ministry	of	Information	can	be	found	in	Donaldson’s	book,	chapter	5:	Donaldson.	
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	 183	
work566,	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Warfare,	the	Political	Intelligence	Department	and	the	Foreign	Office.567	Propaganda	became	less	a	consequence	of	function	and	more	a	function	in	itself.		 Finally,	the	practice	of	propaganda	became	more	focused	and	more	efficient	with	the	adoption	of	new	communications	technologies.	As	already	mentioned,	the	British	Council	engaged	in	film	work,	which	were	doubtless	propagandistic	in	nature,	and	this	work	was	regarded	as	so	effective,	that	it	was	one	of	the	main	conditions	for	the	Council’s	cooperation	with	the	Ministry	of	Information	during	the	war.	Indeed,	film	and	radio	had	become	highly	valued	media	for	propaganda	dissemination	before	and	during	the	Second	World	War.568	Especially	film	was	novel	and	effective:	“As	a	communications	medium	film	reached	its	peak	during	the	second	world	war.”569	The	adaptation	of	new	technologies	in	propaganda	certainly	speaks	to	the	development	of	techniques	and	systems.		Kenney	must	have	been	aware	of	the	extent	to	which	the	practice	and	theory	of	propaganda	had	shifted	since	his	work	began	in	1916.	The	institutionalisation	and	bureaucratisation	of	propaganda	was	evident	in	the	establishment	of	the	Ministry	of	Information,	as	well	as	other,	more	specialised	organisations	like	the	British	Council,	events	which	he	had	witnessed	and	taken	part	in,	first	hand.	This	bureaucratic	centralisation	also	betrayed	a	paradoxical	decentralisation	of	the	concept	of	soft	propaganda,	of	which	Kenney	had	intimate	understanding,	especially	considering	the	wide	range	of	roles	and	positions	Kenney	occupied.	Had	propaganda	been	absolutely	centralised,	a	man	of	Kenney’s	abilities	would	have	remained	at	the	Ministry	of	Information																																																									566	Donaldson.	The	British	Council.	567	Cruickshank,	Charles.	The	Fourth	Arm:	Psychological	Warfare	1938-1945.	London:	Davis-Poynter,	1977.	568	An	overview	of	the	development	of	British	propaganda,	including	radio	and	film	propaganda	in	the	interwar	period	can	be	found	in	Philip	M.	Taylor’s	chapter	in	Film	&	Radio	Propaganda	in	World	War	II.	Taylor,	Philip	M.	Propaganda	in	International	Politics,	1919-1939.	Film	and	Radio	Propaganda	in	
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throughout	the	war.	His	movements	between	the	Foreign	Office	and	the	Ministry,	as	well	as	his	roles	within	the	British	Council,	in	institutions	concerned	with	film	propaganda,	as	well	as	his	embedding	with	the	Norwegian	government	clearly	illustrates	the	absorption	of	principles	and	practices	of	propaganda	in	a	wide	range	of	official	institutions.	Finally,	his	concern	before	the	war	with	the	establishment	of	a	National	Films	Council	or	Unit570,	as	well	as	his	work	with	the	BBC	broadcasts	during	the	war	show	him	present	at	the	cutting	edge	of	technological	innovation.	Kenney	was	not	only	a	highly	capable	propagandist,	but	he	embodied	the	very	evolution	of	propaganda	principles	and	techniques	from	1916	until	(at	the	very	least)	1942.		
v v v 	This	chapter	has	put	forth	the	most	complete	account	of	Kenney’s	Second	World	War	activities	available.	He	had	returned	to	Oslo	in	order	to	carry	out	the	same	kind	of	work	he	had	originally	begun	in	1916,	though	the	bureaucratic	machine	behind	him	was	not	at	all	the	same.	In	April	1940,	following	the	German	invasion	of	Norway,	Kenney	assisted	the	SIS	and	Frank	Foley	in	high-value	intelligence	work,	as	well	as	continuing	an	impressive	effort	to	maintain	and	coordinate	British	propaganda	in	Norway	under	nearly	impossible	conditions.	Upon	his	eventual	escape	back	to	Britain,	Kenney	was	eventually	given	the	post	of	director	of	the	Northern	Section	within	the	Ministry	of	Information,	a	position	finally	befitting	his	experience	and	expertise.	Continuously	disappointed	with	the	conditions	within	the	Ministry,	Kenney	was	finally	manoeuvred	back	into	the	Foreign	Office	and	seconded	as	an	advisor	to	the	Norwegian	government.	During	this	meandering	professional	period,	Kenney	was	in	close	contact	with	a	variety	of	more	or	less	revered	political	operatives,	indicating	his	own	position	within	a	quickly	evolving	system.	In	fact,	Kenney’s	work	and	his	network	make	him	an	undeniable	central	character	in	the	evolution	of	the	institution	of	British	propaganda	specifically,	and	the	development	of	principles	and	practices	of	propaganda	generally.																																																									570	Referenced	in	Chapter	V;	Kenney,	Rowland.	Summary	of	Memorandum	on	
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	 Without	sanctifying	the	character	too	much,	it	remains	clear	that	Kenney	was	undoubtedly	an	influential	man,	despite	being	waylaid	by	most,	if	not	all,	of	documented	history.	The	point	of	the	thesis	is	of	course	to	demonstrate	his	role	in	the	creation	of	lasting	propaganda	systems.	In	this	respect,	legacy	becomes	an	important	form	of	argument.	The	next	chapter,	therefore,	examines	further	the	evolution	and	development	of	propaganda	as	a	state	practice	after	the	Second	World	War	in	order	to	show	Kenney’s	lasting,	though	forgotten,	effect	on	the	usage	of	information	and	propaganda	as	a	political	tool.	
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CHAPTER	VIII	
LEGACY		 …much	of	what	I	have	to	say	is	nowadays	banal	and	much	of	it	already	covered	by	the	present	directives.571			The	thesis	began	by	exploring	the	history	and	concept	of	propaganda.	The	roots	of	the	practice	can	arguably	be	traced	back	further	and	further	as	the	definition	of	the	word	becomes	broader,	but	a	general	starting-point	for	organised,	proto-modern	propaganda	could	be	pinned	to	the	Catholic	Church	and	its	rapid	expansion	in	the	eleventh	century.	The	printing	press	is	also	a	major	event	in	the	history	of	propaganda,	enabling	a	uniform	distribution	of	material	to	the	masses.	Not	to	be	underestimated,	propaganda,	in	some	form	or	another,	has	played	a	role	in	virtually	all	conflicts	throughout	history,	but	it	was	at	the	turn	of	the	nineteenth	century	that	modern	propaganda	was	finally	developed	and	used.		 Defining	the	concept	is	a	surprisingly	difficult	task.	Nearly	every	academic	foray	into	the	subject	contains	a	discussion—and	more	often	than	not																																																									571	Kenney,	Rowland.	Memorandum	to	Laurence	Collier.	18	Sep.	1945.	Rowland	Kenney	Papers,	p.	1.	
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a	proposal—of	definition,	usually	coloured	by	the	native	field	of	the	academic,	ranging	from	psychology	to	history	with	a	menagerie	of	subjects	in	between.	Propaganda	is	defined	in	this	thesis	as	a	set	of	techniques	employed	by	a	political	power	against	a	population	in	order	to	persuade	the	members	of	that	population	to	accept	or	internalise	specific	and	intended	ideas	as	truth.	The	definition	centres	on	the	concept	of	propaganda	as	technique,	but	cedes	also	certain	functional	characteristics:	that	it	is	a	political	action	from	a	political	source,	that	the	message	is	distributed	massively	but	received	individually,	and	that	it	seeks	to	ingrain	ideas	in	the	recipient	in	the	form	of	truths.	It	is	important	to	note	the	amorality,	or	moral	neutrality,	of	propaganda,	which	is	to	say	that	whether	or	not	propaganda	is	malicious,	this	rests	solely	on	the	intent	behind	the	message.	Propaganda	also	always	presents	itself	as	truth,	as	opposed	to	a	claim	or	an	argument,	and	historically	there	has	been	a	concerted	effort	to	only	partake	in	propaganda	that	is	factually	true,	though	it	may	omit	unwanted	truths.	The	practice	also	relies	on	the	mass	media	for	distribution,	demanding	some	sort	of	control	of	the	media.	This	is	effective	because	it	encases	the	propagandistic	message	in	a	format	that	is	often	sought	out	willingly	by	the	masses.	Finally,	propaganda	works	primarily	by	proxy,	not	seeking	to	directly	implant	an	idea	or	a	fact	into	the	mind	of	a	recipient,	but	rather	sowing	the	seeds	which	then	grow	into	a	complete	ideology.		 The	First	World	War	was	a	‘first’	in	many	respects,	not	least	in	the	unprecedented	use	of	propaganda	techniques.	Great	Britain	was	keen	to	maintain	its	position	as	a	leading	nation	in	the	world,	and	to	achieve	this	aim	it	was	desirable	to	sway	neutral	parties	over	to	the	British	side,	in	turn	creating	great	incentive	for	the	use	of	propaganda.	Assisting	in	this	endeavour	were	the	British	media,	who	had,	on	many	levels,	close	ties	with	the	government	and	its	institutions.	Especially	relevant	in	the	context	of	the	thesis,	the	enmeshment	of	the	news	agencies	with	their	governments—Reuters	in	the	case	of	Britain—was	a	very	useful	one.	It	is	undeniable	that	Reuters	had	a	political	agenda	at	the	start	of	the	war.	This	was	only	strengthened	by	its	restructuring	in	1916,	which	brought	the	firm	squarely	under	the	influence	of	the	Foreign	Office	giving	it	veto	power	in	Reuters	on	several	issues,	most	tellingly	on	issues	of	public	policy.	The	close	cooperation	between	the	agency	and	the	official	propaganda	machinery	
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was	not	diminished	by	the	fact	that	the	agency	director,	Roderick	Jones,	also	took	a	position	in	the	Department	and	later	Ministry	of	Information	as	the	head	of	the	section	responsible	for	cable	and	wireless	propaganda.		 The	Department	of	Information	rose	out	of	the	need	to	streamline	a	mesh	of	different	propaganda	bureaus	operating	within	different	departments	of	the	British	government.	For	the	first	two	years	of	the	war,	propaganda	was	handled	by	the	War	Propaganda	Bureau,	the	Foreign	Office	News	Department,	the	Press	Bureau,	the	censorship	office	of	the	Admiralty	and	of	the	War	Office,	and	the	Home	Office	Neutral	Press	Committee,	to	only	name	a	few.	The	Foreign	Office	believed	the	structure	of	the	machinery	would	function	best	were	it	organised	under	their	department.	When	Lloyd	George	became	Prime	Minister	at	the	close	of	1916,	he	immediately	seized	upon	the	lateral	structure	of	the	propaganda	departments,	and	decided	to	create	a	centralised	department	housed	within	the	Foreign	Office.	This	new	Department	of	Information	absorbed	the	existing	departments	and	reorganised	the	entire	process	of	policy,	creation	and	dissemination.	The	Department	remained	inadequately	powerful	within	the	government,	and	by	January	1918,	the	decision	was	made	to	create	in	its	place	a	Ministry	of	Information.	Continual	struggles	for	policy-control	between	the	Ministry,	the	military	offices	and	the	Foreign	Office	created	turmoil,	and	while	the	machinery	of	propaganda	functioned	much	more	smoothly	by	the	end	of	the	war,	there	was	certainly	evidence	of	political	rifts.		 The	Norwegian	position	before	and	during	the	war	informed	its	relationship	to	the	warring	parties	considerably.	Norway	had	a	long	history	of	mercantilism,	operating	the	fourth	largest	merchant	fleet	in	the	world	during	the	First	World	War,	a	fleet	which	was	a	great	wartime	economic	asset.	This	position	of	trade	also	left	Norway	underprotected	in	terms	of	military	power,	as	it	relied	on	its	economic	partners—primarily	Great	Britain—to	come	to	its	rescue	were	anything	to	happen.	Norway	was	a	very	young	country	by	the	start	of	the	war,	together	with	Denmark	and	Sweden,	it	struck	a	neutral	line	which	would	remain	officially	in	place	until	the	end	of	the	war.	The	agreed	neutrality	was	a	way	to	ensure	that	the	Scandinavian	countries—with	differing,	and	in	some	cases	contradictory	positions	towards	the	warring	parties—would	not	fight	between	themselves.	
	 189	
	 Norway	had	a	long	and	rich	history	of	both	cultural	and	economic	ties	to	Great	Britain,	and	naturally	tended	towards	Britain	in	the	war.	The	newly	elected	Norwegian	royal	house	had	strong	connections	to	the	British,	but	perhaps	more	significantly,	trade	involving	Norwegian	ships	was	highly	concentrated	towards	Britain	and	the	United	States.	Norwegian	exports	also	favoured	Britain	over	Germany,	and	imports	vice	versa,	though	the	figures	were	here	closer	to	each	other,	indicating	a	strong	dependence	both	on	the	British	and	German	markets	and	thus	reinforcing	the	need	to	remain	neutral,	guaranteeing	continued	economic	growth	in	a	period	of	intense	industrialisation.	While	leaning	closer	to	Britain	than	to	Germany,	the	official	position	of	neutrality	was	a	pragmatic	one,	made	on	the	basis	of	arguments	of	both	security	and	trade.		 Norway’s	significance	to	the	warring	parties	had	a	lot	to	do	with	the	usefulness	of	its	merchant	fleet	and	its	trade-networks.	However,	geopolitical	concerns	were	also	of	importance	to	war	strategists.	Access	to	the	Baltic	Sea	was	a	potentially	crucial	advantage	in	the	event	of	a	major	European	war,	and	naval	strategists	were	more	than	aware	that	this	access	could	be	restricted	either	by	the	Scandinavian	countries	themselves,	or	by	the	control	of	these	countries	from	some	outside	force.	Controlling	the	Norwegian	coastline,	or	establishing	bases	there,	would	afford	very	useful	points	of	access	both	to	the	Baltic	Sea	and	to	the	Atlantic	and	was	considered	a	possible	scenario	demanding	counter-planning	and	stern	consideration.				 Rowland	Kenney	joined	the	war-effort	in	1916.	He	had	for	quite	some	time	worked	as	a	journalist	and	then	an	editor	for	various	radical-leftist	publications	and	had	strong	ties	to	the	unions.	It	was	his	connections	with	the	unions	that	brought	him	to	the	attentions	of	the	Foreign	Office.	The	Foreign	Office	News	Department	had	for	a	while	been	considering	the	situation	in	Norway	from	afar,	and	concluded	it	would	be	wise	to	send	an	agent	there	to	observe	and	report	on	the	steps	they	could	take	to	ensure	Norwegian	support.	Kenney	was	subsequently	sent	in	August	1916	and	reported	on	what	he	thought	were	the	necessary	actions	to	be	taken:	distributing	news-propaganda	countering	German	charges,	connecting	the	British	and	Norwegian	press,	and	repurposing	the	Norwegian	national	news	agency.	
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	 Kenney	obtained	a	cover	as	a	Reuters	correspondent	in	the	Norwegian	capital	and	began	to	deal	with	the	issues	he	himself	had	raised.	Primarily,	he	monitored	the	Norwegian	press,	reporting	back	to	the	News	Department	with	various	developments,	reactions	and	suggestions.	He	also	began	to	gather	a	network	of	Norwegian	journalists	and	editors	in	order	to	spread	pro-British	articles	in	the	Norwegian	press.	It	was	clear	he	was	ambitious,	suggesting	some	Norwegian	journalists	be	blacklisted	from	publishing	in	British	newspapers	and	even	going	so	far	as	to	suggest	there	was	a	chance	to	depose	the	Norwegian	Foreign	Minister	who	had	a	tendency	to	appear	anti-British.	It	quickly	became	clear	that	Kenney	was	the	point-man	in	Norway,	not	just	for	the	distribution	of	propaganda	material,	but	also	for	the	creation	and	execution	of	British	propaganda	policy.	By	the	end	of	the	war	it	can	be	estimated	that	Kenney	was	responsible	for	over	3000	articles	appearing	in	the	Norwegian	print-media.	Throughout	the	war,	Kenney’s	success	in	Norway	became	evident	not	only	to	himself,	but	also	his	superiors	in	the	Department	and	Ministry	of	Information,	and	his	areas	of	responsibility	were	constantly	widening.	Kenney	always	seemed	to	maintain	a	not	insignificant	level	of	autonomy.		 Perhaps	the	most	impactful	example	of	Kenney’s	efficiency	is	his	role	in	the	NTB-Reuters	affair.	Kenney	had	noted	from	the	start	that	the	Norwegian	national	news	agency,	NTB,	should	unequivocally	be	dismantled	and	replaced	by	an	agency	more	suited	to	British	propaganda	dissemination.	The	Norwegian	agency	had	since	its	creation	been	under	the	influence	of	the	German	bureau,	making	it	a	dangerous	source	of	German	propaganda,	and	it	had	also	become	near	farcical	in	its	inefficiency.	Kenney,	perfectly	placed	at	the	intersection	between	Reuters,	the	Foreign	Office	and	the	Norwegian	press	elite	began	working	together	with	influential	Norwegian	personalities	to	create	a	new	agency	which	could	replace	or	swallow	up	NTB.	Kenney	essentially	worked	behind	the	scenes	to	orchestrate	the	negotiation	of	a	contract	between	the	potential	new	bureau	and	Reuters,	and	making	sure	this	contract	would	fall	into	the	hands	of	the	suitable	people	who	in	turn	could	fight	out	the	old	agency.	A	series	of	events	which	could	have	been	catastrophic	to	the	scheme	were	deftly	navigated	by	Kenney’s	handling	of	his	Norwegian	contacts,	resulting	in	the	new	agency	being	established	and	purchasing	NTB.	While	it	is	difficult	to	ascertain	to	
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what	extent	Kenney	had	initiated	the	entire	affair,	it	is	clear	he	played	a	crucial	role	in	its	successful	execution.	At	the	completion	of	Kenney’s	stay	in	Norway	in	the	First	World	War,	he	had	accomplished	a	great	deal,	establishing	a	system	of	information	control	and	dissemination	that	served	British	interests.	His	contacts	both	in	Norway	and	in	Britain	demonstrate	his	position	in	a	network	of	highly	successful	propagandists	and	politicians.	His	accomplishments	demonstrate	his	ability	to	affect	policy.		 After	the	First	World	War,	Kenney	returned	to	the	Foreign	Office	and	was	asked	to	travel	to	Poland	to	engage	in	preparations	and	planning	for	the	Peace	Conference.	Kenney	was	slated	to	begin	working	for	the	new	Political	Intelligence	Department,	but	fell	victim	to	an	airplane	crash	which	left	him	hospitalised	and	in	poor	condition	for	a	long	period	of	time.	Finally	joining	the	PID	in	1920,	Kenney	became	a	member	of	a	highly	regarded,	though	short-lived	organisation	and	doubtless	made	friends	with	an	assortment	of	highly	influential	people	who	would,	many	of	them,	become	his	professional	allies.	With	the	dissolution	of	the	PID,	Kenney	returned	to	the	News	Department,	where	he	worked	on	a	variety	of	tasks	he	has	characterised	as	propaganda	under	a	different	name.	Particularly	interesting	from	this	period	is	Kenney’s	role	in	the	establishment	of	the	British	Council.	In	the	News	Department,	Kenney	worked	in	a	tiny	section	dedicated	to	British	publicity	abroad.	While	the	concept	of	propaganda	had	been	sullied	after	the	war,	Kenney	found	that	referring	to	the	work	as	‘cultural’	in	nature	was	beneficial	in	order	to	garner	support.	Working	with	a	shoestring	budget,	he	nonetheless	managed	to	eke	out	impressive	results	which	soon	caught	the	attention	of	Rex	Leeper,	second	in	command	at	the	News	Department.	Leeper	determined	to	lift	up	the	section	and	eventually	consolidated	it	into	what	became	the	British	Council.	Kenney	always	maintained	that	the	British	Council	was	a	propagandistic	tool.	Nonetheless,	Kenney	remained	a	fairly	nondescript	character	in	the	Foreign	Office,	never	truly	climbing	the	ranks	as	might	have	been	expected.	Partly	due	to	his	fairly	extreme	political	views,	his	lower-class	background	and	the	debilitating	airplane	crash,	he	remained	a	somewhat	low-ranked	civil	servant	throughout	the	interwar	period.	
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	 As	it	began	to	become	clear	that	a	new	European	war	would	soon	be	unavoidable,	it	also	appeared	that	Britain	was	largely	unprepared	for	the	event.	The	position	of	Britain	in	the	global	system	had	gradually	weakened,	and	the	country	was	overstretched	in	its	commitments,	eager	to	keep	at	least	a	foothold	in	several	rapidly	diminishing	spheres.	The	policy	of	appeasement	towards	Germany	had	also	resulted	in	war	preparations	being	neglected.	Nonetheless,	there	was	a	clear	understanding	that	drawing	the	support	of	neutral	countries	would	again	be	a	big	objective	for	Britain.	Propaganda,	being	a	very	suitable	method	of	garnering	this	support,	would	need	to	be	revitalised,	and	it	quickly	became	clear	that	a	return	to	the	late-First	World	War	rendition	of	the	Ministry	of	Information	was	preferred.	The	Ministry	was	by	no	account	a	great	success,	bureaucratically	bloated	and	stiffened	by	overeager	centralisation.		 During	the	interwar	period,	Norway	had	remained	relatively	closely	connected	with	Britain,	mainly	through	trade,	which	had	been	boosted	by	trade	agreements	made	in	1933.	However,	Norway	was	internally	more	proud	and	independent	than	some	British	policy	makers	anticipated,	which	led	to	a	misconception	that	Norway	would	not	need	much	attention	to	remain	in	the	British	sphere	of	influence.	With	war	on	the	horizon,	the	Northern	Department	of	the	Foreign	Office	became	concerned	that	Norway	might	feel	left	out	in	the	cold,	and	eventually	they	convinced	the	Foreign	Secretary	to	give	an	assurance	of	conditional	British	aid	were	Norway	to	be	attacked.	The	significance	of	Norway	rested	primarily	in	its	control	of	a	variety	of	important	wartime	natural	resources.	Maintaining	access	to	these	resources,	or	denying	access	to	them	for	the	enemy	was	a	good	military	strategy.	In	addition,	Norway	represented	easy	German	access	to	Sweden’s	iron	ore,	given	its	year-round	open	ports.	Using	Norway	as	a	trade	route	for	iron	ore	was	a	massively	significant	economic	objective	for	Germany,	and	losing	access	to	the	Norwegian	coastline	would	be	devastating.	Were	Norway	to	be	brought	into	the	war,	dropping	its	neutrality,	it	would	be	a	large	gain	in	terms	of	the	sea-corridor	offered,	the	trade	routes	controlled	and	the	natural	resources	claimed.	Norway	consequently	found	itself	in	a	precarious	position,	being	a	prized	target	for	the	warring	parties	and	unable	to	fully	trust	any	one	side.	
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	 Kenney’s	return	to	Norway	was	in	no	way	part	of	a	long-term	plan.	He	had,	in	a	letter	to	his	superiors	in	the	Foreign	Publicity	Department	of	the	Ministry	of	Information,	taken	a	tough	stance	on	what	he	felt	was	his	unjust	placement	in	the	lower	ranks,	and	had	snidely	remarked	that	if	nothing	was	forthcoming	in	terms	of	a	promotion,	then	he	could	just	as	well	be	sent	to	Norway	for	the	same	job	he	had	held	twenty	years	prior.	He	was	subsequently	sent	to	Norway,	though	not	without	a	series	of	complaints	being	made	by	himself	and	his	high-ranking	friends.	In	Norway,	he	began	the	propaganda	work	which	was	in	many	ways	similar	to	his	tasks	in	the	First	World	War,	though	the	Ministry	now	had	notably	more	control	over	their	agents.	Kenney	fought	against	the	bureaucratisation,	and	dictated	his	own	course	rather	than	listening	to	every	Ministry	directive	sent	his	way.	The	tone	between	Kenney	and	his	superiors	was	surprisingly	insubordinate	at	times.		 When	the	Germans	invaded	Norway	in	April	1940,	Kenney	was	forced	to	flee	Oslo	to	escape	capture.	Joining	a	small	party	including	the	famed	SIS	operative,	Frank	Foley,	he	made	his	way	to	Åndalsnes	on	the	Norwegian	coast,	where	a	temporary	safe-haven	was	in	place.	Working	together	with	Foley,	Kenney	began	to	get	involved	not	only	in	propaganda	but	also	in	true	intelligence	work,	becoming	a	link	in	the	only	chain	connecting	the	remaining	Norwegian	command	with	the	outside	world.	In	spite	of	the	chaos,	however,	he	also	managed	to	work	together	with	the	Norwegians	to	set	up	an	information	service	under	the	occupation.	One	of	the	Norwegians	he	came	into	contact	with	was	Lieutenant	Martin	Linge,	and	it	is	likely	that	Kenney	played	a	major	part	in	propelling	Linge	into	the	hero-status	he	would	occupy	not	a	year	later.	Kenney	managed	to	escape	from	Norway	by	ship	and	returned	to	the	Ministry	of	Information	to	see	what	could	be	done.		 After	a	brief	spell	of	being	sent	back	and	forth	between	the	Foreign	Office	and	the	Ministry,	Kenney	was	offered	the	position	of	Director	of	the	Northern	Section	of	the	Foreign	Division.	He	reluctantly	accepted	and	began	truly	shaping	policy.	Several	memoranda	from	this	period	reveal	Kenney’s	own	thoughts	on	propaganda	as	a	concept.	The	work	at	the	Northern	Section	was	of	a	very	heavy	load.	Extensive	reports	on	the	media	and	propaganda	situation	in	the	Scandinavian	countries	show	a	remarkable	depth	of	research.	By	the	autumn	of	
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1940,	Kenney’s	section	was	responsible	for	the	propaganda	work	in	nine	European	countries.	Kenney	began	to	work	closely	with	the	BBC’s	international	radio	broadcasts,	attending	weekly	meetings	and	liaising	between	the	BBC,	the	Ministry	of	Information	as	well	as	Norwegian	officials	in	London.	His	work	higher	up	in	the	bureaucracy	did	not	diminish,	however,	his	appreciation	for	on-the-ground	work;	he	led	a	large	group	of	international	journalists	on	a	tour	of	Kent	and	Sussex	to	demonstrate	the	lack	of	effect	of	the	German	bombing	raids,	for	example.	His	time	as	Director	would,	nonetheless,	be	short-lived.	He	appealed	constantly	for	additions	to	be	made	to	the	staff	in	order	to	address	the	insurmountable	amount	of	work	funnelled	into	his	section.	These	requests	were	delayed	if	not	outright	rejected,	though	Kenney	fought	hard	for	his	own.	His	disappointment	and	frustration	was,	by	the	summer	of	1941,	unbearable.	Through	some	manoeuvring	by	Kenney’s	old	friends,	Sir	Robert	Vansittart	and	Laurence	Collier,	as	well	as	Kenney	himself,	he	was	finally	pulled	from	the	Ministry	back	into	the	Foreign	Office	and	subsequently	seconded	as	Honorary	Adviser	to	the	Norwegian	Government.	Thus,	in	the	known	broad	strokes,	ended	Rowland	Kenney’s	career	in	the	field	of	propaganda.		 What	makes	Kenney	such	an	interesting	figure,	and	an	excellent	subject	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis—aside	from	his	meticulous	and	well-kept	collection—,	is	his	wide	range	of	held	positions,	his	long	service,	and	his	role	as	a	practitioner	within	the	field.	Kenney	was	present	at	the	very	beginning	of	the	development	of	truly	modern	state	propaganda,	and	followed	this	development	nearly	until	it	arrived	at	the	doors	of	the	Cold	War.	He	not	only	witnessed,	but	also	took	part	in	its	spread	from	newspaper	columns	and	pamphlets	to	cinema	screens	and	radio	waves.	He	not	only	distributed	material,	but	also	had	a	role	in	creating	policy.	He	offers	an	unparalleled,	personal	and	intimate	view	of	the	workings	of	propaganda	from	several	obscure	angles.		 	
v v v 	Having	accounted	in	detail	for	Rowland	Kenney’s	work	between	1916	and	1942,	the	thesis	has	outlined	a	specified	evolution	of	propaganda	as	a	technique	and	as	an	institution	during	this	period.	However,	the	true	test	of	Kenney’s	significance	
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to	the	development	of	these	tools	is	whether	the	echoes	of	his	contribution	can	be	heard	beyond	his	direct	involvement.	The	remainder	of	this	chapter	therefore	seeks	to	chart	the	progression	of	certain	aspects	of	propaganda	after	the	Second	World	War	and	then	trace	these	back	to	Kenney’s	work.	This	will	show	the	legacy	that	Kenney	left	behind	and	serve	as	the	central	argument	that	he	had	a	significant	effect	on	a	practice	that	continues	to	affect	the	relationships	both	within	and	between	states	to	this	day.	This	‘post-Kenney’	development,	however,	cannot	be	easily	attributed.	There	is	no	illusion	in	the	mind	of	this	author	that	any	one	propagandist	could	have	a	definitive	effect	on	propaganda,	as	it	is	such	a	complicated	and	multi-faceted	practice.	As	was	discussed	in	Chapter	II	cultural	and	ideological	context,	for	example,	is	naturally	a	sizeable	component	of	propaganda	development.	As	such,	with	the	emergence	of	the	ideological	battle	of	the	Cold	War,	classic,	dichotomising	propaganda	came	into	its	natural	element.	“This	was	a	war	on	the	mind,	a	contest	of	ideologies,	a	battle	of	nerves	which,	for	the	next	forty	years	or	so,	was	to	divide	the	planet	into	a	bi-polar	competition	that	was	characterized	more	by	a	war	of	words	and	the	threatened	use	of	nuclear	weapons	rather	than	their	actual	use.”572	In	essence,	propaganda	development	is	more	suitably	credited	to	a	great	number	of	elements,	from	cultural	changes	to	technological	advancement	to	policy	shifts.	Nevertheless,	the	thesis	maintains	that	Kenney’s	work	can	be	seen,	at	least	indirectly,	influencing	the	further	development	of	propaganda	and	information	control.	At	a	very	basic	level,	Kenney’s	involvement	in	the	NTB-affair	(discussed	in	Chapter	V)	as	well	as	his	work	in	establishing	the	British	Council	(detailed	in	Chapter	VI)	are	concrete	examples	of	his	legacy.	Both	of	these	institutions	exist	to	this	day.	NTB’s	early	ownership	and	its	ties	to	Reuters	and	Havas	played	no	small	part	in	shaping	its	evolution	from	1918	until	now.	The	case	of	the	British	Council	is	even	clearer.	Kenney’s	work	in	the	interwar	years	were	not	only	the	inspiration	for	Rex	Leeper’s	organisation,	but	also	formed	the	core	of	its	early	operations.	Kenney	found	that	propaganda	had	to	be	rebranded	into	cultural																																																									572	Taylor,	Philip	M.	Munitions	of	the	Mind:	A	history	of	propaganda	from	the	
ancient	world	to	the	present	era.	3rd	ed.	Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	2003.	p.	250.	
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diplomacy,	an	insight	which	doubtless	informed	the	very	foundation	of	British	Council	principles.	His	post-war	assertion	that	the	cultural	work	of	the	British	Council	was	no	different	to	the	propaganda	work	of	the	Ministry	of	Information	speaks	to	his	authority	on	the	matter	and	his	close	familiarity	with	the	organisation	he	had	helped	create.	It	is	of	course	true	that	in	both	of	these	cases,	there	is	no	way	of	testing	the	claim	that	Kenney	was	instrumental.	History	does	not	provide	the	luxury	of	isolated	variables.	Perhaps	NTB	would	have	been	remade	and	the	British	Council	would	have	arisen	just	as	they	now	are	even	without	Kenney’s	involvement.	The	thesis	has,	however,	presented	the	best,	currently	available	indications	to	the	contrary,	that	Kenney	did	indeed	significantly	influence	negotiations	and	did	indeed	create	the	circumstances	for	their	emergence.	In	a	very	concrete	way,	it	is	possible	to	strongly	suggest	that	Kenney	here	has	markedly	had	an	impact	beyond	his	own	active	years	on	the	practice	and	policies	of	propaganda.	In	a	much	more	indistinct	way,	it	is	certainly	possible	to	argue	that	his	work	also	influenced	the	creation	of	policy.	The	chapters	IV	and	VI	in	particular,	discussing	Kenney’s	general	wartime	work	in	relation	to	Norway,	has	laid	out	countless	examples	of	this	particular	agent	creating	local	policy,	enacting	his	own	initiatives	and	receiving	praise	for	his	own	ideas	and	practices.	In	some	cases,	there	are	even	requests	that	Kenney	export	his	method	or	teach	others.	An	underlying	and	subconscious	premise	of	the	thesis	has	rested	in	the	idea	that	policy	is	rarely	whisked	out	of	thin	air	in	governmental	meetings,	but	is	often	solidified	by	practices	and	actions	already	made.	Kenney’s	mission	to	Norway	in	the	First	World	War,	for	instance,	where	he	was	trusted	not	only	to	discover	the	necessary	actions	but	also	to	enforce	these,	is	an	excellent	example.	He	was	an	untrained	low-level	agent,	who	went	on	to	build	a	highly	effective	system.	It	is	difficult	to	imagine	that	the	lessons	learned	from	this	system	were	not	taken	into	account	in	the	creation	of	defined	policy.	It	is	impossible	to	determine	to	what	extent	Kenney’s	use	of	the	BBC,	for	example,	during	the	Second	World	War,	determined	the	policy	that	later	led	to	the	creation	of	the	covert	radio-propaganda	institution,	the	Information	
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Research	Department	of	the	Foreign	Office,	in	1948.573	Similarly,	it	is	impossible	to	confirm	or	deny	whether	it	was	Kenney’s	suggestion	to	Vansittart	in	1940,	that	an	unnamed	Norwegian	officer	should	be	trained	and	sent	on	sabotage	missions	to	Norway,	that	was	the	foundation	of	Lieutenant	Linge’s	important	role	in	the	Norwegian	resistance	movement.	It	is	unknowable	whether	Kenney’s	insight	that	propaganda	had	become	a	dirty	word	and	could	be	replaced	with	‘cultural	exchange’	at	all	influenced	the	fact	that	modern	propagandists	call	themselves	by	“cryptic	euphemisms,	‘image	consultants’,	‘public	relations	officers’,	‘spin	doctors’,	etc.”574	It	is	not	really	a	worthwhile	pursuit	to	attempt	to	assess	to	what	extent	Kenney’s	access	to	the	Norwegian	newspapers	in	the	First	World	War,	or	his	help	in	establishing	the	Norwegian	centre	for	information	in	Åndalsnes	in	April	1940,	or	his	countless	memoranda	outlining	what	should	and	should	not	be	done,	had	an	effect	on	propaganda	policy	and	development,	because	fundamentally,	simply,	they	did.	Modern	propaganda	has	become	what	it	is	because	of	the	work	of	thousands	upon	thousands	of	propagandists,	politicians,	spies	and	journalists.	Kenney	was	one	of	them.	His	legacy,	like	all	of	their	legacies,	is	evident	in	its	every	mutation.	
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